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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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**USSR REPORT
PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST
No. 4, 1980**

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND DETENTE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 3-13

[Text] The now traditional Crimean meetings of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, with the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the GDR, Laos and Mongolia took place in July and August 1980. Talks in Moscow with a party and governmental delegation from Socialist Vietnam took place somewhat earlier. The Crimean meetings of 1980 represented a continuation and development of the results of the Warsaw conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

The stronger solidarity and unity of the socialist states and their constantly increasing interaction in the implementation of plans for the construction of a new society and in the struggle for lasting peace on earth occupy a prominent place among today's major trends in world development.

The foreign policy of the socialist community nations is aimed chiefly at advancing detente, breathing new life into it, guaranteeing a resolute move away from the arms race and toward disarmament and accomplishing the just political settlement of existing conflicts.

There is no question that the Crimean meetings of 1980 will raise the level and expand the scales of the foreign policy coordination of socialist states. They clarify the specific goals of the coordinated actions of the friendly countries. The results of these meetings have been unanimously approved by the Soviet people, the working people of other fraternal countries and the progressive public throughout the world.

The Crimean meetings of 1980 marked a new stage in the consolidation of the socialist community, the establishment of more effective economic, political and ideological contacts between fraternal countries and the augmentation of the role of specialization and cooperation by means of coordinated long-range programs. The increasing contacts of the community nations will stimulate the development of their national economies and the fuller use of internal resources and the advantages of socialist relations.

The progress of the socialist community and the enlargement of its dimensions will certainly aid in attaining the objectives of internal socioeconomic development and the construction of socialism and communism, as well as the objectives of socialist foreign policy at a time of international complications and tension.

During the course of talks, the leaders of fraternal parties stressed that the reasons for these international complications were the following:

Reactionary circles in the United States and the NATO powers have resolved to put an end to the current approximate parity of military strength and ensure their own superiority to the socialist community, and they are even trying to revive the methods and arguments of the era of "classic imperialism";

The imperialists' partnership with the Beijing hegemonists, which centers around the further escalation of international tension for the sake of their own great-power, chauvinistic plans, is having a negative effect on international relations.

American foreign policy's abrupt turn for the worse--a turn toward the attempted revival of the methods of cold war and action "from a position of strength," open subversion of the cause of detente--and a disregard for the sovereignty of free nations--is not just a temporary aberration or a campaign maneuver. This is a result of the purposeful effort of the most reactionary circles of American imperialism to impede the process of progressive change in the world and to reverse this process. It will take a great deal of time and effort to defend and consolidate detente, which has put forth deep roots in the practice of international relations and has become firmly entrenched in the public mind. There is no question that these new trials will make it much stronger. A guarantee of this can be found in the labor and political enthusiasm and the constantly increasing social activity of the Soviet people on the threshold of the 26th party congress and their constant efforts to strengthen the economic and defensive might of our homeland.

The Soviet people have expressed unanimous support for party domestic and foreign policy. During the course of the nationwide socialist competition for a fitting tribute to the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet people are carrying out important tasks in the struggle to heighten production efficiency, improve the quality of work, accelerate the augmentation of labor productivity, strictly observe the rules of conservation and strengthen labor and state discipline. As attested to in the draft "Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1981-1985 and the Period Up to 1990," the line of heightening production efficiency and improving product quality will be adhered to consistently in coming years in the interests of the enhanced well-being of Soviet people, stronger economic support for CPSU social policy and a stronger material basis for the process of detente and the opposition of imperialist reaction's attempts to divert the socialist countries from the performance of constructive work.

People of goodwill in various countries are now reviewing the lessons of history with an eye on the future. These lessons are multifaceted--they are simultaneously tragic and reassuring. American atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 35 years ago, killing more than 300,000 people. The broad world public has always supported and sympathized with the tireless activity of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries in the struggle to prevent new tragedies of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki type and to improve the international situation.

The preservation of peace on our planet is the cardinal objective of our time. The Soviet Union and the fraternal countries are taking vigorous action in this direction and their efforts have produced beneficial results. In sober-minded

circles in the capitalist countries, especially in Western Europe, the conviction that the preservation of detente is of vital importance to the entire world, and to Europe above all, is gaining strength.

It is now becoming particularly obvious that the fraternal socialist countries were looking ahead when they centered their post-Helsinki foreign policy coordination around the supplementation of political detente with detente in the military sphere, the reduction of levels of military confrontation and the limitation and cessation of the arms race.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's personal contribution to the development and implementation of this policy line has been tremendous. His meetings with French President V. Giscard d'Estaing and FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt have conclusively demonstrated that a realistic approach, administrative wisdom, self-possession and determination, as opposed to artificially escalated emotions, produce beneficial results in the efforts to attain mutual understanding between states with differing social structures.

The Soviet Union's new constructive proposals regarding the rapid commencement of talks on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe in connection with the question of American forward-basing nuclear systems are another demonstration of goodwill and a sincere desire to preserve and consolidate peace on our planet. Consistency, adherence to principle, bold initiative, realism in negotiations, and the willingness to consider the legal rights and interests of others--these are the distinctive features of the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries perform in close interaction with one another in the international arena, and this interaction has introduced fundamentally new features into the development of international relations. The world public must give socialism the credit for the improvement of the international situation in the 1970's and for the establishment of detente as the chief tendency in the development of world affairs.

"Detente," the decree of the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum states, "is the natural result of the global balance of power that has taken shape in recent decades. The present military-strategic balance between the socialist world and the capitalist world is an achievement of fundamental historic significance.... All plans to disrupt this balance are destined to fail."

The new peaceful initiatives set forth by the Warsaw Pact countries aroused tremendous satisfaction in all those who cherish the peace and security of our planet because they are completely consistent with Lenin's idea of peaceful coexistence by states of differing social systems, which began with the Decree on Peace. Rejecting the imperialist policy of force and the oppression of some states by others, Soviet foreign policy is based on respect for the vital interests of all people and their sacred right to determine their own destiny.

The strong community of socialist states is a living embodiment of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. The communist parties of these countries are constantly striving to strengthen the unity and develop the cooperation of the fraternal countries and to consolidate our common international positions. The participants in the Crimean meetings stressed the fact that today, now that imperialist and reactionary forces are trying to

openly take the offensive against detente, against peace and against the rights of people, the concerted effort of the socialist countries to defend these most valuable entities is more important than ever before.

The entire history of Soviet foreign policy has proved that this policy reflects the deepest interests of the broad masses. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed that "the strength of our policy lies in the fraternal unity of our countries, our parties and our people, in our fidelity to the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of socialist internationalism. The strength of our policy lies in the fact that it is in the vital interest of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world, all those who need peace rather than war, all those who cherish construction rather than destruction, all those who want cooperation and mutual understanding between nations rather than alienation and hostility." The words pronounced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in Alma-Ata have been broadcast throughout the planet: "The foreign policy of our country is a clear and honest policy of peace and is not directed against anyone else. We are not encroaching upon anyone else's land, we are not interfering in anyone else's internal affairs. But we will always defend our own rights and legal interests."

The Soviet Union has adhered to the Program of Peace, adopted by the 24th and 25th congresses of our party. In this way, great successes were achieved in the 1970's. Socialism's influence was expanded and strengthened, the international atmosphere became healthier, and excellent conditions were established for the reliable safeguarding of public security and for advancement by means of the curtailment of the arms race. At the turn of the decade, however, the people of the world had to deal with a frenzied counterattack by reactionary and imperialist forces. They do not want to accept irreversible historic changes or the new balance of power in the world.

The nations of the socialist community and the international communist movement must not lose sight of the fact that imperialist and reactionary forces are continuing intensive material preparations for war. The scales of today's arms race are tremendous--around a billion and a half dollars is spent on weapons each day in the world. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries do not believe that war is inevitable but they cannot ignore the imperialist states' efforts to accumulate and constantly perfect and update weapons.

Imperialist reaction, with U.S. ruling circles at its head, is taking more and more new and dangerous steps to resurrect power politics and replace the spirit of Helsinki with the spirit of cold war. What is the reason for the military passion that reigns in the White House? What has motivated President Carter's and his associates to unceremoniously disregard Washington's international obligations to the detriment of the United States' own interests and to reject all of the good that was accumulated in the years of detente through the efforts of many nations and governments? These questions were answered by former Secretary of State C. Vance. When he spoke at Harvard University on 5 June 1980, he mentioned the prevailing nostalgia for the "good old days" in American ruling circles and their nonacceptance of a world which is undergoing rapid changes and in which Washington, alas, no longer enjoys "absolute power." The leaders of the NATO military bloc, and the U.S. leaders above all, are taking active steps to torpedo the strategic balance between East and West in their own favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, against the interests of

detente and international security. They want to return the world to the days of politics "from a position of strength."

In May 1978, the NATO countries were pressured by the United States to agree to an automatic annual increase in their military expenditures up to the end of this century, and in December 1979 they consented to the production of new American medium-range nuclear missiles and the deployment of these missiles in Western Europe. At that time, Washington adopted a new multibillion-program for the accelerated buildup of its weapons.

The prolonged delay in the ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (SALT II) is clear proof of the militaristic policy of the United States. The new presidential directive No 59 reaffirms that Washington has no intention of renouncing its militaristic policy that envisages the delivery of an initial nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. This directive has aroused objections both in the United States and in the Western European countries, particularly those which have been assigned the role of nuclear hostages in the Pentagon's plans. Washington's new plans, as West German General G. Bastian remarked in a public debate organized jointly by the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, will essentially redistribute the "degree of risk" within the Atlantic Alliance. The United States is building up its potential for a nuclear strike against the USSR but would like to transfer all of the risk connected with nuclear war to Western Europe, particularly the FRG, where the main forces of the new nuclear missile complex are to be concentrated. General Bastian logically refuted the false allegation that the U.S. decision was a "reaction" to Soviet actions, noting that the deployment of the new medium-range American missiles in the FRG would actually represent a new and dangerous level of arms race escalation.

Equally important evidence of the increasingly aggressive nature of White House policy can be found in the creation of the "rapid deployment force"--a new instrument of imperialist authoritarianism, the provocative actions taken against Iran and other countries and the feverish search for locations for new military bases. It is also attested to by Washington's openly imperialistic declaration that some parts of the world, mainly those rich in oil, are "spheres of vital importance to the United States." Actions of this kind, as USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stressed, resemble the morals of the American "Wild West."

In this way, militaristic circles in the West are vigorously pushing their governments into further intensification of the arms race and the active use of military force in international politics. One of the reports of the Rand Corporation, which is always giving advice to military-industrial monopolies and the Pentagon, states: "As a superpower destined by history to lead the world, the United States can be expected to use its military strength to prevent the collapse of world order or at least to defend the specific interest of American citizens if they are not protected by international law." This leads to the conclusion that "increasing attention must be given to the development of doctrine and plans for weapons and the structure of the armed forces in the expectation that military force could be used in some kind of critical situation."

The present U.S. line in the world arena is reflected in paradigm in the so-called "Carter Doctrine," which describes the American ruling clique's move toward an aggressive and militaristic policy, toward a revival of the cold war. This "new" military and political doctrine symbolizes Washington's latest attempt to attain its foreign policy objectives primarily by means of force. The methods used include intervention in the internal affairs of other states, the provocation of international conflict and other actions leading to international complications. The main feature of this line is the emphasis on military force in all of its various forms--from threats and militaristic shows of strength to overtly aggressive actions.

Imperialist propaganda is bending over backwards to justify NATO's present line, attempting to convince the general public that the events in Afghanistan are the reason for the current increase in international tension. But the complication of the world situation did not begin with the events in Afghanistan, but with the reversal in White House policy, which started with new plans for the arming of NATO, the buildup of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and other steps aimed at changing the existing balance of power in the world and suppressing the growing struggle of people who want to be free of imperialist oppression. Here it would be wise to recall V. I. Lenin's statement that there are "stupid people who pretend that they believe in this stupidity and who fling accusations right and left, employing their legal knowledge to invent false arguments and pull the wool over the eyes of the masses."

But times change, and more and more people in the West are now realizing where the real cause of the Afghan events lies. The Soviet Union sent a limited military contingent to Afghanistan after numerous requests from the legitimate government of this country. This step was taken because some neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, with the aid of the United States and China, are taking armed action against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, is striving to launch a counteroffensive on a broad front. The frenzied arming of NATO states, the various attempts to suppress the revolutions in Afghanistan and Iran, the increasingly intensive military penetration of Asia and Africa by the United States, the intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries and the deeper political and military cooperation with China are all links of the same chain.

The participants in the 1980 Crimean meetings underscored the vital need to normalize the situation in Asia and discussed considerable achievements in the reinforcement of socialist position on this continent.

One of the distinctive features of political life in Asia is the increasing desire of the people for peace and peaceful cooperation, social progress and the protection of national sovereignty. At the same time, forces opposed to the freedom of the Asian people are openly and dangerously active in this region. The U.S. imperialists and the Chinese hegemonists, each in their own way, are seriously poisoning international relations in Asia and are striving to preserve and escalate conflicts--in the Middle East and in connection with Iran, the April revolution in Afghanistan and the progressive changes in Indochina. The situation is disturbing in Southeast Asia, where the hegemonism of Beijing, supported by the United States, is interfering with the creation of a zone of peace and

stability and with the establishment of normal relations between all countries in this region. The peaceful and principled approach of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, which is in the interest of all Southeast Asian countries, is playing an important role in the regulation of relations here. Lasting peace in Asia could serve effectively to improve the world political climate. But the Chinese leadership is openly demonstrating its move to a pro-imperialist foreign policy line, which is aimed (in conjunction with or parallel with imperialism) at exacerbating the world situation and undermining international detente--a line directly aimed at creating a global anti-Soviet alliance. Beijing has become the chief organizer and inspirer of counterrevolution, a servant of imperialism and the striking force of world reaction in Asia, and in Southeast Asia in particular. Preparations for the development of a neutron bomb have been announced in the PRC. In essence, the chauvinistic, great-power and militaristic purpose of the "Four Modernizations" is not being concealed. Although the PRC is ranked 40th in the world in terms of per capita national income, it ranks 3rd in terms of military spending.

In their military and political plans, imperialist circles in the West, especially the United States, are relying more and more on playing the "China card" and on using, in their own interest, the policy of the Chinese leadership, which is permeated with great-power ambition, is hostile to the socialist community and is contributing much to the escalation of international tension.

When a U.S. military and political delegation, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Perry, visited the PRC in September of this year, people in Washington called this trip the "most significant" in the history of the developing American-Chinese relations in the military sphere. During talks in Beijing, according to a UPI report, plans were drawn up for the modernization of China's huge military machine and for the establishment of two American military observation stations in China for the purpose of military intelligence against the Soviet Union. This, according to India's NEW WAVE weekly, represented another step in the creation of the threatening Washington-Beijing military alliance.

Imperialism's partnership with Beijing hegemonism is a dangerous phenomenon in world politics--dangerous for all mankind, including the people of the United States and China. The Beijing leadership's vehement hatred for the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community is regarded by U.S. ruling circles as a major trump card in the military and political game.

For a long time, the Beijing leadership has been trying to put together the "broadest possible united front" with the participation of all reactionary forces for a struggle against the Soviet Union and against world socialism. Beijing is trying to justify its position with references to the imaginary "threat to China from the North." The groundlessness of this fantasy is attested to by the USSR's numerous attempts to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union is not to blame for the present state of the relations between our countries. The USSR always gave the Chinese revolution its closest attention and gave the Chinese people real assistance in their struggle against imperialism and in their construction of a new life. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed: "We would like to have normal, friendly relations with this country. We have said this before and we are now saying it again. But the relationship between any two states must be built from both sides."

It was not the imaginary "threat from the North," but absolutely different factors, namely a chauvinistic and great-power policy line, that led Beijing to its alliance with the enemies of socialism and the liberation movement.

This has resulted in such dangerous international conflicts as China's attack on Vietnam, the present subversive activity in Afghanistan, Iran and Kampuchea and the concentration and increasing activity of U.S. air and naval forces in the Persian Gulf zone.

The Soviet Union is keeping a close watch on the development of events in China. There are serious internal changes taking place in this country at present. "They," L. I. Brezhnev stressed, "are visible, as they say, even to the untrained eye. It is probably too early to assess their actual significance. It is clear, however, that some Maoist concepts connected with the theory and practice of the nation's internal development, which have nothing in common with socialism, are already being criticized openly or in secret in China. The notorious Cultural Revolution, for example, is already being described openly as the greatest catastrophe for the Chinese people."

But something else is also obvious. None of these changes have affected the main factor—China's hegemonic and aggressive policy line in the world arena. What is more, reinforced by the campaign for the so-called "Four Modernizations" and by the weapons and credit of bourgeois countries, this line is becoming even more dangerous.

Chinese policy is definitely aimed against detente and broad-scale international cooperation. It is helping to escalate international tension and is sabotaging practical steps to stabilize the world situation. The Beijing leaders' present statements about the advantages of peace and about the "postponement" of world war are nothing other than a propagandistic trick, a brand of demagogery intended to deceive the public. Maoist strategy, which is supposed to guarantee China a leading position in the world, has remained unchanged. This is attested to by the results of the recent visits by Premier Hua Guofeng of the PRC State Council to Japan, Vice Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council to the United States and PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua to Western Europe. China's hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community is viewed as a major trump card in Washington's military and political game. There have been reports about the plans of American and Japanese monopolies to invest tens of billions of dollars in China. Given Beijing's present policy, it is obvious that these funds will be used primarily for the further militarization of the country. Of course, this is not yet a military alliance in the literal sense, but this kind of Chinese convergence with imperialism in today's international situation will create an extremely dangerous state of affairs.

Peace-loving people are naturally disturbed by the further development of the Beijing leadership's dangerous alliance with the aggressive circles of the United States, NATO and Japan and the expansion of the military ties connecting the imperialists with Beijing. When U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown holds forth on the "Soviet military threat," he stresses, according to the JAPAN TIMES, the importance of concerted action by the United States, the European NATO countries, Japan and China in the military sphere. It is no secret that this kind of alliance on an anti-Soviet basis is the cherished dream of the Beijing leaders.

After all, in our day Beijing has fervently supported the "NATO-ization" of Western Europe, praised the growth of American military presence in Asia and encouraged Japan to rearm and to play a more important role in the "Security Treaty" system.

Beijing is also frightening the Japanese with references to the "threat from the North" in order to justify the existence of real, and not imaginary, sources of danger--the American military bases in Japan--and in order to compel Tokyo to take an anti-Soviet stand. But Japan's geographic location forces the people who have lived through the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to look at things more objectively. In the nuclear age, it is in Japan's vital interest to turn the Pacific Basin into a zone of peace and friendship rather than a center of global contradictions, a seat of conflicts and an arena of political intrigue.

The main issue of the late 1970's and early 1980's is the issue of the fate of detente. The Soviet Union believes that detente is a result of deep-seated objective factors and the balance of economic, political and military power in the world. This balance of power has not undergone any radical change.

The major moral and psychological factors have not changed either. The ideas of detente and peaceful coexistence have gained a firm foothold in the minds of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people of different races and nationalities, of different classes, of a different social status and with different outlooks. They have already become an important element of contemporary international life and have put out strong roots. And the statement that there is no reasonable alternative to detente is not simply a collection of words, but a confirmation of the real state of affairs in the world. We are already justified in concluding that Washington's political line of undermining detente will not and cannot give its initiators what they want. Public opposition to the policy of adventurism and the arms race is mounting in the Western countries, and demands for the preservation and reinforcement of detente are being voiced more widely. All of this is seriously limiting the possibilities of U.S. aggressive circles.

There has been a perceptible sobering-up process in the West recently. There has been a period of reflection, during which many sober voices have been raised in ruling circles to question U.S. policy and assert that only detente can hold out the hope of a life without military conflicts and of the gradual curtailment of the arms race. Evidence of this can be found, in particular, in the resignation of former Secretary of State Vance and several State Department officials.

As for the Soviet Union, it is still consistently advocating the relaxation of international tension and defending detente, peace, friendly relations and co-operation between different states. Although detente is now being attacked from various sides, it can and must be defended. We want it to take on a universal nature, we do not want it to be limited to the framework of blocs, we want all countries without exception, large and small, to participate equally in detente and we want it to encompass all parts of the world and all spheres of international relations.

The intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace call for constant vigilance and activity by peace-loving forces in all countries and a struggle against imperialism's plans to achieve military superiority and rule the world.

Recently published Soviet documents and proposals contain a concrete and constructive program of measures to liquidate seats of tension and put an end to international trends that are dangerous for all nations. They are aimed at setting up an insurmountable obstacle to prevent a new war and guaranteeing the triumph of the ideas of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation by states with differing social structures. These measures envisage the broad-scale development of diplomatic contacts, the organization of meetings and consultations and the unification of all democratic movements and organizations around the cause of peace.

One important new peaceful Soviet initiative is set forth, in particular, in the draft resolution "On Some Immediate Steps to Reduce the Danger of War," which USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko submitted to the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly. These proposals are intended to augment the efforts to preserve and reinforce international detente, prevent war and effectively block the reckless escalation of the arms race and all attempts to gain unilateral military advantages.

On behalf of the Soviet Union, A. A. Gromyko also submitted a memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security" to the session of the UN General Assembly. In this memorandum, the Soviet Union appeals to all states to abandon any kind of opportunistic considerations and plans, whether internal or external, to renounce attempts to achieve military-strategic superiority and hegemony on the global or regional scale, and to realize that the vital interests of all people consist in eliminating the danger of a nuclear catastrophe and in guaranteeing a peaceful future.

The memorandum sets forth an extensive program of measures whose implementation will be essential for the all-round improvement of the international situation. It discusses such issues as the curtailment of the nuclear arms race, the need to renounce the use of force in international relations, the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the prevention of accidental and unauthorized attacks, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other major international issues.

The Soviet people are entering this new decade with an optimistic view of the future. As A. A. Gromyko said: "We will continue to make every effort to preserve detente and everything good that the 1970's brought us, to accomplish a move toward disarmament, to support the right of people to free and independent development and to preserve and consolidate peace."

Most of the Asian and African countries have pointedly criticized the military activity of Washington and its allies on these continents, have suggested specific ways of liquidating military bases and are insisting that the Western powers abandon their policy of intervention, authoritarianism and blackmail. Washington's hegemonic ambitions were resolutely rebuffed in the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean, virtually all of the littoral and continental states have demanded the liquidation of military bases in this region and they want to put an end to the United States' intention to establish itself as the world's policeman. The desire of the littoral states to guard their sovereignty against encroachment by imperialist powers and to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation has been widely supported by the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist community.

Our country has taken a consistent and principled stand on the issue of foreign military bases in this region. It was quite clearly set forth in L. I. Brezhnev's report at the 25th CPSU Congress. "In recent years," L. I. Brezhnev stressed at that time, "more and more people in a number of countries have declared that the Indian Ocean must not become an arena for the establishment of military bases by any power. We sympathize with these declarations. The Soviet Union has never had any intention to build military bases in the Indian Ocean. We call upon the United States of America to take the same position." It is obvious that the liquidation of military bases would create a qualitatively new atmosphere for the positive resolution of problems connected with the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and the establishment of lasting peace in this region.

Imperialist policy, which is contrary to the fundamental interests of people, is destined to fail. In the fierce confrontation with militarism, fighters for peace and progress will resolutely defend man's most sacred right--his right to live--and there is no question that they will ultimately win this fight.

Under present conditions, the most important and urgent task is to keep imperialist power politics from replacing detente and to keep the fly-wheel of the arms race from gathering new and dangerous momentum. This task is feasible. The objective possibilities and sociopolitical forces needed for its accomplishment do exist, and these forces recognize their responsibility for the fate of mankind. Washington's attempts to bury detente and to push the world back into the clutches of the cold war have been rejected by the masses. The most diverse circles, including some among the United States' allies, recognize the need to preserve and strengthen detente, to ensure peaceful international cooperation and to curb the arms race. Past experience has proved that no one serious problem on earth has ever been solved by the rattling of sabers. The only reasonable course is the course of negotiations based on strict observance of the principles of equality and equivalent security.

Now, more than ever before, people must be highly vigilant and all forces must be mobilized to fight against the adventuristic plans of the enemies of peace, to preserve and reinforce detente and to guarantee mankind a peaceful future. The day of anti-war demonstrations, held on the 41st anniversary of the start of World War II, indicated that increasingly broad segments of the public are joining the noble peace movement. Mass demonstrations by people of goodwill took place in dozens of countries to demand the curtailment of the arms race, the exposure of its instigators in Washington, NATO and Beijing and to support the constructive and peaceful initiatives of the socialist countries. Under present conditions, the unit^v and energetic action of the international communist movement and the cooperation of the fraternal parties in the struggle for peace and social progress and against imperialism and its aggressive, misanthropic plans are acquiring tremendous significance.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are resolutely countering the imperialist doctrine of arms race and war hysteria with a doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and security on earth. Our people totally and unanimously approve of the Leninist peaceful policy line of the CPSU and the Soviet State. The Soviet Union will continue to adhere to this line--purposefully, actively and unconditionally.

"Soviet communists are proud of themselves," L. I. Brezhnev stressed, "for taking on the difficult but noble mission of joining the front ranks of the fighters who want to save people from the dangers connected with the continuation of the arms race. Our party calls upon all people and all countries to unite their efforts to put an end to this fatal process."

Deeper and broader political dialog and contacts between countries with differing social systems are a tried and tested method of preserving and consolidating detente. On the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union set forth an entire series of new initiatives which will guarantee the further consolidation of the process of detente, continue and develop the great Program of Peace, which has accomplished so much in the struggle for peace in the 1970's, and afford opportunities to overcome difficulties and tension in world affairs in the 1980's.

The participants in the summer 1980 meetings in Crimea stressed that the complications in the process of detente, which arose as a result of imperialism's dubious alliance with hegemonism, are completely surmountable. There are no problems in Europe, Asia or other parts of the world that the socialist countries are unwilling to settle through negotiations. There is no doubt that the 26th CPSU Congress will mark another victorious stage in the struggle for peace and social progress. The new Soviet initiatives are in the vital interest of the people of our planet and are backed up by the definite achievements of the builders of a new world and the fighters for national and social liberation. The peace-loving states have enough strength and influence to overcome the dangerous escalation of tension and stabilize the international situation.

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THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S STRUGGLE AGAINST BEIJING'S GREAT-POWER INTERVENTION

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[Text] It is no coincidence that the JCP is now waging an intense struggle against the great-power policy of the Chinese leadership. The beginning of this struggle dates back to the days when the Beijing leaders convinced the Japanese Communist Party to adopt the leftist-extremist line that severely split the party in 1950. The restoration of the unity of JCP ranks took almost 10 years of intense work by healthy party forces and its best theoretical personnel to assess accumulated experience correctly and to work out a new strategy and tactical line which would guarantee Japanese democratic forces success in their advancement along the path of peace and social progress.

This line was worked out at the seventh party congress in 1958 and recorded in the JCP program that was ratified at the eighth party congress in 1961.

The party program proceeded from the fact that Japan was a dependent country and that its socioeconomic development depended largely on its military and political alliance with the United States, which was of an unequal nature. Under the conditions of the unprecedented social upheavals resulting from military defeat and postwar chaos, Japanese ruling circles had to agree to a broad-scale military and political alliance with the United States, viewing it as a guarantee of the preservation of their economic privileges and political power.

The leaders of the JCP have pointed out many times that the Japanese-American alliance formed after the war was mutually beneficial to Japanese and American ruling circles. Japanese monopolistic capital was striving, with U.S. aid, to regain its shaken positions in all spheres of economic and political life in the nation and to use American bayonets to protect itself from the wrath of the masses, who had been driven to extreme poverty. American imperialism, in turn, used Japan as a powerful military strategic base for the suppression of the national liberation movement that had taken on such broad scope in this part of the world.

The Japanese people were doubly oppressed--by local monopolistic capital and by American imperialism. This is why the decisions of the eighth congress pointed out the need for broad-scale struggle against two enemies--U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopolistic capital, which were closely connected with one another and were suppressing and exploiting the working class and the broad working masses in Japan.

Japanese-American reactionary forces, which were dealt a perceptible blow during the fight against the "Security Treaty" that broke out in 1959 and 1960, learned the necessary lessons from this, along with Japanese ruling circles, and began to concentrate on destroying the unity of democratic forces and isolating the JCP from its allies--the JSP [Japan Socialist Party], Sohyo and other democratic forces. American and Japanese special services intensified their subversive activity in mass organizations and directed their main strike against the JCP. They began to use the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the National Council of Trade Unions (Zenro). With the aid of these rightist reformist organizations, American politicians and Japanese ruling circles tried to create a new anticommunist current within the socialist party, the General Council of Trade Unions and the Council of Independent Trade Unions and among scientific and cultural spokesmen who took part in the struggle against the "Security Treaty."

In conjunction with anti-party elements that had been expelled from the JCP and with the aid of their lopsided "theory of anti-monopoly struggle," which underestimated the importance of struggle against imperialism, including struggle against the "Security Treaty," the rightist reformists tried to reduce the entire democratic movement to a fight against monopolistic capital. They armed themselves with the "theory of structural reform," which excluded the possibility of direct confrontation with American and Japanese reactionary forces, and placed their hopes in voluntary concessions by the government and monopolistic capital. The rightist leaders of the JSP began to introduce this reformist line into the peace, democratic and labor movements.

The growing strength of the rightist current within the JSP led to the disintegration of the organization for collective struggle against the "Security Treaty." The national council for struggle against the Security Treaty and in defense of peace and democracy, which resumed its activity in March 1961, was actually paralyzed in 1963. This was largely a result of the split that had taken place in the movement for a ban on nuclear and hydrogen weapons.

A new factor which complicated the situation in the democratic movement was the creation of anticommunist centrist political parties in 1961--the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito Party, which took on the ignoble duty of carrying out Japanese and American reactionary plans to divide leftist forces.

At the same time, the directive of the Eighth JCP Congress on the need for struggle against two enemies was opposed by external forces, under the influence of which leftist opportunist elements, which had existed in the party since the time of its split in 1950, began to interpret the party program in such a way that American imperialism was the only enemy of the Japanese people and should be the only target of the struggle of Japanese revolutionary forces. As for the second enemy--Japanese monopolistic capital, which was the chief exploiter of the Japanese working class and other laboring segments of the population, and which conducted a policy of the most cruel repressive action against progressive forces in the nation--Japanese sectarians and dogmatists, under the influence of the Chinese Communist Party, tried to prove that the fat and wealthy Japanese monopolies were also victims of American imperialism and could serve the working class as "allies" in the struggle for the freedom and national independence of the Japanese people.

To corroborate this allegation, the concept of the so-called "intermediate zone" was invented in Beijing. With the aid of this concept, an attempt was made to replace the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of confrontation between the two systems, socialism and capitalism, with a nationalist description, according to which there were two intermediate zones between the United States and the socialist countries. The Maoists said that the first zone, "the main zone of revolutionary storms," consisted of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, while the second zone took in the developed capitalist Western European countries, Japan, Australia and Canada, which had supposedly "turned into an object of oppression by the United States" and, by virtue of this, were taking an anti-American and anti-imperialist stand.

By setting forth this "theory," the Maoists were trying to promote the creation of an "anti-American patriotic united front," which would include not only the struggling people, but also countries in the imperialist camp. In an attempt to win Japanese monopolistic capital over to their side, the Maoists resolved to set up this kind of anti-American patriotic united front in Japan first and took energetic action to encourage Japanese democratic forces to accept this theory. The Maoists hoped to include the Japanese monopolies as well as leftist parties and mass organizations of Japanese workers in this front, and to thereby unite the exploited and their exploiters in a single organization.

By alleging that this "intermediate zone" took in not only Japan, but also the Western European countries, on the grounds that there were American troops on their territory or that they were members of the NATO military and political bloc, Beijing was trying to assign colonial or semicolonial status to developed capitalist countries that had entered the stage of imperialist development long before. This harmful anti-Marxist theory is completely refuted by actual conditions in Western Europe and in Japan. If all of the countries where American troops are stationed can be called colonies or semicolonies, it would be easy to come to dangerous conclusions about the disappearance of world imperialism.

The CCP leadership has directed most of its criticism against commonly accepted assessments of the world affairs and the objectives of the international communist movement. The Maoists are trying to convince the fraternal parties to accept their anti-Marxist views on such important issues as the nature of the present era, its chief contradictions and the main forces of the world revolutionary movement; war and peace; strategy and tactics in the world revolutionary process; the forms and methods of struggle against imperialism; peaceful and non-peaceful forms of transition from capitalism to socialism; the combination of national and international objectives in communist party activity; the absolutization of the Chinese revolutionary experience, and so forth.

At the end of 1962 the Chinese leadership began to publish a series of articles against the fraternal parties (Italian, French, American, Indian and others). The basic views of the CCP were summarized in a letter of the CCP Central Committee of 14 July 1963. It was given the pretentious title of "A Proposal on the General Line of the International Communist Movement" and was addressed to the CPSU Central Committee. During the course of the ensuing debates, the CCP leadership published nine articles with the CPSU as their direct target. Although these articles wore a Marxist disguise, the Maoist leadership demonstrated its break with Marxism-Leninism and its attempt to replace this great and absolutely

superior doctrine with the petty bourgeois nationalist concepts that were called the "Thought of Mao Zedong." The CCP leaders tried to represent Maoism as the modern version of Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP as the center of the world communist movement. The parties that accepted Maoist concepts in one form or another were pronounced "truly Marxist-Leninist," while those who firmly defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism were called "revisionists" and it was alleged that they had surrendered to American imperialism.

The CCP leaders then moved on from purely polemical methods of struggle to overtly propagandistic methods and, finally, to purely political forms of struggle against the CPSU and the other fraternal countries. The main content of this struggle was rabid anti-Sovietism, in all its forms and varieties. The most characteristic features of the struggle against the CPSU were the demand for political and organizational separation from the CPSU and the other communist parties that had "betrayed the cause of revolution"; the refusal to engage in any kind of united action with the CPSU in the struggle against imperialism; open intervention in the internal affairs of the CPSU and the Soviet Union; attempts to discredit the CPSU and undermine the authority of the Soviet Union in the international arena; a provocative policy intended to aggravate the international situation; the creation of armed conflicts and the attempt to bring about an armed conflict between the USSR and the United States. These basic features of the Maoist struggle against the CPSU and other fraternal parties were later supplemented with new propagandistic theses and forms of political struggle.

Not wishing to limit themselves to the propagandization of their pseudo-Marxist, but actually great-power views and rejecting all of the proposals of fraternal parties regarding united action against imperialism, the Beijing leaders openly tried to split the communist parties by encouraging the formation of various subversive parties and splinter groups. The actual course of events, however, completely refuted all of the Maoists' theories, and the schismatic groups created in various countries with their assistance are dragging out a miserable existence and are on the verge of complete disintegration. In time, the Maoists themselves realized the groundlessness of their theories. They had to discard most of them in their entirety and considerably modify some others. Many of the tenets that were subjected to the most merciless criticism by the Maoists were quickly Sinized and reclaimed. A similar process took place in politics. Yesterday's sworn enemies became intimate friends, and former friends were called irreconcilable enemies.

The JCP, fighting a struggle on two fronts--against the rightist social democrats and against their allied leftist-extremist elements with Maoist leanings--conducted a line of struggle against two enemies: American imperialism and Japanese monopolistic capital. It mobilized the masses for an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly democratic revolution, striving to unite the efforts of all liberation forces and create a united front.

The JCP's position of independence and self-sufficiency was first set forth at the Seventh Plenum of the JCP Central Committee in October 1963. The plenum discussed the state of affairs in the international communist movement and defined the JCP's stand in the debates of that time between the CCP on one side and the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties on the other.

An official publication of the JCP entitled "Fifty Years of the Japan Communist Party" defines the party's position in regard to these disagreements in the following way:

"From the very beginning of the international debate, the party clearly expressed its consistent position of struggle against the aggression and war of American imperialism, adhered firmly to an independent and self-sufficient position, which permitted neither the imitation of another country's party nor interference by other parties in its internal affairs, except for the increased interference of the Seventh Central Committee Plenum (Eighth Congress), which began in October 1963, and thoroughly studied the international situation and the international communist movement in addition to current political issues.

"The resolution adopted by the Seventh Plenum on the international communist movement explained that the independent, self-sufficient position of the JCP was not a neutral or passive position in regard to the disagreements in the international communist movement, but an active search for the truth, a fight against erroneous tendencies and a contribution to genuine international solidarity. It was a firm position, permitting no intervention by any foreign party....

"Our party's position of independence and self-sufficiency stems from the party program, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and clarifying the general line of revolution in Japan, it stems from the revolutionary principles of the two policy-planning documents of the international communist movement, from principled independence in the study of the issues debated in the international communist movement, and a correct approach to these issues. This position signifies a desire to find the truth and to correctly determine the right and wrong views in each specific case."¹

The line of independence and self-sufficiency was reaffirmed at the Ninth JCP Congress (November 1964). The congress clarified the party line in relations with all democratic forces and approved the line of struggle against "leftist" and rightist opportunists. The congress also pointed out the need for more intense struggle to create an international united front against American imperialism's policy of war and aggression and spoke in favor of the unification of the international communist and democratic movements.

The congress specifically defined the party line and set forth the immediate objectives of the JCP under the slogan of the "four banners": the banner of the anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly, democratic revolution of the people; the banner of the national-democratic united front; the banner of the construction of a politically, ideologically and organizationally powerful and unified Japanese Communist Party; the banner of an international united front fighting for national liberation and peace and against imperialism, with American imperialism in the lead.

Current forms of dogmatism and sectarianism, which were still apparent in the actions of some party members, were subjected to principled criticism at the congress.

The accountability report of the JCP Central Committee condemned "the revisionists who are avoiding confrontation with American imperialism, who believe that the Japanese people's only enemy is Japanese monopolistic capital and who will

ultimately refuse to fight against it." It also pointed out the errors of those who "try to automatically adapt the demand for an international united front against American imperialism to Japanese conditions, deliver one-sided sermons about the 'anti-American patriotic struggle' and virtually refuse to fight against Japanese monopolistic capital."²

At the same time, the JCP leadership set forth the idea of creating a united anti-imperialist front for stronger opposition to the American aggression in Vietnam. Among the prerequisites for this kind of front, the JCP mentioned the need for joint action by the USSR and PRC, in the belief that the concerted action of the two largest socialist states and other peace-loving forces would force the American aggressors to retreat and stop their hostilities against the Vietnamese people. The Soviet Union made several proposals to the Chinese leadership regarding the organization of joint action in support of the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle, but Beijing refused to accept the Soviet proposals each time, on various pretexts.

The disagreements over Vietnam became increasingly serious because Mao Zedong's group in the CCP announced the theory of the "anti-imperialist, anti-Soviet united front," which regards the CPSU and the Soviet Union as the common enemies of the world's people, and launched a frontal attack against the anti-imperialist international united front, openly advocating a split in the international communist movement. Mao Zedong's group demanded that communist parties throughout the world and anticomunist forces submit to its leadership under the banner of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" and accept the theory of the anti-imperialist, anti-Soviet united front and the theory of "people's war," and attacked the parties that refused to do this by labeling them "revisionist" and "counterrevolutionary."³

To sound out the possibility of coordinated action by all peace-loving forces in support of Vietnam, a JCP delegation, headed by Party Secretary-General Kenji Miyamoto, visited the DRV, the PRC and the DPRK in February and March 1966. At the time of the Beijing visit, however, the Chinese leadership definitely rejected the JCP proposal regarding joint action against the American aggression in Vietnam. Instead, Mao Zedong raised the question of joint action that would not be directed against the United States, but against the CPSU and the Soviet Union, and tried to convince the JCP delegation that it was precisely the USSR that should be the main target of struggle and that the CPSU was supposedly a special detachment of American imperialism within the international communist movement.

Mao Zedong demanded that "the CPSU be ranked with American imperialism and that a struggle be launched in an anti-American and anti-Soviet united front," as one JCP document states.⁴ The CCP leadership insisted on deifying Mao Zedong and absolutizing his "Thought." The JCP delegation, with K. Miyamoto at its head, rejected the Chinese leaders' ultimatum as an unnatural and counterrevolutionary demand. The JCP representatives also disagreed with the Chinese opinion regarding the need to start a "people's war"--that is, a partisan movement--in Japan and to curtail all legal forms of struggle, particularly the parliamentary activity of the JCP.

The JCP delegation refused to sign a communique with the CCP on the grounds that it was unacceptable and it returned to Japan.

The history of the origins of the disputes between the JCP and CCP is described as following in a brochure entitled "The True Facts About the History of the JCP, Which Have Been Distorted by Anti-Party Elements That Have Left the Party": "As early as 1961, our party expressed its disagreement with China's idea of the inevitability of a split in the communist movement, and in 1963-1964 our party supported the organization of a conference to achieve united action against U.S. aggression in Vietnam and in other countries on the basis of the full consent and unanimity of all interested countries. The CCP declared, however, that 'it would be better not to hold' this conference. As for the international democratic movement, the CCP leadership essentially viewed it as a rostrum for the exposure of revisionism, while our party attached great significance to the success of united action against American imperialism's policy of aggression and war. This is apparent to anyone who makes a careful study of the two parties' documents and papers of that time. Differing views were also discussed within each party. In November 1965, the Chinese press printed an article proposing the creation of a 'united anti-American and anti-Soviet front' and the exclusion of the USSR from united action. What is more, all of those who did not agree with the Chinese proposal were accused of revisionism. This made the disagreement between the JCP and CCP even more acute."⁵

The Fourth Plenum of the JCP Central Committee was convened in April. It unanimously approved of the delegation's actions in the talks in Beijing and resolved to conduct a revolutionary line on the basis of independence and self-sufficiency. When AKAHATA newspaper reported on the plenum decision, it said that "the combination of proletarian internationalism with patriotism is acquiring increasing importance and the objective of independence and self-sufficiency is becoming increasingly urgent." Summing up the results of the plenum, the newspaper stated that the JCP should be guided by three principles in the international communist movement: "1) the defense of revolutionary principles and the standards of inter-relations between fraternal parties; 2) the defense of an independent and self-sufficient stand based on Marxism-Leninism; 3) consistent struggle against contemporary revisionism, dogmatism and sectarianism."⁶

Not all party members understood the decision of the Fourth JCP Plenum correctly, however. Some top officials departed from the party program stipulations regarding the creation of a united anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly front, adopted at the eighth party congress, and, in particular, took the wrong stand on the strike organized by trade unions during the Spring Struggle of 1964. Their negative attitude to the major strike planned for 17 April 1964 was due to the fact that K. Miyamoto and other members of the Politburo were not in the country at that time, and some party leaders (Katsumi Kikunami and others) decided to establish the so-called "united anti-American patriotic front" that Mao Zedong and the CCP were then imposing on the Japanese people as the chief objective of their struggle. At the time of that strike, as the abovementioned brochure notes, the importance of the workers' economic struggle against monopolistic capital was underestimated, and everything was viewed from the standpoint of struggle against American imperialism. As a result of all this, the prevention of the strike eventually came to be regarded as the chief objective. This error was due to "servile compliance with the instructions of a foreign party."⁷

The rebuff dealt to the Maoist leadership during the talks in Beijing and during the discussion of several major aspects of world development and the international communist movement at the Fourth Plenum of the JCP Central Committee resulted in a CCP campaign of "brutal attacks on the Japanese Communist Party. The Maoists and their followers in Japan began to slanderously accuse the JCP and its leaders of "anti-Maoist" and "anti-Chinese" behavior, of "revisionism" and of "betrayal of the revolutionary cause." They unceremoniously intervened in the internal affairs of the JCP and mass democratic organizations and embarked on incendiary and subversive activity.

In summer 1966 they invited representatives from 15 countries, who had walked out of the 12th international conference for a ban on nuclear and hydrogen weapons, to Beijing and organized mass rallies in their honor. At these rallies, the decisions of the international conference convened by Gensuikyo were labeled "revisionist" and it was alleged that they did not have the force of law.

The Maoists made a special effort to control the youth movement in Japan, in an attempt to isolate it from the JCP and push it to the point of provocative extremist demonstrations. The Maoists focused on the League of Democratic Youth (Nihon minshu seinen domei), which they hoped to turn into an instrument of struggle against the Japan Communist Party. Only a sorry handful of renegades followed the lead of the Chinese schismatics, however. The League of Democratic Youth refused to organize a joint festival of friendship between Japanese and Chinese youth and firmly took the side of the party against all of the provocative tricks of the Maoists and their followers in Japan.

Maoist elements suffered an equally shameful defeat in the struggle for the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society. The schismatics had to leave the society and form a new organization, which was completely at the service of Beijing. Most of the participants in the movement for Japanese-Chinese friendship remained on the side of the JCP and are still advocating a policy of friendship with the Chinese people on a principled basis.

The Maoists also attacked the Japanese Committee for Solidarity with the Asian and African Countries, the Congress of Japanese Journalists and other organizations, most of whose members resolutely condemned the attempts of Maoist elements to subordinate the activity of Japanese mass organizations to Beijing's interests.

The Tenth JCP Congress in October 1966 amplified the concept of independence and self-sufficiency and corroborated the need for more intense struggle against Chinese intervention.

In his closing speech at the Tenth JCP Congress, K. Miyamoto clarified the meaning of the JCP's independent and self-sufficient position: "The independence and self-sufficiency of our party essentially presuppose two facts: Firstly, that this party is responsible for the revolution in Japan and must perform its work independently, building relations of genuine solidarity with all communist parties on this basis; in addition, the content of the party line is naturally consistent with real life in Japan."⁸ The Tenth JCP Congress did not call for open disagreement with the CCP, proceeding from the belief that it was necessary to unite the ranks of the international communist movement.

"In the hope of solving this problem quietly and behind the scenes, the congress did not resort to criticism and disagreements aimed directly against the Chinese leadership, which was interfering in its internal affairs. The tenth party congress, in spite of existing disagreements on the question of relations with foreign communist and workers parties and on several other important issues, reaffirmed the principled position of the JCP. This position consisted in efforts to achieve, as far as possible, united action in the struggle against a common enemy, on the condition that foreign parties would not attempt intervention and the destruction of the communist party and democratic movement in Japan."⁹

In spite of the JCP's wish, which was clearly expressed at the tenth congress, to restore normal relations with the CCP, the Beijing schismatics continued to expand their intervention in the Japanese democratic movement. In February 1967, Maoist elements from Japanese extremist groups and Chinese living in Japan attacked the central administration of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society, beat up society leaders and activists and committed several other acts of hooliganism.

Beijing continued to interfere in the internal affairs of the JCP, inviting Riuji Nishizawa and his followers, who had been expelled from the JCP, to come to China as honored guests. On the instructions of the CCP, they launched a frenzied campaign in Japan to undermine the communist party's influence with the Japanese people. With money from China, they published large quantities of literature in which the "Thought" of Mao Zedong was extolled and overt appeals for struggle against the JCP were made. The kind of insults the JCP was subjected to at that time by the Chinese mass media can be judged from the following hooliganistic statements in the Chinese press.

"The Miyamoto group is committing crimes against Chairman Mao and against the thought of Mao Zedong.... Does this not prove that they themselves have shamefully betrayed Marxism-Leninism by blindly following the lead of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism?"¹⁰

"The revisionist Miyamoto group in the JCP is now declaring a 'parliamentary course' and...undermining the anti-American patriotic struggle of the Japanese people.... It is becoming an accessory to the crimes of American-Japanese reaction."¹¹

In their hatred for the JCP, the Chinese Red Guards went as far as unconcealed violence against JCP representatives in Beijing. Ichiro Sunada, candidate for membership in the JCP Central Committee Presidium, and a special correspondent of AKAHATA newspaper, who were leaving Japan on the instructions of the JCP Central Committee as a sign of protest against Beijing's flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of the Japanese democratic movement, were brutally beaten at the Beijing Airport.

In response to these and other acts of violence against the JCP and its representatives, the party press published many articles to inform the entire world of the Maoists' actions in Japan and to criticize the leftist-extremist, essentially Trotskyist errors of the CCP leadership's adventuristic policy line.¹²

Correctly criticizing the Mao Zedong clique and the anti-party elements that were blindly following Beijing's orders for their negative attitude toward the use of parliament as one form of struggle for authority, the Tenth JCP Congress declared

that these people "have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, are attacking our party and are accusing it of degenerating into a 'parliamentary party.' But in our nation, where the parliamentary system and democracy, although they do have serious limitations, have taken on such developed forms, even more attention must be given to election campaigns and parliamentary activity. Without a strong parliamentary faction, our party would find it difficult to defend the interests of the working class and other working people and bring about changes in Japanese policy."¹³

In December 1966, AKAHATA described the subversive activity of Beijing's supporters against various Japanese democratic organizations under JCP control: "They (the Chinese and their supporters in Japan--I. K.), without any justification, are sling-
ing mud at the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Society, the Japanese Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, the Congress of Japanese Journalists, organizations connected with trade, the Japan Press publishing firm, the Kyokuto Shoten book sales company, the New Japanese Women's Society and other democratic organizations, and are conducting schismatic subversive activity under the guise of 'withdrawal' from these organizations."¹⁴

Then AKAHATA went on to say that a common feature of all of the subversive actions of Maoist elements was the tactic of withdrawal from the organizations they had joined and the attempt to form their own organizations. "Forgetting the real state of affairs in Japan," the newspaper stressed, "they employed flowery phrases about 'international friendship and solidarity' but actually absolutize the line and foreign policy of a 'certain socialist country' and the theory and practice of a 'certain leader of this country.'

"All of those who advocated genuine friendship on the basis of equality, independence and nonintervention in one another's internal affairs were accused of 'contemporary revisionism' by the Maoist stooges and were branded 'anti-Chinese elements.'" These actions by the Maoists, in the opinion of this newspaper, were nothing other than the "imposition of the policy line of a foreign state on Japanese democratic forces."¹⁵

The growing schism between the communist parties of Japan and China affected the sphere of Japanese-Chinese relations directly, especially the so-called "trade by friendly firms," which accounted at that time for around 60 percent of all trade between the two countries.

On 5 September 1966, the Chinese authorities requested representatives of three Japanese firms, Haga, Mitsumi and Sanshin, to leave the PRC by 7 September. These firms constituted the backbone of one of the largest Japanese organizations engaged in "friendly trade"—the Association for the Promotion of Trade Between China and Japan, which was connected with the JCP. The pretext used for deporting the representatives of these companies from the PRC was the criticism of these men by the Chinese authorities for their "reluctance to cooperate" in the preparations for a Chinese exhibit in the Japanese city of Kitakyushu. The process of the curtailment of trade by the Chinese later extended to other Japanese "friendly firms" supporting the JCP. At the same time, Chinese trade organizations began to give preference to Japanese firms which did not support the JCP and which were associated with the new pro-China groups and organizations in Japan, and expanded trade with them.

According to a report in the bourgeois newspaper SANKEI SHIMBUN, Chairman Liao Chengzhi of the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Society invited representatives of "friendly firms" to visit him on 29 September and told them that "China is in favor of the further development of friendly trade, but there are people in Japan who are interfering with this. Wearing masks, they have infiltrated Japanese-Chinese trade. We are now breaking off all relations with this group of people."¹⁶

In connection with these events, AKAHATA printed an editorial entitled "For the Correct Development of the Movement to Promote East-West Trade." It stated, in particular: "Some of our country's merchants are being asked whether they agree with certain positions and views on questions connected with anti-imperialist international united action and the united front, and questions relating to Japanese revolutionary tactics. Besides this, a situation has arisen in which the ideas of the leaders of a certain party are being elevated to the status of absolutes on the international scale from positions which demand that economic exchange be based on the propagandization of these ideas. The independence of the trade partner is being ignored, he is being forced to participate in this kind of propaganda, and those who express independent views on this matter are called 'unfriendly.'"¹⁷

During the course of the Cultural Revolution, increasingly loud voices were heard coming from Beijing, calling for the overthrow of the 'revisionist Miyamoto clique,' which was supposedly pushing the party into cooperation with American imperialism. Beijing soon included the JCP among its "four enemies."¹⁸

The Maoists were able to establish a number of small but extremely loud organizations in Japan, and these have definitely injured the democratic movement in the nation. The political line and tactics of these pro-Chinese organizations are distinguished by narrow-minded sectarianism, dogmatism and adventurism.

One of the largest Maoist organizations in Japan is the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party (Leftist) (Nihon kyosanto saha), headed by M. Fukuda, one of Beijing's most zealous followers and once the leader of the JCP party organization in the Yamaguchi Prefecture. The Beijing leaders hoped to overthrow the central party leadership with the aid of Fukuda and his disciples and to impose the "Thought of Mao Zedong" on the party as the philosophical line of the JCP. But this attempt failed. The party was able to resist the attacks of the Maoists headed by Fukuda, and this factional group suffered a crushing defeat. It is now dragging out a sorry existence and is managing to hold its head above water only by virtue of generous assistance from Beijing.

Another, equally malicious anti-party group is the National Committee of the Japan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) (Nihon kyosanto emei shugi zenkoku iinkai), headed by Kuraji Anzai, former member of the JCP Central Committee leadership. Acting as Beijing's protege, K. Anzai tried to destroy the party from within and to urge it to blindly follow the anti-Leninist, leftist-extremist orders of the Maoist leadership.

Another anti-party group working for Beijing is the Japan Communist Party (of Marxist-Leninists) (Nihon kyosanto marksu-reninshigisha), headed by famous schismatics and provocateurs T. Sumioka and T. Harada.

An AKAHATA article of 3 April 1980 contains stern criticism of the subversive activity of this pseudocommunist party. In particular, the article states that antiparty elements have been trying since the second half of the 1960's to sow the poisonous seeds of blind obedience to Beijing. "The group headed by T. Sumioka and T. Harada, who were expelled from the JCP long ago for working against the party and functioning as Chinese agents, set a fine example of a total lack of principles, with the exception of one--unconditional compliance with the wishes and whims of their Beijing masters for the purpose of undermining the JCP and the Japanese progressive movement."

On the basis of concrete facts, the newspaper exposes the maneuvers of the Chinese hegemonists in the last 14 years. This antiparty group began serving Beijing in 1966, in the struggle against the so-called "four enemies," and it has concentrated on slandering the CPSU and JCP. In the beginning of the 1970's, after then U.S. President R. Nixon's trip to China, Beijing's declaration of the notorious "Theory of Three Worlds" and its move toward alliance with Washington, the newspaper reports, China's lackeys in Japan stopped even their verbal condemnation of American imperialism and began to praise U.S. aggressive strategy as a "defensive" strategy. Following in Beijing's footsteps, this group took a 180-degree turn in its policy and reached the point of approval of the Japanese-American "Security Treaty" and the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces."

"In essence, the antiparty Sumioka-Harada group has only been consistent in one way--it has blindly followed the Chinese leaders in their great-power intervention and subversive activity in regard to the JCP. The Japan Communist Party will resolutely fight this kind of great-power intervention and the intrigues of the antiparty group, which is a product of this great-power intervention," the newspaper stressed in conclusion.¹⁹

The three groups mentioned above, which called themselves "communist," have been joined by a so-called "workers party," headed by old renegade T. Okuma. Aspiring to a special role in the workers movement, this "party" publishes its own press organ, RODOSHA ("Worker"), which is filled from start to finish with Chinese articles slandering the Soviet Union and the Japan Communist Party.

The active promoters of Chinese policy in the Japanese youth movement, particularly among students, are the Revolutionary Marxist Faction of Revolutionary Students (Kakumaru ha), the Nucleus Faction of the Revolutionary Student Union (Chukaku ha), the Faction of the Central Secretariat of the Fourth Internationale (Dai yon inta chuo shokikyoku ha), the Japan Anti-Imperialist Student Council (Zenkoku hentei gakusei hyogikai), the Union of Bund Communists (Bundo), the Red Army Faction (Sekigun ha) and some others.

Many of these organizations are connected with the right-wing underground and the Japanese authorities. They often act like gangs of common criminals: They commit political assassinations, bomb various government facilities, hijack airplanes, and so forth. The government is not taking any decisive measures to stop the provocative actions of these ultra-leftist organizations because bourgeois propaganda is skillfully using their crimes to discredit the JCP and the entire leftist movement.

The JCP is mobilizing its forces for a struggle against Beijing's subversive activity, and not only within Japan. It is consistently exposing the hegemonic ambitions of the great-Man chauvinists in the international arena and their anti-Soviet conspiracy with American imperialism.

Here is what First Deputy Chairman Tetsuzo Fuwa of the JCP Central Committee Presidium wrote: "The Chinese side has completely reversed its foreign policy line: It regards the Soviet Union as its chief enemy and, on this basis, has allied itself with American imperialism, has praised the Japanese-American 'Security Treaty' as a military alliance directed against the USSR, and also approves of the reinforcement of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Progressing in this direction, Chinese foreign policy has now reached the next stage in its escalation.

The pages of RENMIN RIBAO are now filled with all kinds of praise for the Japanese-American 'Security Treaty' and the fascist course of building up the nation's military strength (this attitude has been expressed in the most diverse cases, from the compilation of the 'Instructions on Joint Japanese-American Operations' to the preparation of legislation for emergency situations, the fifth plan of defense, and so forth). All of this is regarded as a means of resisting the Soviet 'threat.'

"Now the Chinese newspapers have begun to agitate for the revival of Japanese militarism and the reinforcement of the Japanese-U.S. military alliance in a tone that sounds as if it is coming from the hawks in the Liberal Democratic Party. In Europe, RENMIN RIBAO supports NATO, and extols to the high heavens all of the efforts made by the FRG and other countries to build up and strengthen their armed forces and weapons. In all parts of Asia and Africa where the United States has engaged in intervention, China has used the pretext of struggle against the USSR to assist the United States in the conduct of its imperialist policy. In this way, China has taken a pro-imperialist, pro-militarist stand."²⁰

JCP leadership resolutely opposes the attempts made by Beijing and Washington to draw Japan into their dangerous conspiracies against the cause of peace and the security of people. The JCP constantly reminds the people that Japanese territory could become a support point for aggression at any time if the broad masses relax their vigilance and cease to fight against the militarization of Japan, against the Japanese-American "Security Treaty" and against Beijing's attempts to involve Japan in its anti-Soviet strategy.

Speaking at a JCP Central Committee plenum (August 1979), K. Miyamoto said that more intense struggle against the Japanese-American military alliance was also needed because it was serving as the basis to strengthen the allied relations of the United States, Japan, China and South Korea. Miyamoto also pointed out the particular danger of Chinese hegemonism, which manifested itself in Beijing's aggression against Vietnam, and the tension escalated by the Maoist leadership around Indochina and throughout Southeast Asia.

Beijing's arrogant declaration of its intention to "teach Vietnam another lesson," the JCP campaign platform (August 1979) noted, "will only exacerbate the situation in Indochina and is intended to undermine peace in Asia and the rest of the world... and will benefit imperialist forces."²¹

The JCP's consistent struggle against the Chinese leadership's great-power intervention in the internal affairs of the nation's democratic movement, its fight against Beijing's attempt to impose its will on the Japanese people, and its exposure of the aggressive and great-power ambitions of today's Maoists are heartily approved by the broad working masses.

The 15th congress resolution and subsequent JCP documents stressed that the party will resolutely fight to the finish against China's great-power intervention and against the intrigues of the anti-party group that are blindly following China's orders.

Exposing the maneuvers of Japanese ruling circles in their attempt, along with the United States, to play the "China card" in the struggle against the USSR and all progressive forces in the world, the 15th JCP Congress underscored the following: "The LDP Government is constantly threatening its actual ally relations with China and South Korea, with the Japanese-American military alliance as their axis. This Japanese-U.S.-Chinese-Korean alliance has become the source of increased tension in Asia.... Ally relations with China have taken tangible form as a result of mutual support--as when Japan and the United States put up with China's aggression against Vietnam, and China supports the American-Japanese military alliance and the revival of Japanese militarism--and as a result of a joint propaganda campaign to condemn the three Indochinese countries."²²

The congress assigned a task to progressive, democratic forces: the continuation of the struggle against the reactionary foreign policy of the LDP, aimed at putting together a quadripartite alliance on an anti-Soviet, anticomunist basis. It called upon communists to do everything within their power to make the 1980's a decade of progress and reform in the nation and of victory for the united front and progressive forces in the democratic renovation of Japanese society and in the revision of national foreign policy in the interests of lasting peace and international security.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Nihon Kyosanto-no gojiunen," Tokyo, 1972, p 29.
2. ZENEI, January 1960, No 231, p 21 (special edition).
3. "Nihon Kyosanto-no gojiunen," p 47.
4. For more detail, see the JCP Central Committee brochure "Nihon Kyosanto-no yonjū go nen" [Forty-Five Years of the Japan Communist Party], Tokyo, 1967, p 93.
5. "Honto tenrakusha ga yugameru to-shi no shinjitsu" [The Truth About JCP History, Which Was Distorted by Anti-Party Elements Who Broke with the Party], Tokyo, 1978, p 29.
6. AKAHATA, 11 May 1966.

7. "Nanto tenrakusha ga yuganeru to-shi no shinjitsu," p 34.
8. "K. Miyamoto's Closing Speech at the 10th JCP Congress," ZENEI, 1966, No 258, p 94.
9. "Nihon Kyosanto-no gojiunen," p 196.
10. BEIJING RIBAO, 1967, No 50.
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 December 1968.
12. See the following articles in AKAHATA: "Our Definite Reply to Trouble-Makers" (21 August 1967); "Mao Zedong's Present Policy Line" (10 October 1967); "We Will Resolutely Defeat the Schismatic Maneuvers of Elements Who Blindly Follow the Orders of Foreign Forces" (6 December 1966); "We Condemn the Illegal Attacks and Intervention of RENMIN RIBAO and Others in the Affairs of Our Party" (19 March 1967); "The Mockery of the Japanese People's Struggle" (5 December 1968); "Nixon and American Imperialism" (21 August 1971); "Mao Zedong's Current Line and the International Communist Movement" (10 October 1967) and others.
13. ZENEI, 1966, No 258, p 74.
14. AKAHATA, 6 December 1966.
15. Ibid.
16. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 1 October 1966.
17. AKAHATA, 18 September 1966.
18. The three others were American imperialism, "Soviet revisionism" and Japanese militarism.
19. AKAHATA, 3 April 1980.
20. ZENEI, 1979, No 441, p 48.
21. PRAVDA, 22 October 1979.
22. AKAHATA, 1 March 1980.

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IN REFERENCE TO SOME CHANGES IN BEIJING'S DOMESTIC POLICY

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[Article by L. M. Gudoshnikov, doctor of juridical sciences, and R. N. Neronov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] Current domestic political developments in the PRC represent a complex and ambiguous process, resulting from the attempts of China's leaders to continue Mao Zedong's strategy of establishing a strong military-industrial power with modified methods, including the use of several reasonable forms of political and economic management that are aimed primarily at the more efficient conduct of this strategic line, now associated with the program of "Four Modernizations." The Third Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] and CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference], which completed its work in September 1980, and the preparations for the 12th CCP Congress, have graphically corroborated this process. These undertakings testify that the changes in the Chinese leadership's domestic policy reflect tactical maneuvers within the framework of a single strategic line in search of more efficient ways of attaining hegemonic goals. As early as the end of 1978, this leadership had already made dramatic changes in its basic domestic policy line and tried to work out a compromise version of "updated" Maoism.

The 11th CCP Congress, which recorded the thesis declared at the important all-China conferences of 1976-1977 in its documents, and the First Session of the Fifth NPC (February-March 1978) confirmed the line of "orthodox" Maoism, aimed at the artificial preservation and intensification of so-called "class struggle" throughout the "entire historical period of socialism." At the First Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Guofeng stressed: "The acceleration of socialist modernization in the four areas will require that class struggle be regarded as the decisive link and that we adhere firmly to the course of proletarian struggle against the bourgeoisie and to Chairman Mao's great theory of continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship."¹

Beginning with the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee (December 1978), however, the slogan "class struggle is the deciding link" was replaced by the announcement of a new "general objective": "The timely and resolute conclusion of the nationwide mass movement for the exposure and criticism of Lin Biao and the 'gang of four,' and the redirection of all party work and public attention to the need for socialist (in the Maoist sense--Author) modernization." With the conventional reference to a statement supposedly made by Mao Zedong in 1957, the plenum resolution renounced the "class struggle" that had constituted the chief method

of implementing domestic policy in Mao's lifetime: "In essence, we have already completed our broad-scale, stormlike, mass class struggle, and questions connected with class struggle...must be resolved in accordance with the policy line of strictly differentiating between two types of contradictions of varying character and regulating them correctly."²

The plenum communique stated that this reversal was a "broad and deep revolution" and appealed for the "further development of stability and unity" and the launching of a "new grand campaign" to turn the nation into "a great China" by the end of the century.

At the end of January 1979, the CCP Central Committee amplified plenum documents and resolved to remove the negative label from the "four evil categories" of urban and rural inhabitants--landowners, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries and "bad" elements.³ The "evil category" label was removed from their children and relatives as well. It was announced that the children and relatives of these individuals would no longer be subjected to any kind of discrimination in education, employment, the army, the CYL (Communist Youth League) or the CCP.

After the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, the rights of "rightist elements" repressed at the end of the 1950's were restored more actively. During the course of this work, which was conducted in accordance with the Central Committee decision to remove the label of "rightist element,"⁴ party committees and local authorities reviewed "cases involving rightist elements" and the rehabilitated individuals were offered suitable jobs at their previous salary.⁵

The decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum also cleared the path for the official modification of the status of the bourgeoisie in China. The members of this group are now categorized as "socialist laborers," and all of the bank deposits, material goods, high salaries and real estate confiscated from these individuals during the Cultural Revolution have been returned to them.⁶ At the Third Session of the Fifth NPC, the question of the private sector as a third sector of the economy, along with the state and cooperative sectors, was officially raised. Mao Zedong's directive that "class struggle is the deciding link, and everything else is dependent on this" and his postulate regarding the "three great revolutionary movements"--class struggle, production and scientific experimentation, with "class struggle" holding the dominant position--were completely paralyzed. After the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, the "deciding link" directive was modified in the following way: "The four modernizations are the deciding link." The first place among the "three great revolutionary movements" was no longer held by "class struggle," but by the "production struggle" and "scientific experimentation." The question of the chief contradictions in the Chinese society were also rephrased: "Class contradictions have objectively been transformed from the chief contradictions into secondary contradictions" and "the production struggle and scientific experimentation have naturally become the chief contradiction in society."

The revision of domestic policy methods in the decisions of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum aroused confusion and even resistance throughout China because the new vague definition of the chief contradiction in Chinese society and of class struggle was extremely confusing to local cadres and the pauperized masses in China, who made up the social base of "orthodox" Maoism. The ones suffering the

most from the "new" policy are the millions of rural inhabitants. The Maoists have maintained the system of equal distribution in rural areas--that is, they are supplying rural inhabitants with only their minimum food requirements. These are the poorest strata in rural China, individuals with large families, the disabled, the aged and so forth, who already constituted 20-40 percent of the rural population in the 1960's after which the group of underprivileged individuals grew even larger during the Cultural Revolution.

The current reversal in the sociopolitical line was recorded in the documents of the Second Session of the Fifth NPC (June-July 1979), the Fourth CCP Central Committee Plenum (September 1979), the Fifth CCP Central Committee Plenum (February 1980) and the Third Session of the Fifth NPC (August-September 1980). The ruling group's social reorientation toward skilled workers, the intelligentsia, the more prosperous (according to Chinese standards) peasant strata and bourgeois elements is arousing increasing confusion and opposition in the semi-indigent mass strata, who grew up believing in Mao Zedong's egalitarian priorities, and among low-level cadres. The methods of the post-Mao leadership are already conflicting sharply with many previous Chinese political axioms, and it is the latter that are being sacrificed. In September 1979, for example, the press first announced that the implementation of CCP agrarian policy would necessitate "a refusal to rely on poor peasants and the lowest strata of middle-income peasants to avoid the artificial expansion of class contradictions," as this "arouses passivity in middle-income peasants" and affects their children and relatives.

The decisions of the Third, Fourth and Fifth CCP Central Committee Plenums are still being implemented quite slowly due to the extremely strong social inertia of the Mao Zedong period. According to the Beijing press, "the decisions of the Third Plenum are not only not being carried out," but "it is believed that, not long ago, 'democracy was developed too much' in our nation, the 'freeing of consciousness was taken out of its orbit,' the reassessment of past accomplishments was begun 'too quickly, with whirlwind speed,' and there was a shift 'to the right' in party policy."⁹

An analysis of the most important changes in domestic policy, as witnessed since 1978 in comparison to 1976-1977, indicates that the ultra-leftist part of the platform of the 11th CCP Congress and the First Session of the Fifth NPC on domestic policy is being renounced and partially discarded. For example, the "Dazhai line" and the "Daqing line" have been removed from the agenda, although in 1977 they were declared to be the "Chinese line" of agricultural and industrial development, a means of creating "a new race" and "the road to communism."

The Chinese press has admitted that the slogan "Dazhai must be taken as a guide in agriculture," which was widely publicized until recently, was an "ultra-leftist directive which did not contribute to the development of agricultural production." For example, in an article entitled "Learning Serious Lessons from the Study of 'Models,'" which was printed in the provincial newspaper SHANXI RIBAO and was reprinted in central news organs, it was stated that the movement to "learn from Dazhai" was not only one of the ways in which repressive actions and purges were conducted in the Cultural Revolution, but was also used as an instrument to counteract the agricultural policy of recent years.

It is no secret that the slogan "learn from Dazhai"--that is, from the production brigade of Dazhai village in Xiyang District (Shanxi Province)--was Mao's own and was declared by him in 1964; the slogan then served as the basis of CCP policy directives in rural areas. In 1975 and 1976, two all-China conferences were held to disseminate the "progressive Dazhai experience." Reports and speeches on the dissemination of the "Dazhai experience" were presented at these conferences by Hua Guofeng, now chairman of the CCP Central Committee, and "model peasant" Chen Yonggui, who was carried on the crest of the murky wave of the Cultural Revolution to the office of vice premier of the PRC State Council¹⁰ and member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo.

Now SHANXI RIBAO is reporting that the Dazhai brigade cannot serve as a model for all Chinese agriculture. During the Cultural Revolution, however, Dazhai and its achievements were praised as a universal model. Dazhai was held up as an example of the proper way to conduct the notorious "class struggle" and to accomplish the "all-round establishment of proletarian dictatorship" in rural areas. It was not only peasants who were supposed to "learn" from it, but also workers, employees in the spheres of finance, education and culture, athletes and members of the militia, the police force and youth and women's organizations. Dazhai was depicted, therefore, as a universal domestic policy model. In particular, press coverage was given to the methods by which the "jiaofan took power away from those taking the capitalist road" and the way in which Dazhai served as the "leading detachment in the campaign for criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" and took an active part in the criticism of the rightist tendency to revise the correct conclusions drawn from the Cultural Revolution. After the "gang of four" had been apprehended, Dazhai was called a "heroic giant" in the struggle against this group.¹¹

It is indicative that the Dazhai harvest reports were falsified from 1973 through 1977. According to RENMIN RIBAO, they were overstated by as much as one-fourth. Depicting Dazhai as a flourishing example of "self-reliance"--in order to squeeze as much as possible out of the Chinese peasants for the intensive militarization of China--the Chinese leadership was quietly giving Dazhai "an extra ration." For example, the Jinrong region, where Dazhai and Xiyang are located, received, in addition to the agricultural equipment and fertilizer it obtained from the state, more than 25.6 million yuan for capital construction in farming since 1966, or around 600 yuan for each additional mu of irrigated farmland.¹² The construction of the loudly publicized canal to "carry water from the West to the East" in Xiyang District cost 50 million yuan in state allocations and had absolutely no economic impact.

One of the characteristics of the movement to "disseminate the progressive Dazhai experience" was an authoritarian manner, political pressure which went as far as the use of "dictatorial" methods and the enforced imposition of the entire "experience of Dazhai and Xiyang." The correct or "false" attitude toward Dazhai was used as the criterion of the "correct or false attitude toward revolution," as a paradigm of the "struggle between two classes, two courses and two lines in rural areas," as a criterion of the party-mindedness of members of the CCP and their attitude toward Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committee. It was also stressed that following the Dazhai example was inseparable from the "issue of authority."

When the "Dazhai experience" is criticized today in China, its critics do not condemn the Maoist agrarian line as much as they use these exposures for the sake of factional struggle against persons who advance to high-level offices by

"learning from Dazhai." They include the individual who, as RENMIN RIBAO put it, "seized power in Xiyang District in 1967." Although the newspaper has not named any specific names, there is no question that this refers to Chen Yonggui, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and former vice premier of the PRC State Council, who became the chairman of the Xiyang District revolutionary committee during the Cultural Revolution.

In 1967 and subsequent years, party committees on various levels expelled all those who were not enthusiastic enough about the "Dazhai line," all those who were categorized as "forces in the factional system," all those who engaged in "three against, one for cutting down"--that is, who opposed Mao Zedong's line and "cut down the Dazhai banner." People were dragged out to "struggle and criticism" rallies, removed from office and arrested. According to RENMIN RIBAO, during the "learn from Dazhai" campaign, in just Xiyang District "141 people died of unnatural causes, and 1,372 people were subjected to various kinds of repression."¹³

The political significance of the exposure of the Dazhai hoax is considerable: The entire nation was obligated for many years to "learn from Dazhai" and only learned the ugly truth (and, apparently, not even the whole truth) as a result of another reversal in the internal struggle within the Chinese leadership. This dealt an extremely perceptible blow to the authority of the leadership and to leftist Maoist tendencies.

Daqing, another of Mao Zedong's "models," is also falling apart. A campaign for criticism of the slogan of "learning from Daqing in industry" was launched in summer 1980 and reached its peak in July and August. It is indicative that it was at the end of August that Song Zhenming, minister of the petroleum industry, was dismissed from office. He advanced to his position in the State Council from the post of party committee secretary in the Daqing oilfields after he delivered a speech entitled "The Fundamental Experience of Daqing" at the All-China Conference on the Dissemination of the Progressive Daqing Experience (1977).

Difficulties in the petroleum industry were made public at the August-September 1980 sessions of the NPC and the All-China Committee of the CPPCC. In his speech, for example, Qiu Xixin, member of the All-China Committee of the CPPCC, said that the directive regarding the establishment of "ten Daqings" in China was not based on actual possibilities and was nothing more than a "slogan." Qiu Xixin reported that the nine man-made fiber plants established in the expectation of these "ten Daqings," for which equipment had to be purchased abroad with foreign currency, were standing idle due to a lack of raw material. These plants were supposed to use the waste and by-products of petroleum refining.

The economic collapse of the Daqing experiment has apparently also affected the sociopolitical aspects of the Daqing model. Without much publicity, the Chinese leaders stopped advocating self-sufficiency, reliance on pure enthusiasm and the militarization of the work of oilmen, but criticism of the Daqing experience became a weapon of the Deng Xiaoping group. Most of this criticism was aimed at those who wanted to retain some of these extremist methods and the militarization of domestic policy.

On the threshold of the 12th CCP Congress, rival groups in Beijing reached another compromise on the degree to which Mao Zedong's past activity would be criticized. In the middle of August, the Chinese mass media reported that the CCP Central

Committee had resolved to "limit the number of portraits of Mao Zedong and bulletin boards of quotations from Mao" in government and public establishments.

At the same time, the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY released the text of CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng's interview in Yugoslavia's VIESNIK newspaper, in which Hua admitted that the CCP had "committed grave and serious mistakes" during the period of Cultural Revolution and that Mao Zedong, as the chairman of the party at that time, was responsible for these mistakes. "Big mistakes," Hua said, "were also made prior to this, before the Cultural Revolution." Naturally, in this interview Hua Guofeng did not answer questions about the purpose of Mao's Cultural Revolution: Whether it was a struggle against nonexistent "capitalist roaders" or a struggle for power by Mao Zedong's group, including Lin Biao and the "gang of four," which led to the establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

An examination of all trends in China in the last few years indicates that there has been a general tendency toward the modification of the political regime since 1978, in the sense that top-level authorities are trying to change their methods of implementing political leadership within the nation while retaining their previous great-Han hegemonic platform in ideology, propaganda and foreign policy.

Nonetheless, the domestic political situation in the PRC is still contradictory, and this is reflected, in particular, in the fact that the Beijing authorities and local officials are taking steps that contradict the slogans and documents adopted at the latest CCP Central Committee plenums and NPC sessions. For example, the editorial in the 23 December 1979 issue of RENMIN RIBAO appealed for the revival of the principle of "three supports, two military accomplishments," which was set forth by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. The newspaper stipulated only that this principle would have to be "purified" of "past mistakes." The continuing broad-scale propaganda of the slogans of "selfless and difficult struggle" and "self-reliance" and the glorification of asceticism and self-denial are striking.

In his report at the all-China conference on political work in the PLA [People's Liberation Army] (April 1980), Hua Guofeng advised concentration on political work in all spheres of activity without relying on material incentives.

In this way, the domestic policy declared and recorded at the Third, Fourth and Fifth plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the Third Session of the Fifth NPC has been limited and modified as a result of the struggle between opposing tendencies within the nation.

On the whole, the changes in domestic policy have primarily emphasized nationalism, the unification of diverse class forces on the basis of their affiliation with the Chinese race in the interests of the "great China" of the future. This racial and nationalistic unity presupposes the maintenance of a sufficiently effective power structure.

This is why one important part of the domestic policy line of the post-Mao leadership was the work to revive the political system that had existed in the nation in the beginning of the 1960's. The revival of the previous political system was accompanied by the gradual elimination of political institutions engendered by the Cultural Revolution and a few subsequent campaigns--for example, the revolutionary committees, the combined staff of party committees and administrative

organs, the "sections for struggle against capitalist roaders" in public security organs, the "May 7th schools," the "theoretical detachments," the urban "workers militia" and so forth. Some signs of a return to the previous political system were witnessed even in Mao Zedong's lifetime: For example, work was already being done in 1969 to restore the structure of the party, the committees and organizations of which, with the exception of army units, were dissolved during the period of Cultural Revolution, and in the beginning of the 1970's the "gongjianfa"--the unified punitive agencies of the Cultural Revolution, which performed the functions of security organs, the procuracy and the court--began to be liquidated and judicial bodies were restored (as entities unconnected with security organs, but without the restoration of public prosecutors); in 1973 the trade unions, youth and women's organizations and other groups that had been disbanded in 1966 were restored on the provincial level.

The post-Mao leadership in the PRC accelerated this process and resolutely eliminated all of the links in the political system that had been created by political opponents for leverage in the power struggle (for example, the abovementioned urban "workers militia," "sections for struggle against capitalist roaders" in public security organs and so forth). Other remnants of the past in the political system were gradually liquidated. The revolutionary committees are a characteristic example. The operational plan for the first stage (1977) called for a purge of the provincial revolutionary committees of greatest importance in the struggle for power. The preparations for the First Session of the Fifth NPC were utilized for this purpose. The next stage was this session's adoption of a new constitution (March 1978), in accordance with which the territorial revolutionary committees lost their status as organs of authority and became local administrative organs. At the same time, the liquidation of the revolutionary committees of establishments and enterprises was announced and a system was introduced in which responsibility was delegated to individual administrators (directors, chiefs and so forth) who were to perform their work "under the supervision of party committees." Finally, a decision of the Second Session of the Fifth NPC abolished the revolutionary committees--the last terminological remnant of the Cultural Revolution in the state structure--and they were replaced by local people's government, headed by provincial governors, city mayors, and regional and district chiefs. The revolutionary committees of communes became administrative boards.

At present, the main institutions of the PRC political system are virtually undistinguishable from those which existed prior to the Cultural Revolution in terms of organizational form. They have undergone some changes, however; for example, standing committees of local people's congresses have been organized, the special rail and water transport tribunals, which were abolished in 1957, have been restored, the possibility of organizing forestry tribunals and other special courts is being considered, chambers of economic affairs may be established as part of conventional courts on various levels, and so forth. The procedure for the formation of local people's congresses has also changed: District level congresses, and not only those on the lowest level, are now being formed by means of direct elections with a secret ballot; besides this, the right to nominate more than one candidate for each deputatorial mandate has been restored. These and other changes and modifications in the PRC state structure cannot be defined in the same way. Most of them are aimed at reinforcing the effectiveness of the machinery of state, but some have a certain propagandistic value in connection with the creation of a "new image" for China, with which the present Beijing leadership, judging by all indications, is extremely concerned.

At the same time, measures were taken to arm the PRC government structure with legal provisions to guarantee its effective functioning. The first series of laws was ratified by the Second Session of the Fifth NPC and it included laws on the organization of local organs of authority and administration, courts and public prosecutor's offices, an election law, a law on joint Chinese-foreign enterprises and criminal codes. A number of ukases and decrees were published the same year, as well as experimental laws on forestry regulation, environmental protection, awards for inventions and the manufacture of high-quality products, and others.¹⁴ Besides this, several acts on the maintenance of public order, which were adopted at the end of the 1950's, were finally published. All of these spheres of legal regulation are important to China, particularly the maintenance of public order, in connection with the rise in crime rate and the increasing number of mass disturbances.¹⁵

A new series of laws was adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth NPC in September 1980. These were a law on PRC citizenship, an amended law on the nature of government, a law on the taxation of joint societies founded with Chinese and foreign capital, and a law on a personal income tax.¹⁶

When Peng Zhen delivered the accountability report on the work of the NPC Standing Committee at the abovementioned session, he noted that more than 70 economic laws and decrees had been drafted or were in the process of being drafted by various State Council agencies.¹⁷ According to the Chinese press, NPC deputies insisted on the "immediate ratification of economic legislation" in their speeches.¹⁸ As Peng Zhen said in his report, however, "China is still inexperienced in economic legislation" and "will need more time" to draft it. In his words, these laws will "gradually be drafted on the basis of accumulated experience."¹⁹

On the eve of the NPC session, on 26 August 1980, the Standing Committee adopted a normative act of extreme significance in terms of its possible consequences. It was an act on cooperation with foreign capital--the "Statute on Special Economic Regions in Guangdong Province." This act was supposed to be a decision of the Guangdong provincial authorities that was ratified by the NPC Standing Committee only in principle. The few reports in the press about this unpublished act indicate, for example, that a customs boundary will exist in these territories--that is, they will be separated, as it were, from the rest of the PRC. Foreign capital will have virtually unrestricted access to profits and products acquired by means of the exploitation of Chinese workers. The sole restriction will be the far from burdensome taxes they will pay to the Chinese State. It would seem that the capitalist system will be unrestricted at enterprises in the "special economic regions."

At the Third Session of the Fifth NPC, the list of statewide laws meriting priority drafting included laws on enterprises, on economic contracts, on national regional autonomy, on labor and on energy resources and civil law codes.

When we assess the significance of the reinstatement of legislative regulation in the PRC, we certainly must admit that this is a positive phenomenon in comparison to the unadorned voluntarism and arbitrary practices that have been commonplace since the time of the Cultural Revolution. In today's China, however, it is also largely a formal act because there are no cadres capable of putting this legislation

into effect (according to Deng Xiaoping, the nation is lacking up to 2 million attorneys for work in the courts, the procuracy and the police), there is neither any significant experience nor any tradition of administration based on legal norms, and much of the population is illiterate. The new legislation can only have a positive effect in the future.

After the death of Mao Zedong and the elimination of the "gang of four," the new coalition of Chinese leaders took steps to reinforce the effectiveness of the party staff and party organizations as instruments for carrying out the "four modernizations" program. The most important of these steps were the separation of the sectorial system of local party committees from the revolutionary committees (people's government) and the general line of relieving party personnel of administrative functions, the restoration of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat and the office of general secretary, the creation of discipline inspection commissions and others. Not all of these measures are aimed only at heightening the effectiveness of the party system; some also reflect the intra-party struggle within the CCP, but, even if this factor is taken into account, they are still capable of strengthening party administrative links and guaranteeing the more successful implementation of the leadership's policy line.

The majority of CCP members, however, are still distinguished by ideological stagnation, passivity, confusion and the misinterpretation of new developments. This is due both to the many years during which Mao Zedong's line prevailed, and to the extremely diverse makeup of the party, half of whose members (18 million people, according to official statistics) joined the CCP after the start of the Cultural Revolution, when party admission requirements were relaxed to the extreme, the period of probation was abolished, and most new members were the unthinking "activists" of political campaigns. It has now been frankly admitted that this group does not possess the "elementary knowledge required of a party member."²⁰ This contingent of the CCP membership is now being subjected to purges, and will continue to be subjected to them in the future, but the large size of this group and the age group it represents suggest that it could play a considerable role in the Chinese leadership of the next generation.

In an attempt to involve increasingly large groups of overseas Chinese in the work on the "four modernizations" program, the Chinese leadership solidified the organization of the united front--the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which was charged with the task of uniting "all forces that can be united" on a broad nationalistic platform. The nationalist bloc, based on the united front organization, is also intended, according to the plans of the Beijing leaders, to unite China in the international arena "with all forces with which union is possible, in order to form the broadest possible united front of struggle against hegemonism," which actually means the escalation of hatred for the Soviet Union, Socialist Vietnam and the socialist world in general.

The First Session of the All-China Committee of the CPPCC, which was held in February-March 1978, approved the Beijing rulers' plans for the militarization of the country and their hegemonic foreign policy. The objective of the political and ideological unification of forces with vastly differing class features was set. The CPPCC Charter adopted at this session reinforced the present leadership's line of broader representation for the Chinese bourgeoisie (including the domestic

bourgeoisie, now known as "socialist laborers") in united front organs, and the creation of the illusion of political pluralism with the aid of the slogan about "prolonged coexistence and mutual control" by the CCP and the small "democratic" parties of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia. It was no coincidence that the members of this All-China Committee of the CPPCC included many individuals who received special invitations from the Beijing leaders--representatives of overseas Chinese communities and "patriotic figures," who occupied more than half of all the seats in the highest united front organ. Mass public organizations, on the other hand, were represented by only 5 percent of the CPPCC All-China Committee delegates.

At the next session of the All-China Committee, the second, held in June-July 1979, the framework of the "revolutionary united front" was broadened by the inclusion of all Chinese in this front, regardless of their citizenship ("all those who love their native land"). The August-September 1979 conference on the work of the united front led this front even further to the right. At this conference, the front was defined as a "broad political alliance of all socialist laborers, patriots who support socialism and patriots who are in favor of the reunification of their native land."²¹ The name of the front was also changed: It began to be called the "revolutionary-patriotic united front." What is more, there is no indication now, in contrast to past written references, that it functions "under the supervision of the working class and is based on the alliance of the working class with the peasantry." Furthermore, according to the new membership requirements of the front, a new member of the organization does not even have to recognize socialism as a political program. The main purpose of this organization is to seek contacts with the Taiwan authorities and involve not only the domestic bourgeoisie, but also the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie in Shanghai and Macao, in the "four modernizations." Through the united front, the Beijing leaders hoped to make use of this bourgeoisie's capital, experience and knowledge for the accelerated development of the nation's economy, particularly its military-industrial potential.

The Third Session of the All-China Committee of the CPPCC met at the same time as the Third Session of the Fifth NPC. In its political resolution, it expressed agreement with the reports, decisions and decrees of the Third NPC Session and stressed that the CPPCC "must exercise control over the enforcement of the constitution, laws and ukases and over the work of the government and its cadres on various levels. At the same time, it must take part in disclosing the intellectual potential of the nation, participate actively in the transformation of the cadre system and make a mass effort to promote and advance capable individuals."²² Nothing was ever said about these CPPCC functions in the past. They are somewhat reminiscent of the plans of the "bourgeois rightist elements" from among the democratic party officials and university professors who proposed in 1957 that the CPPCC be converted into the upper chamber of the NPC with supervisory powers, and insisted that the decisions of the NPC be subject to control by local democratic parties.

The Third Session of the CPPCC also adopted a resolution regarding the revision of the 1978 CPPCC Charter and created a commission for this purpose, with Deng Xiaoping as its head. In reference to the charter, it was noted that "because it was limited by the framework of the specific historical conditions under which it was drafted, the charter contained some obviously erroneous statements, and parts of it can no longer meet the requirements of the new state of affairs."²³ The resolution said nothing about the specific nature of the future changes in the CPPCC Charter.

The modified united front policy is part of the Chinese leadership's extensive maneuvers to broaden the social base of its political course. These maneuvers also include the previously mentioned widespread rehabilitation of the victims of mass campaigns of the past, the removal of negative labels from the "evil categories" of Chinese people, and flirtation with the intelligentsia, now known as "part of the proletariat." Policy regarding the working class and the peasantry has obviously been modified to appeal to the more prosperous strata of these classes (guild workers and "strong" peasants). The targets of the "class struggle," in its Maoist interpretation, are no longer the "remnants of old exploitative classes" and "capitalist roaders," but criminals and "counterrevolutionaries," and the latter category includes all persons who displease the present Maoist rulers.

The Chinese leadership no longer relies, as it did in the recent past, on the pauperized urban and rural masses, as they cannot serve as the prime movers in the "four modernizations." There is essentially no possibility that their status will be improved by the intensive modernization, which will be connected with tremendous expenditures on weapons. Consequently, the pauperized masses still have reason, and it is even growing constantly, to be dissatisfied with their lot, and this dissatisfaction can no longer be restrained by means of equalizing trends from above. These masses still represent a nutritive medium for Maoism in its extremist form and a destabilizing factor in the domestic political situation in China.

The Beijing leaders have had to pay serious attention to the work of organizations responsible for generating mass support for the regime and for conducting the ideological brainwashing of the masses. In today's China, these are trade unions, youth and women's organizations and other public organizations. The mass organizations engendered by the Cultural Revolution have disappeared from the political arena, however.

After Mao Zedong's death, there was a steady tendency toward the gradual restoration of public organizations on new ideological, political and organizational bases. These public organizations were actually created anew, but in China they are represented as a continuation of the mass organizations in the PRC's past. This has been accomplished by numbering their congresses (for example, the Tenth Congress of the CYL, the Fourth All-China Women's Congress, the Ninth Trade-Union Congress and so forth) and by the issuance of reports about congresses of public organizations which state that their activity was "curtailed" for decades through the fault of the "gang of four" but is now being continued. All of this is a ruse to conceal the fact that Maoist leagues, which have thousands of members and are united by a common strategic goal, are being created under the guise of socialist public organizations.

The consolidation of the Chinese political structure, which includes mass youth, trade-union and women's organizations, as well as many artistic unions, sports and technological societies, religious groups and "patriotic" societies, according to the plans of the Chinese leadership, should stabilize the domestic situation and mobilize all forces in society for the completion of the program of "four modernizations."

The Chinese leadership is trying to establish strict control over the activities of the CYL, trade unions, women's organizations and all other leagues and societies. This particularly applies to the activities of mass public organizations.

From the time the Chinese Komsomol (CYL) was restored on a new basis at the Tenth CYL Congress (October 1978), it actually had to establish a new organizational structure. The official reference to the "Thought of Mao" in the CYL Charter as "the guiding and directing force of all Komsomol work,"²⁴ with only a few slogans modified, gives rise to periodic crises in the PRC youth movement. In recognition of the alienation and resistance of the sizable ultra-leftist strata of Chinese youth, the ruling group in the CCP called for the expansion of the CYL base, focusing on young intellectuals, children of bourgeois and rich peasant parents, repatriates, skilled young workers, and young men and women who suffered during Mao's lifetime because they were members of the "evil categories" of Chinese people.

The encouragement of CYL activity has naturally had a certain stabilizing effect and has reinforced the political position of the Chinese leadership within the nation and abroad. The seemingly positive slogans about "building a great and powerful socialist China" naturally appeal to Chinese young people, and they are responding to the demand that they study, take part in competitions, display their talents and so forth. Some young Chinese emigres are also responding to the appeal to build a "great China."

The resumption of the activities of Chinese trade unions and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions after the Ninth All-China Trade-Union Congress (October 1978) was accomplished on Maoist ideological and organizational bases. The new leadership, just as in Mao's lifetime, is trying to solve production problems primarily with political methods and the exertion of ideological pressure on workers and employees. The present Chinese leadership is still using trade unions for anti-Soviet, antisocialist demonstrations within the country and abroad. Adhering to the line of confrontation with the nations of the socialist community, the Ninth Trade-Union Congress called upon the trade unions of the PRC to "fight against hegemonism"--that is, against the USSR, Vietnam, Cuba and all countries that actively oppose the global strategy of the Maoists.²⁵

As for the organizational principles of the new trade unions, despite the statements about elections and democracy in these unions, the present line is the one that was worked out in 1973-1976, which imposes maximum restrictions and limitations on the organizational independence of trade unions. They do not perform the supervisory functions that were assigned to them in the 1957 trade-union charter, and so forth.

There have also been changes in union operations. Much is being said in China today about the production functions of trade unions, about their participation in the organization of production and technical training for workers, about the convening of meetings for workers at enterprises, at which the workers make recommendations that are compulsory for the administration, about the elected status of low-level administrators, about the participation of trade unions in "collective prosperity" and labor safety programs, and so forth. In addition, the restriction of union membership on political grounds, as a result of which many laborers who were politically immature or insufficiently aware had not been eligible to join unions in the past and therefore did not enjoy any social privileges, has been abolished. Trade unions now accept intellectuals, who have been reclassified as "proletarians." All of this is being done to reduce social tension in the nation.

Officially, federations of Chinese women have existed for 7 years now (since 1973), but their role in Chinese politics is negligible. The activities of the women's federations still center around Maoist policy and short-range measures. After the

Fourth All-Women's Congress (September 1978), the activists of the Women's Federation of the PRC displayed energy only during trips overseas, when they have made slanderous anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese statements.

The public organizations of the PRC are now promoting Beijing's chauvinistic and hegemonic policy. It is only to a minor extent that they reflect the interests of the Chinese working masses.

Behind the modified facade of government, the military-bureaucratic dictatorship still exists, and the current political processes in China are aimed, in the final analysis, at strengthening this dictatorship. This is the purpose of the Chinese leadership's steps to heighten the effectiveness of the state and party systems and the entire political machinery of the country, including security organs, the courts and the procuracy (along with the armed forces, these organs constitute, according to Hua Guofeng's definition, the "people's machinery of state").

Under present conditions, now that the organizational structure of the government has been essentially stabilized, the Chinese leadership has been able to renounce some of the methods of the Cultural Revolution in the "big four" ("broad four")--that is, the "widespread expression of opinions, the full exposition of views, widespread debate and dazibao." The rightist pragmatic group of Deng Xiaoping, which now holds the leading position in the Chinese leadership, once made extensive use of dazibao to exert pressure on its political opponents, particularly during the period preceding the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. Now it naturally does not want this weapon to be employed by its political opponents and other opposition elements. This is the reason for the Fifth CCP Central Committee Plenum's recommended amendment to the PRC Constitution, in accordance with which the "big four" would be excluded from the list of the political rights of citizens.²⁶ This recommendation was acted upon by a special resolution, and the amendment to the PRC Constitution was adopted by the Third Session of the Fifth NPC on 10 September 1980.

The ruling group in China believes that it is now possible to use "legal" methods to deal with its political opponents, without resorting to Mao Zedong's "big democracy."

When we assess the political situation in China as a whole, we must say that the few changes in the domestic policy of the Chinese leadership have not affected the strategic goals of this policy, and we therefore have no reason to view it as something that differs radically from Mao Zedong's policy.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.
2. Ibid., 24 December 1978.
3. The document has not been published in full; for an account of it, see RENMIN RIBAO, 29 January 1979. From this account, it is clear that the document was distributed locally in the form of a "Central Committee Announcement."

4. This decision was only mentioned in the press, and a partial account of it was printed in PRC newspapers in 1978—for example, in RENMIN RIBAO, 17 November 1978, and others.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 17 October 1978.
6. Ibid.
7. "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" [Contemporary Chinese History], Moscow, 1972, p 346.
8. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 4 September 1979.
9. GUANGMING RIBAO, 8 September 1979.
10. Chen Yonggui was relieved of the duties of this office in September 1980 by the NPC session.
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 18 June 1980.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. For more about current Chinese legislation, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 4, pp 66-73.
15. In this area, as current events in China indicate, legal and even police undertakings have turned out to be inadequate and the assistance of military units has been enlisted.
16. These laws are analyzed in the article on "The Results of the Third Session of the Fifth NPC" in this issue of the magazine.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 3 September 1980.
18. Ibid., 5 September 1980.
19. Ibid., 3 September 1980.
20. Ibid., 12 June 1979.
21. Ibid., 15 September 1979.
22. NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY RELEASE, 12 September 1980.
23. Ibid.
24. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 November 1978.
25. Ibid., 16 November 1978.
26. Ibid., 1 March 1980.

BEIJING: POLICY LINE OF ESCALATING TENSION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 41-54

[Article by V. K. Grishin]

[Text] From the first days of its existence, the Soviet Union has been fighting a constant battle against war and for universal security and disarmament. The cause of detente and peaceful cooperation by states is now being defended, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union, by our friends and allies--the nations of the socialist community. At the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly alone, the USSR set forth three initiatives at once on the improvement of the international climate: a draft resolution "On Some Immediate Steps to Reduce the Risk of War," the memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security," and the draft resolution "On the Historical Responsibility of States for the Preservation of Nature on Earth for Present and Future Generations." In all, the Soviet Union has made more than 100 constructive proposals in the postwar period in regard to the consolidation of peace. This policy is organically inherent in states which resolved to build a society, aimed at the maximum satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of each of its members and uninvolved in the wasteful arms race. The cessation of the arms race--after all, military expenditures throughout the world in 1980 will exceed 500 billion dollars, and disarmament, the most reliable way of eliminating war from the life of mankind, constitute what V. I. Lenin called the socialist ideal.¹

The Chinese leaders have departed from this ideal and have embarked on a course of militant, great-power nationalism and chauvinism. An integral part of this is Beijing's present destructive foreign policy: mounting aggression, intervention in the affairs of other nations, and hegemonic obsessions. The attainment of these expansionist objectives is connected with the aggravation of international affairs and war, including even thermonuclear war, as a result of which Beijing could realize its cherished dream of establishing its "new order" in the world. "The 21st century will be the Chinese century," a central Chinese newspaper stated, "when we will possess abundant human resources and intellectual potential." This statement is in tune with the statement by Su Yu, member of the CCP Central Committee Military Council: "We are prepared to make the greatest national sacrifices in order to make a suitable contribution to the liberation of mankind"² (this is how they prefer to describe their plans in Beijing, in an attempt to camouflage their desire for global hegemony).

The Chinese leaders must realize, however, that they are still obviously lacking the necessary material prerequisites for the realization of their hopes regarding the "Chinese century." This is the reason for their attempts to rely on the most diverse reactionary and aggressive anticommunist forces in the confrontation with the most consistent defenders of international security and the peaceful coexistence of states--the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community--and to put together a "united front" for struggle against the socialist world.

In its inflammatory way, Beijing is cautioning "vigilance" in connection with the imaginary "Soviet military threat," is advising the "repulsion of the USSR" and is intensifying its attacks on the coordinated foreign policy line of the fraternal countries, aimed at stopping the slide into cold war. China developed its anti-socialist course by launching aggressive actions against the SRV in 1979, refusing to negotiate with the USSR and Vietnam in 1980, organizing provocations against Laos and Kampuchea, eagerly supporting the actions of the NATO powers in connection with the events in Poland and undertaking many other actions that were hostile to the Soviet Union and other socialist states. During his stay in Canada at the end of August 1980, Vice Premier Bo Yibo of the PRC State Council ostentatiously responded as follows to the question of a news correspondent regarding the prospects for Sino-Soviet relations: "I see nothing ahead." As for the USSR's position on this matter, as USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko stressed on 23 September 1980 in a speech at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly and as numerous top-level statements testify, the USSR is in favor of the normalization of relations with the PRC.

Doing their part to complicate the international situation, officials in Beijing responded enthusiastically to the plans of adventuristic imperialist circles to disrupt the existing military strategic balance in the world and openly commended the dangerous line of the American administration, which was expressed concisely in a statement by J. Carter in summer 1980: Peace must be based "on force, force whose existence does not require special proof, force which simply exists, force recognized by other countries and other people, force that we ourselves recognize." Beijing also commended the "new nuclear strategy" of the United States. The Chinese leadership's position becomes all the more understandable if we consider that it is also increasingly inclined to rely on the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. In an attempt to whip up the already high wave of anti-Sovietism and militaristic passion in the West, Deng Xiaoping made frightening statements about the "awe-inspiring" 1980's when he was interviewed by an Italian journalist at the end of August 1980,³ and Hua Guofeng made an absurd allegation at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC--that the USSR "is not only directly undermining the cause of peace and security in the Persian Gulf zone, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, but is also threatening the cause of peace and security throughout the world."⁴

By slanderously accusing the USSR of having intentions that are hostile to its very nature, Beijing would like to whitewash its own complicity in imperialism's intrigues and to somehow divert the attention of its own population away from the acute domestic problems and economic difficulties that are largely a result of China's excessive military allocations (it appears from the documents approved at the last NPC session, that just the unconcealed military expenditures in the PRC state budget for 1980 exceed the total sum of government funds allocated for agriculture by 15 percent, and allocations for science, culture, education and public health by 30 percent).⁵

The Beijing leadership has betrayed the interests of the Chinese revolution, world socialism and the national liberation movement. Guided by their own selfish goals, the PRC leaders regard national liberation forces and the developing countries in general only as a means of attaining their own great-power objectives, and they have stubbornly persisted in trying to turn them against their natural friends and allies--the socialist states and the international communist and workers movement. China displayed its hostile feelings for the young People's Republic of Angola when it urged gangs from UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], trained and equipped by the CIA and by Beijing instructors, to make devastating raids on Angola's border regions. In this connection, there was spiteful rejoicing in the Chinese capital when South African Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Botha announced in February 1980, in a tone resembling Beijing's own style of speech, that the racist regime wanted to "teach a lesson" to Angola, which was still supporting the organization leading the war of independence against occupation forces--the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

In line with its invariably negative approach to the Ethiopian revolution, Beijing was happy to learn about the conclusion of the U.S.-Somali agreement on the establishment of U.S. military bases in Somalia at the beginning of September 1980. Commenting on the position of the Chinese side, Lemma Gutema, member of the Central Committee of the Organizational Commission of the Ethiopian Workers Party, said on 17 September 1980, when he was interviewed by India's CENTRAL NEWS SERVICE AGENCY, that the PRC's subversive activity against Ethiopia had already begun by 1977, when the Somali regime launched its armed aggression against Ethiopia; China helped to broaden the scales of this intervention by supplying Eritrean separatists and Somali aggressors with weapons. China, Gutema stressed, is still supporting the expansionist Somali regime in its intrigues against Ethiopia.

Hand in hand with imperialism, Beijing is trying to slow down the national liberation movement, divert it from its anti-imperialist course and deprive it of the international support of other states. The position of the Chinese leadership often takes on even more odious and belligerent features: For example, the Chinese leaders are trying to teach imperialist circles the "most expedient" methods and lines of struggle against national liberation forces. "If the United States had taken a firmer stand in dealing with Cuba, Castro would not have been able to send soldiers to Africa," PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Song Zhiguang said.⁶

At the same time, in an attempt to somehow conceal its own hostile attitude toward the national liberation movement and to take the dominant position among the developing countries, Beijing constantly asserts that China "belongs" to this group of states and implies that it is something just short of the natural spokesman and "defender" of their interests. In reality, however, it is flagrantly intervening in the internal affairs of these countries and is instigating and provoking conflicts. For the sake of its hegemonic plans, Beijing is quite prepared to weaken and divide its Asian neighbors: It is encouraging demonstrations by schismatics in Northern Burma, supporting "rebels" in Thailand and Malaysia, sponsoring nationalist groups in Nepal, and giving material assistance to separatists in India's northeastern states. There is good reason to believe, as Sri Lanka's weekly TRIBUNE stated at the end of August 1980, that now that Beijing has won the recognition of the United States, it is displaying an absolute lack of

interest in relations with the developing countries. What is more, there has been a definite tendency in Chinese diplomatic behavior to sacrifice all relations with young states to the strategic need for an alliance with the United States and its NATO allies.⁷ China has "embarked on direct cooperation with the United States and is assisting it in its struggle against forces fighting for national independence," Nigeria's TIMES INTERNATIONAL stressed.⁸

The actual, and not the ostensible, feelings of the Chinese ruling clique about the vital needs and ambitions of the developing countries were also attested to by the stand taken by Beijing during the course of the August-September 1980 11th special session of the UN General Assembly on economic matters. The results of the session, which conclusively demonstrated the reluctance of Western countries to agree to the reorganization of international economic relations on a fair, equal and democratic basis, naturally disillusioned the developing states that had initiated the session. The PRC delegation gave considerable support to the developed capitalist powers which categorically refused to discuss any proposals aimed at granting more extensive powers to the developing countries in a number of international currency and financial agencies in which the key positions are held by the West. The PRC delegation persistently urged the developing states to accept decisions that would benefit the Western powers. In his speech at the session, Li Qiang, head of the PRC delegation, completely ignored, along with representatives of the imperialist states, the question of the direct connection between disarmament and the resolution of the economic problems of developing countries. The Chinese representative made every effort to divert their attention from this aspect of the matter, appealing instead for "an uncompromising struggle... against forces for hegemonism." This also graphically demonstrated the PRC leadership's total lack of interest in working toward the constructive goals of the economic development of young independent states. After the session was over, however, Beijing, in unison with Western representatives and propaganda and for their benefit, made an attempt to somehow soothe public opinion in the developing countries and even to depict the obstructionist approach of the West as a "constructive" line.

These and many other facts clearly attest to the increasing collaboration of forces for imperialism and hegemonism in all areas, collaboration which is intended to sabotage international cooperation and which will injure the people of other countries, especially the developing states. But in no other area have the efforts of aggressive imperialist circles and Beijing been so visibly and closely linked, and it is probable that on no other issue have their views conflicted so dramatically with the fundamental interests of mankind, as in their attempts to bury detente, poison the atmosphere in the world and push it to the verge of war.

The statements by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other Chinese leaders about the acceptability, and even the "advantages," of "colossal upheavals" in the international arena, and of universal conflicts, are widely known. When Mao and Zhou left the political arena, no fundamental changes were made in Beijing's approach to these matters. "Large-scale war will break out soon," Ye Jianying declared in May 1977.⁹ At the NPC session in June 1979, Hua Guofeng said that "the international situation in general is distinguished by even more unrest and tension. The factors of war are still gaining strength."¹⁰ At a meeting with Japanese journalists in Beijing in April 1980, Hua predicted that the future would bring

"even greater upheavals and crises."¹¹ "War is inevitable," prophesied Deng Xiaoping in an interview in August 1980.¹²

These and many other statements by representatives of the Chinese ruling elite, made at various times and on various pretexts, serve as irrefutable proof of Beijing's intensely hostile attitude toward an issue affecting the vital interests of all people. This position has naturally aroused increasing condemnation of China's views in the overwhelming majority of states. In order to slow down the process of their exposure as instigators, the present Chinese leaders have had to make more, purely tactical changes, for the nth time in the last 20 years, in their stand on questions of war and peace. They have had to make a maximum effort to make China appear respectable to the members of the world community and to pass themselves off as something just short of the most steadfast upholders of peace and universal security. "The struggle against aggression and expansion in defense of peace throughout the world," said Li Xiannian, for example, on 7 May 1980 when he was in Australia, "has become an urgent matter for the world's people."¹³ Hua Guofeng expressed his views in a similar tone at the NPC session in September 1980.¹⁴

Another important foreign policy factor which, as Vice Premier Ji Pengfei of the State Council admitted in his speech at a June 1979 conference of PRC diplomatic personnel, has forced Beijing to speedily "discard all inexpedient slogans," is the fear of some influential circles in the capitalist countries that China could, at some point, "turn into a superpower," a promoter of some kind of "socialist militarism" and even an "Asian and world policeman."¹⁵ This, Ji said with regret, is still limiting the organization of close cooperation with the Western powers in the area of deliveries of the modern equipment and necessary technology,¹⁶ for which Beijing is lusting. Corroboration of Ji's words, and of the West's sneaking suspicions about the PRC's future intentions, was found, as the June 1980 information bulletin of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress stated, in the apprehensions voiced at the end of 1979 by some congressional leaders, responsible for overseeing the Asian aspects of U.S. foreign policy, in regard to the "possible effect of recent American initiatives in relations with China on the broader interest of the United States in Asia and on world affairs."¹⁷ In this context, it is also indicative that the WASHINGTON POST classified China's development of an "intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of hitting targets in the United States" in March 1980 as "disturbing news."¹⁸ Beijing, the newspaper warned, could henceforth "reinforce any future change in its policy with intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads." In June 1980, Japan's SANKEI SHIMBUN displayed the poorly concealed fear that Beijing might use its strengthened armed forces primarily against its Asian neighbors.¹⁹

In line with its new tactics, intended to mislead its present and potential political opponents and broad segments of the international public, Beijing has for some time been discussing the possibility of postponing the outbreak of universal conflict. "Although world war is inevitable, it can be postponed," a PRC representative announced at the 32d Session of the General Assembly.²⁰ What is more, ever since the 11th CCP Congress, China has been assuring the world public that it also wants "a peaceful international situation." In 1980 alone, statements of this kind were made by, in particular, Li Xiannian (14 May) during his stay in New Zealand, Zaho Ziyang (16 June) at a meeting with participants of a science symposium in Beijing, Hua Guofeng (7 September) at an NPC session, and others.²¹

In addition, the Chinese leaders have expressed the hope, as Deng Xiaoping did, for example, in a conversation with a Japanese delegation on 7 October 1977, that "peace will last until the end of this century," after which he felt the need to add: "Wars are, nonetheless, inevitable." Deng expressed similar views in a meeting with Italian journalists on 17 April 1980. "As far as China is concerned," he stressed, "it would be best if there were no wars for at least the next 20 years." It was far from a coincidence that Deng referred specifically to a period of 20 years. This is precisely the length of Beijing's officially announced period for carrying out the "four modernizations" plan, which centers around the creation of a military-industrial complex and the transformation of China into a "strong modern power"--in other words, a militaristic state capable of imposing its will on others. At the same time, the slogan of "winning time from the enemy" began to be propagandized in China. In a conversation with the general director of the FRENCH PRESS AGENCY on 21 October 1977, Deng Xiaoping substantiated this objective in the following words: "The 'gang of four' engaged in sabotage for 11 or 12 years, but the aftereffects of this will be felt for 20-30 years. This is why we need to win time."

How does Beijing propose to "win time from the enemy" for the correction of its technical and military underdevelopment? The Chinese leaders' response has been unequivocal: By continuing and intensifying provocative activity aimed at the all-round exacerbation of relations between states, primarily between the United States and its NATO allies and the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist community. "Peace cannot be achieved through requests, and war cannot be prevented by concessions," Hua Guofeng said on 30 September 1979 at a reception in London.²² To give more decorum to their inflammatory position, the Beijing leaders have resorted to a new trick: They have begun to assert that they are not at all opposed to detente, which they quite frankly described as a "fraud" until 1978, but to the "policy of aggression." At the same time, the Chinese side, through its representatives in the United Nations and other international organizations, has vigorously been promoting another brand-new thesis: It has blasphemously drawn a parallel between the "fight against the hegemonism" of the Soviet Union and the struggle for peace.²³

In this way, the latest plot against detente and against peaceful cooperation by states, which have invariably been favored by the overwhelming majority of members of the international community, was launched by Beijing as, so to speak, an inside job. Right up to fall 1979, with just a few modifications to comply with the wind of change, the updated plan was aimed less at discrediting the idea of detente than at discrediting the forces that played and are still playing a decisive role in its constant defense.

When the international situation was aggravated at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, the Chinese leadership quickly discarded even the semblance of its deliberately vague acceptance of the idea of detente and made a feverish attempt, along with the more adventurist circles of imperialism, to destroy all of its favorable results in the preceding decade. At the end of August 1980, for example, Deng Xiaoping openly called for a stop to all of the "idle talk about peace and detente."²⁴

For this purpose, Beijing and Washington work hand in hand to turn the events centering around Afghanistan into a permanent factor of instability in Southwest Asia and in world affairs in general.

Tens of thousands of bandits, trained by American and Chinese instructors, are being sent to Afghanistan from abroad. This unconcealed intervention is being organized in the customary way--by hiring mercenaries. According to DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] Minister of the Interior S. M. Gulabzoi, "the Afghan-Chinese border is only 70 kilometers long, but Beijing and the Chinese military establishment and special services have turned each of these kilometers into a bridgehead for aggressive armed raids on the sovereign DRA."²⁵

The Chinese leadership objected to the Afghan Government's proposal of 14 May 1980, aimed at the practical settlement of the disputes over Afghanistan. From the very beginning, this proposal was called "pure fraud"²⁶ and the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was called "only a propaganda maneuver."²⁷ After this, the Chinese press was full of pointed attacks on "some people in the West," who had "become more inclined" to agree to these Soviet and Afghan initiatives--that is, to make progress in the normalization of the situation in Southwest Asia.²⁸ Finally, to exclude the possibility of any agreements of this kind, Beijing resolved (typically, immediately after Hua Guofeng's meeting with Carter in Tokyo on 10 July of this year) to speed up sea, land and air shipments of large additional quantities of weapons and ammunition for counterrevolutionary groups fighting against the DRA.²⁹ The definition of aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly and the list it contains conclusively prove that the actions taken by China and the United States against Afghanistan constitute, from the standpoint of international law, a typical example of armed aggression. "If the USSR had not been on our side," Babrak Karmal said on 2 September, "the country could have lost its independence."³⁰

The dangerous intrigues in this region by forces hostile to the cause of peace are arousing profound concern in the Asian countries. The Beijing leadership is working with the administration, Indonesia's MERDEKA newspaper reported, to turn Pakistan against Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. It is no secret that the Chinese leadership is conducting a two-faced foreign policy: On the one hand, it is asserting its desire for friendship, but on the other, it is trying to subjugate neighboring countries.³¹ The annual report of India's Ministry of Defense for 1979/80, published in July 1980, directs attention to the noticeable destabilization of the situation in Asia. It reached its peak at the time of the events centering around Afghanistan, bringing the danger of war closer to India's borders. This situation, the report stresses, requires that India display vigilance and take effective measures to protect the country in view of the Chinese-U.S. decision on large-scale shipments of weapons to Pakistan.

Beijing and Washington are feverishly resisting the stabilization of conditions in another "hotspot"--Southeast Asia--and are striving to create a constant source of war there to exert pressure on the liberated Indochinese countries. In June and July 1980, at their suggestion and with their unconcealed assistance, yet another attempt was made to artificially exacerbate the situation with the aid of hostilities launched by Thai military authorities on the Kampuchean border. This action was called the "voluntary repatriation" of so-called refugees from Thailand, although it was actually an operation to transfer some of Pol Pot's gangs to Kampuchean territory. This was followed by Thailand's decision to close the border between Laos and Thailand in July. It was no coincidence that the beginning of this latest provocation coincided with the meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Kuala Lumpur. The purpose of this was quite simple: It was an attempt

to discredit the policy of Socialist Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea and to bring about a confrontation between the ASEAN countries on one side and the SRV and Kampuchea on the other.

Official U.S. spokesmen immediately turned the facts upside down in an attempt to depict Thailand as a victim of "Vietnamese-Kampuchean aggression." Under the cover of this slanderous lie, a new massive series of American weapon shipments to Thailand was authorized. At the same time, Beijing made threatening statements about "supporting the actions of the Thailand Government" and appealed to the ASEAN countries to "unite."³² There were more frequent shows of military strength on the Chinese-Vietnamese border. According to the communique of a Vietnamese commission investigating the crimes of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, 1,120 armed provocations were committed just in the first half of 1980.³³ When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Holbrooke was in Beijing at the beginning of July, Chinese officials informed him that they definitely did not exclude the possibility of military action to "teach Vietnam a lesson."³⁴ Similar threats were issued by PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wenjin when he was interviewed by West Germany's DIE WELT at the end of July 1980.³⁵

The recognition of the Kampuchean Government by India under these conditions infuriated the enemies of the Indochinese people. Washington and Beijing immediately expressed their "regrets." A representative of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged on 9 July that this decision had supposedly "undermined India's prestige." In the Chinese capital, this action was first hastily described as evidence of a "departure from the position of a non-aligned state,"³⁶ and then it was even implied that India had "lost" its "status as a non-aligned country."³⁷ And RENMIN RIBAO, losing all sense of proportion, followed the Bogdahan line of reasoning and called the decision of this sovereign state, the largest of the non-aligned countries "stupid."³⁸ Finally, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua canceled his visit to India, which he himself had requested.

India's demarche was correctly assessed in the Indochinese countries as "an event of great political significance" and "another failure for imperialism and reactionary forces."³⁹ A telegram sent by Heng Samrin to I. Gandhi to thank the Indian Government for recognizing the People's Republic of Kampuchea stated that "this is a just act of goodwill toward the Kampuchean people, a powerful stimulus for our just struggle and a definite contribution to the cause of peace in Southeast Asia." With good reason, England's TIMES acknowledged that "the struggle for Kampuchea's future has entered a new stage with the passage of this resolution."⁴⁰

The events in Indochina are a striking example of the way in which Beijing and Washington use reactionary forces for the artificial creation and spread of armed conflicts. People in the Southeast Asian countries, however, certainly realize that this policy is injurious to their vital interests. Noting that the extension of the conflict in Indochina fits in with the strategic plans of the United States and China, an editorial in MERDEKA in the middle of July 1980 stated: "Both countries use various pretexts, including the so-called 'refugee problem,' or start to accuse the SRV of 'aggressiveness' in order to attain their own expansionist objectives. An explosive situation is being created with their help in Thailand. This is why the concern of the Vietnamese Government is understandable. It believes, with good reason, that Bangkok is playing with fire by helping to escalate

tension in Southeast Asia."⁴¹ In this context, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Kusumahatmadja stressed on 11 July 1980, during a visit to Bangkok, that the ASEAN should maintain a dialog with Vietnam to strengthen peace in the region.⁴²

Beijing and Washington, however, do not want to follow this path and are persisting in their dangerous line. In September 1980 RENMIN RIBAO printed a series of three articles, in which pointed criticism was leveled at the initiative regarding the defense of peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the relaxation of tension on the Kampuchean-Thai border, set forth in a memorandum of the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 26 August.⁴³ Following this, Pol Pot's supporters, with encouragement from the Chinese capital, announced their "consent" to unite with all opponents of the people's government in Kampuchea, including monarchists and other rightist groups, to establish a "united front" of struggle against the People's Republic of Kampuchea. For the purpose of overt intervention in the affairs of this long-suffering country, plans have been made to convene an "international conference on Kampuchea," which received the full support of Zhao Ziyang, new premier of the PRC State Council, in the middle of September.⁴⁴ But the attempts of China and the United States to regain their positions in Indochina are destined to fail: The people of this region will not allow them to divert them from their chosen path of progressive development.

During the second session of the special UN committee on the Indian Ocean in June 1980 in New York, Beijing was guided by its desire to prevent the improvement of conditions in Asia and the Pacific. Using the events centering around Afghanistan and Kampuchea as a pretext, Chinese delegate Lai Yali implied in his speech on 13 June that it was too early to convene an international conference on the Indian Ocean. Along with the United States and several other Western powers, China tried to sabotage all agreements and prevent the commencement of preparations for the conference. This conflicted radically with the opinions of the littoral and continental states in favor of convening this conference in 1981. Contrary to their interests, Beijing also vigorously supported Washington's plans to build up "rapid deployment forces" in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In connection with the Iran-Iraq armed conflicts that broke out in the second half of September, the Chinese side tried to prove that black was white by making every attempt to protect imperialism and to blame the conflict on the USSR.

Hua Guofeng's talks with J. Carter in Tokyo on 10 July 1980 were supposed to occupy a special place in the Sino-American conspiracy. Their choice of a meeting place--ostensibly, so that they could attend the funeral of former Prime Minister M. Ohira--testifies to their obvious desire to involve Japan in the Sino-American campaign to escalate international tension. In this connection, the foreign press noted that when Deng Xiaoping visited the United States and Japan last year, he was able to gain these countries' approval of his aggression against the SRV. One of the goals of the talks in Tokyo, Japan's AKAHATA stressed, was precisely the drafting of plans for new intervention in Indochina.⁴⁵ White House Press Secretary J. Powell confirmed at the end of the talks that "the United States and China essentially adhere to the same line" regarding Afghanistan and Kampuchea, and Hua Guofeng suggested at a press conference in Tokyo that his talks with J. Carter represented one of the links of China's strategy in regard to the "increasing military strength of the USSR."⁴⁶

The dangerous maneuvers of Beijing and Washington have aroused growing concern in Asia and in other parts of the world. The attempt to put together a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing alliance, India's NATIONAL HERALD noted, "has aroused concern in all Asian capitals."⁴⁷ France's PARISIEN LIBERE reported the coming of a "new stage in the convergence of China and the United States" on 11 July 1980, and West Germany's STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG frankly stated that the meeting in Tokyo was aimed at preventing the improvement of the climate in East-West relations.

In its attempts to sow mistrust between states wherever possible, Beijing is not ignoring the distant European continent either. Playing up to their senior partner, U.S. imperialism, in every way possible, the Chinese leaders are insisting on a stronger U.S. military presence in Europe and more intense nuclear preparations by NATO on the slanderous pretext that "the West must unite its efforts against the Soviet threat."⁴⁸ They objected to the socialist community's proposals regarding a summit meeting for the heads of state of all countries to discuss the elimination of sources of international tension and the prevention of war, as set forth in the declaration adopted on 15 May 1980 by the Warsaw Pact states. Officials in the Chinese capital were particularly displeased by the Soviet leaders' summit-level meetings with the leaders of France and the FRG in June and the beginning of July, during which the sides agreed on the importance of direct contacts and negotiations in the present complicated international situation. "Just as in the past, they (the sides--V. G.) consider detente to be," the Soviet-West German communique stated, in particular, "necessary, possible and beneficial, and expressed their intention to make every effort to ensure that it remains the leading tendency in international relations. There is no reasonable alternative to peaceful and equal cooperation by states."⁴⁹

The Chinese side reacted immediately to these undesirable developments with stronger insinuations about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was accused of "misleading the world public" and "encouraging people to make compromises and concessions."⁵⁰ The Chinese mass media interpreted the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June 1980 Plenum, which were filled with concern for peace, as evidence of the USSR's desire to "combine two methods"--"armed expansion" and "peaceful advancement." The statement in the decree about the need for the all-round reinforcement of the nation's defensive capability under present conditions was shamelessly represented as a policy of "preparation for war" and a "buildup of military superiority."⁵¹

This was accompanied by a broad campaign of attacks on sensible politicians in the capitalist world: They were labeled "supporters of conciliation" and "opponents of the reinforcement of Western defensive capability against the Moscow military threat."⁵² On 21 June, RENMIN RIBAO heaped criticism on the "present secret current of conciliation in the West" as the result of the dread of interfering with "detente." There was a sharp increase in the number of Chinese and carefully selected foreign publications containing lies about the USSR's "aggressive designs."⁵³ The Chinese press even went so far as to obviously juggle facts: For example, in a report on the statements by Giscard d'Estaing and H. Schmidt at a press conference in Bonn on the need for a "strong Europe," RENMIN RIBAO completely omitted their comments in favor of a dialog between East and West.⁵⁴ Beijing's own actions against detente in Europe were undertaken hand in hand with the American administration, and the bourgeois press reported this without beating around the bush. For example, West Germany's STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG reported the

following in an article with the characteristic heading "Is Carter Playing the Chinese Card Against Schmidt? The Meeting with Hua Guofeng Could Interfere with the Thaw in East-West Relations": Carter regards contact with Hua Guofeng as a counterbalance to the talks of Federal Chancellor Schmidt and French President Giscard d'Estaing with Soviet President Brezhnev in Moscow and Warsaw, as a means of controlling Western Europeans from the other side of the globe. In essence, Carter is trying to play the Chinese card against the Europeans as well as the Russians.⁵⁵

Propaganda in the Chinese press about the "desirability" and even the "inevitability" of the need for the world to "soon make a serious choice between compromise and conciliation or decisive struggle,"⁵⁶ has been a prominent part since May 1980 of the attempt to torpedo all of the good achieved through the collective efforts of states in the 1970's. "Compromise and conciliation" will lead only to "temporary false detente," RENMIN RIBAO asserted. Urging other countries to make what Beijing considers to be the "correct" choice, the newspaper provocatively advised them to avoid "paying a higher price" and to "wage a decisive struggle and oppose the Soviet Union everywhere."⁵⁷ In the middle of July, RENMIN RIBAO printed a long article, in which, to build up tension, it advised "fighting fire with fire" and "stopping war with war," without waiting until "the correlation of forces in the world and their global distribution undergo a radical change" in favor of the USSR.⁵⁸

The persistent advice about a "decisive rebuff" also has its opposite side: The Chinese rulers view the exacerbation of world affairs as another factor promoting their great-power ambitions. The maneuvers of the PRC leadership have aroused a positive response in the United States and its closest allies. "While these states are striving to draw China deeper into the channel of their policy, Beijing has consented to converge with them in an attempt to push them toward cold war and confrontation with the Soviet Union," A. A. Gromyko stressed on 23 September in his speech at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly.⁵⁹

Interacting closely with international reaction, Beijing has taken a stand hostile to universal security on the issue of detente and on such matters of cardinal importance as the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. It is true that after Chinese representatives encountered impartial criticism of their groundless renunciation of the objectives of disarmament by the majority of states, they felt it would be expedient to temporarily retouch their image as incorrigible opponents of disarmament. They have gradually begun to take part in various international forums and organs on questions of disarmament. At the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (May-June 1978) and at the First Session of the UN Commission on Disarmament (May-June 1979), the PRC leadership even put forth its own "initiatives." Upon closer examination, however, it turns out that all of this apparent "positivism" is merely a more effective way of serving an unchanging goal: the disruption of all measures that might make progress easier. The only difference is that Beijing officials have realized that today it is more convenient (as in the case involving the idea of detente at one particular stage) to impede the cause of disarmament not from the sidelines, but as an apparent participant in the consideration of various aspects of disarmament. But even when all of this phony activity and discussion of disarmament reached its height in 1979, the actions of the PRC leadership demonstrated and redemonstrated that it still zealously opposed any kind of progress in this sphere.

In 1980 the Chinese leadership continued to demonstrate its deliberate constructivism and purely Beijingese versatility, but it actually took an even more rigid approach to the entire group of issues concerned. When Beijing first took part in the work of the Disarmament Commission, its representative, Zhang Wenlin, declared that the Chinese delegation "came to Geneva to take part in these talks with a sincere desire to defend peace and will work seriously toward genuine disarmament,"⁶⁰ in contrast to numerous previous statements and with thorough consideration for prevailing feelings, Beijing consented to the discussion (but no more than this) of measures on partial disarmament in the commission, but it immediately repeated its traditional demands that the "superpowers" be the "first to disarm" and its thesis regarding the "impossibility of universal and total disarmament."⁶¹

The situation changes instantly, as soon as the PRC delegation moves from good intentions to actions. Along with representatives of the United States and its NATO allies, it counterbalanced the position of the socialist countries and many non-aligned states with a frankly obstructionist line during the talks and undermined agreements on all items on the agenda. In an attempt to keep the commission from discussion and executing its assigned duties, Beijing and its imperialist partners made use of the most diverse methods: false (statistics) and idle rumors about the "strategic plans" of the USSR; tricks to involve the commission in the discussion of the so-called Afghan question and to prevent participation by the SRV delegation; and, finally, attempts to drown the essence of various problems in long, drawn-out discussions of procedural matters. Beijing's destructive line in regard to questions of disarmament was once again quite vividly demonstrated at the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly. The PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took part in the general political discussion of 24 September, did not even mention this vitally important issue. Repeating all of the usual phrases about the "growing danger of war" and the need for "struggle against hegemonism," Huang Hua immediately rejected the Soviet proposal "On Some Immediate Steps to Reduce the Danger of War."⁶²

The opposition of real progress in the sphere of disarmament, particularly in the limitation of strategic weapons, is intended, according to the plans of the Chinese ruling clique, to encourage military preparations and poison the atmosphere in the world. But Beijing's ruses are not producing the anticipated results. The tests of the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile in May 1980 aroused deep and, quite frankly, justified anxiety in the Asian countries, including some of Washington's closest allies.

The Chinese authorities had to wiggle out of this mess quickly. On 15 May, Li Xiannian had to admit at a press conference in the capital of New Zealand that China "understands the concern of the Pacific countries" in connection with the tests, but that it intended merely to "strengthen its defensive capability against the threat of the hegemonic powers."⁶³ Two weeks later, Hua Guofeng voiced his justification in a speech in Tokyo, alleging that China "is developing strategic weapons in small quantities."⁶⁴

Beijing's admonitions have obviously failed. And this is quite understandable. The militarization of the most populated country in the world is starting to arouse unpleasant feelings even in some of Beijing's new-found friends in Tokyo. The mass media of this insular country stressed: "Japan does not want China to become

a military power."⁶⁵ In her capacity as chairman of the Indian National Congress (Ruling), Indira Gandhi made the following remark in a conversation with a correspondent from France-Inter radio station: "China already poses a threat to us and has extremely expansionist intentions. They have already made us suffer."⁶⁶

Therefore, in spite of all their vain attempts to disguise their destructive policy in respectable clothing, the Chinese leaders are still--and the previously cited facts serve as irrefutable proof of this--the most evil enemies of peace and good-neighbor relations. Playing with fire has become a daily habit for Beijing: Carried away by great-power passions, it is least interested in the fate of other people, even the Chinese. When he was interviewed by the editors of the Hearst publishing trust on 8 March 1980, Deng Xiaoping explained the reasons for this behavior by admitting that "China is so poor that it does not have much to lose in a war."

But the policy of the Chinese ruling clique, which bears the seeds of disastrous consequences, is arousing increasing condemnation and opposition in China's Asian neighbors and in other countries. Its egotistical plans and ambitions are being recognized more and more in the Western countries as well, including the United States. And there are many realistic politicians, statesmen and experts on Chinese affairs there, who are capable of assessing the possible effects of the game with the "China card" accurately enough. This is attested to, for example, by a statement by renowned American Sinologist R. Scalapino, who stressed in "Chinese Foreign Policy in 1979," a work published in April 1980, that "the Beijing leaders want the United States to counterbalance the strength of the USSR and to serve the interests of China in this global role."⁶⁷ The current suspicions about Beijing's policy in the United States are also mentioned in "Chinese Policies Toward Limiting Nuclear Weapons," a work published by the Stanley Foundation in March 1980. China, this work states, is developing intercontinental missiles capable of reaching not only the USSR, but also the United States; it has had "serious crises in which the United States was involved, and there is no doubt that it remembers those in which the danger of the use of nuclear weapons loomed."⁶⁸ Another telling statement was made by prominent U.S. political and social figure E. Clark on 11 July 1980, when he described J. Carter's talks with Hua Guofeng as "an example of a dangerous policy that could lead to war. The goal of our foreign policy," he said, "should be withdrawal from alliances of this kind and the avoidance of nuclear conflicts, and not the creation of alliances that could give rise to such conflicts. The U.S. support of China and reactionary regimes in other countries are giving rise to mass anti-American demonstrations throughout the world. We should stop conducting this kind of policy."⁶⁹

The dangerous plans of Beijing and the more aggressive circles of imperialism cannot succeed. A guarantee of this can be found in the world community's increasing awareness of the beneficial nature of constructive cooperation by states and the change in the international balance of power in favor of the supporters of peace and social progress, who are capable of guarding the planet against devastating thermonuclear war. In a message to the World Parliament of People for Peace in Sofia at the end of September 1980, L. I. Brezhnev said, with ample justification: "We are certain that it will be possible to curb the behavior, before it is too late, of those who are striving to dominate the world, relying on the use of force, and are pushing mankind into this abyss. Today the fate of the world does not depend merely on those who are accustomed to regarding dictatorship, violence and war as normal methods of settling international matters."⁷⁰

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 30, p 152.
2. GUANGMING RIBAO, 21 January 1977.
3. CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 29 August 1980.
4. RENMIN RIBAO, 15 September 1980.
5. PRAVDA, 6 September 1980.
6. DAGENS NUNETER, 14 May 1979.
7. TRIBUNE, 22 August 1980.
8. TIMES INTERNATIONAL, 16 July 1980.
9. M. S. Kapitsa, "KNR: tri desyatiletiya--tri politiki" [The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies], Moscow, 1979, p 339.
10. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 June 1979.
11. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 23 April 1980.
12. CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 29 August 1980.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 May 1980.
14. Ibid., 15 September 1980.
15. INSIDE CHINA MAINLAND (Taiwan), March 1980.
16. Ibid.
17. Foreign Affairs Committee Print. Congress and Foreign Policy Series No 1, "Executive-Legislative Consultations on China Policy, 1978-1979," Washington, June 1980, p 29.
18. WASHINGTON POST, 27 March 1980.
19. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 27 June 1980.
20. UN Doc. A/C. 1/32/PV 47, 29 October 1977, p 16.
21. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 May, 17 June, 15 September 1980.
22. Ibid., 1 November 1979.
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RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE DPRK

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 55-66

[Article by V. I. Andreyev and N. M. Berezkin]

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RESULTS OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE FIFTH ALL-CHINA NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 67-79

[Article by Ye. A. Konovalov, doctor of economic sciences, L. M. Moiseyev, doctor of juridical sciences, and A. P. Morozov, candidate of economic sciences]

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**MANCHURIA AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS (1946-1947)--(FROM THE MEMOIRS OF A
SOVIET DIPLOMAT)**

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 80-89

[Article by I. N. Nikitin]

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THE NATURE OF CHANGES IN THE PRC SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 90-104

[Article by V. N. Remyga, candidate of economic sciences]

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SOME TENDENCIES IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S SOCIOECONOMIC POLICY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 105-116

[Article by P. B. Kapralov, A. M. Kruglov and A. V. Ostrovskiy]

[Text] It is no secret that the widely publicized ambitious policy line of the "Four Modernizations" has misfired in the PRC. Serious disagreements within the Chinese leadership in regard to the methods and speed of economic construction, an exceedingly heated domestic political battle, the intensification of disparities as a result of a subjectivist approach to national economic development and, finally, the underdevelopment of the socioeconomic structure have all introduced significant changes into these ambitious plans and have necessitated the modification of economic and social policy.

Questions connected with the program of national economic "regulation" were discussed at the Third Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] in September 1980, and the prospects for the nation's economic development in 1981 were outlined. The session approved socioeconomic measures aimed at improving the state of the national economy. To a considerable degree, these measures deviated from the basic principles of socialism within the context of the socioeconomic development of Chinese society.

In accordance with the Beijing leaders' plans to turn the PRC economy into a "socialist system combined with a market economy," they have recently been encouraging the development of traditional economic elements--artisan guilds, individual artisans and private merchants in the cities, small enterprises in communes and brigades, and small peasant groups and even homesteads in rural areas; concrete steps have been taken to revive the business activity of former capitalists and to draw foreign capital into the nation's economy on a broad scale.

In 1977 the gross product of commune and brigade enterprises was 43.7 percent greater than in 1976, and the figure rose another 25.4 percent in 1978. By the end of 1979, the 1.5 million commune and brigade enterprises employed more than 20 million people, or 6.6 percent of the labor force in rural China. In 1979 alone, the number of persons working at these enterprises rose by more than 4 million. The number of collectively owned enterprises in cities and villages has now reached 270,000, and they employ 22.7 million workers and employees. In 1979 this employment figure was augmented by 2.26 million.¹

The scales of petty private enterprise can be judged from the fact that there were almost 400,000 individual industrialists and merchants in China by August 1980.²

It should be stressed that the cooperative enterprises of the late 1970's and early 1980's possess significant and, what is more, fundamental peculiarities and, therefore, their development cannot be defined as merely a return to the conditions of the 1950's. They do not represent, and the Chinese press has underscored this fact, transitional forms or links and stages in the transformation of property relations. On the contrary, this is a deliberate return to previous methods and the authorization of already existing elements of the multistructural economy. This is not a provisional or temporary measure but, rather, as the Chinese leaders have stressed in their speeches, a "strategic line" of economic development, in anticipation of the long-term coexistence of state, cooperative and even private enterprises.

The policy of focusing on small-scale production and on underdeveloped rural China has led to a situation in which more than half of all industrial workers in the nation are employed by small manufacturing enterprises. This is not only prolonging the existence of objectively present intermediate strata, situated between the working class and the peasantry, but is also creating new ones. The working class is in danger of being diluted by non-proletarian forces and falling under their ideological influence.

At the small "collectively owned" enterprises in cities and villages, the status and labor conditions of workers are much worse than at publicly owned enterprises: The workers generally have no chance of joining a trade union or of enjoying the benefits of labor insurance; their pensions (and, frequently, their food rations) are smaller; permanent work at these enterprises is not included in the worker's service record, but even temporary work at state-owned enterprises is included. Wages are generally 30 percent lower for the same type of work. This means that the state can economize on total wages. Besides this, the development of collectively owned enterprises is being used to alleviate the problem of job placement. In recent years, these enterprises have accommodated up to 50 percent of the total number of workers placed in jobs in the nation's large cities. The Chinese press has stressed that collectively owned enterprises, and not state enterprises, will be the main source of jobs in the next few years. Within a short period of time, the relative significance of collectively owned enterprises has increased considerably. At the end of 1978 they employed approximately one-third of all workers and employees in the nation, and the value of their product was equivalent to one-fifth of the value of the entire national industrial product.³ Collective ownership is most firmly entrenched in branches of light industry. In particular, according to the data of the Second Administration of the Ministry of Light Industry (taking in cottage industry and commercial art), collectively owned enterprises accounted for 97 percent of all production units, 91 percent of all workers and employees and 79 percent of the total product in 1978.⁴ The development of cottage enterprises has been particularly rapid in the service sphere (repairs, transportation and so forth). The activities of individual handicraftsmen has been authorized primarily in the service sphere on the condition that "they will not exploit the labor of others." Articles in RENMIN RIBAO have recommended that these craftsmen be guided by the experience of the development of cottage industry in the PRC prior to 1958. As a result of the Beijing leaders' policy, "collectively owned" enterprises are developing more quickly (in comparison to state enterprises).

In Chinese industry, complex jobs are performed by an insignificant substratum of highly skilled workers while the simplest types of labor are performed by an army of unskilled and semiskilled workers. Young workers, who do not have enough professional training, are in a difficult position. What is more, the proportion accounted for by young workers in the Chinese working class is not increasing much. At a conference on work with young laborers, convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League in Shenyang and Beijing from 6 to 13 April 1979, it was noted that "workers and employees under the age of 28 constitute one-fourth of all workers and employees."⁵ Worker classification grades are not elevated in a timely manner. Since 1958, the classification grades of workers have only been elevated three times in the PRC, and only during the course of so-called wage regulation measures: in 1963, 1971 and 1977. This means that a worker who has been at an enterprise since before the "Cultural Revolution" now has a grade-three classification at best.

On the whole, the existing system of training for young workers is such that their technical level is quite low. Most workers and employees are illiterate; at best, they are graduates of elementary and secondary schools of the lowest rank (which corresponds to the primary school level). According to the data of a survey conducted in 1978 in Beijing, only 4 percent of the several thousand workers and employees in transportation, communications and industry have a higher or secondary specialized education, 17 percent have graduated from a secondary school of the highest rank (but half of them did not complete the full curriculum), and more than 70 percent are graduates of elementary and secondary schools of the lowest rank.⁶

The "system of job responsibility" is being propagandized at state enterprises of central jurisdiction in an attempt to augment labor productivity. This system is aimed at stronger labor discipline, the observance of regulations at enterprises and the improvement of product quality. At the same time, it was proposed that profits be employed as an economic indicator for stricter control over enterprise activities.

The Chinese press has called upon enterprises to "turn losses into profits," remarking that "opportunities to turn losses into profits are sizable, and all state enterprises must give the state large profits."⁷ In connection with this, the administrative experience employed at 100 enterprises in Sichuan Province has been propagandized throughout the nation since 1979. In essence, this is a system in which the enterprises were given a certain degree of economic independence in purchases of raw materials and equipment and in the production and sale of goods. As a result of this, their profits increased dramatically. Naturally, in this situation the majority of enterprise managers rely on old workers, who have worked at the enterprise for many years, and the young workers thereby lose their chance to acquire skills.

State enterprises of central jurisdiction generally hire workers from among urban inhabitants, and this tendency will become more pronounced as the Sichuan experiment spreads throughout the nation. In this way, the Chinese peasantry is being isolated from large-scale factory and plant production and a specific urban working class substratum is gradually taking shape in the nation. The members of this substratum are employed in large factories and plants connected with the military-industrial complex and, in the social context, occupy a privileged position in society in comparison to most of the working class.

Nonetheless, despite the intensification of purges at enterprises, the introduction of the "job responsibility system" and the use of the profit indicator, there is a shortage of enthusiasm, as the Chinese press has admitted, at some enterprises, including large ones. This forced the Chinese leaders to conduct a so-called wage regulation measure at the end of 1977, taking in 56 percent of all workers and employees. Some young workers moved up to a higher classification grade and they began to be paid according to a new salary rate. In fact, however, these young workers had already been performing work requiring more skill, but their classification grade was not elevated and they were being paid at a lower rate. Since 1978, publicity has been given to the experience of the Kailuan Coal Mines, Huangpu Port in the city of Guangzhou and the Yongdingmen produce warehouse in Beijing, where they began to use certain types of material incentives that have not been used since the period of "regulation" (1961-1965).

The decree of the PRC Ministry of Finance "On the Experimental Allocation and Utilization of State Enterprise Funds" went into effect at the end of 1978. It authorized the administrators of enterprises which had completed all production assignments in full to use part of their profits to reward outstanding workers. In fact, however, this system of rewards turned into a system of punishments. As ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO reported, "at some enterprises it was decreed that no rewards would be given to those who had committed errors in the last few years, had fallen in love, had failed to attend meetings, had criticized the administration, had paid too much attention to hairstyles, had taken time off to visit relatives, or had been absent from work in connection with industrial accidents, childbirth, abortions, weddings and funerals."⁸ At many enterprises, the bonus is often divided equally, regardless of the results of work. What is more, those who have overfulfilled the production plan and who request a bonus on this basis are often criticized and are told that this "struggle for money" is a sign of egotistical motives and a low level of consciousness.

Despite the higher classification grades of some workers and the introduction of piece-rate wages and bonuses at some enterprises, the Chinese workers are still being called upon to consume less and to refrain from demanding higher wages and a higher standard of living. The standard of living of workers has hardly risen at all in recent years. The insignificant rise in wages "during the course of their regulation" at the end of 1977 was actually nullified by the rise in the prices of more than 200 commodities in spring 1979 (food products, consumer goods and medicines) and another rise in the prices of food staples and consumer goods after November 1979.

In 1978 and 1979 the Beijing leaders had to adapt their policy in rural areas to the archaic features of these regions and to permit and encourage small groups and other traditional peasant forms of organization. An analysis and summarization of data in the Chinese press in 1978 and 1979 indicate that the present Beijing leadership is leaving the main production resources (land, livestock and agricultural implements) and the actual organization of agricultural production in the hands of small peasant collectives--production brigades consisting of 20-30 farmsteads (usually the inhabitants of a single rural settlement), and the contracting and production groups consisting of a few farmsteads within these brigades. The government is striving to gain complete control over the administrative levers of the centralized government exploitation of these small and widely dispersed production nuclei to pump a surplus product out of them through people's communes and large production brigades. The "economic policy of the

CCP in rural areas," which has been given so much coverage in the press, demands that the production brigade, as the nucleus of agricultural production, take care of the actual organization of production, supervise the use of existing resources and manage production with a view to local conditions and possibilities.

Even smaller forms of collective peasant labor than the brigade consisting of 20-30 farmsteads was characteristic of the organization of agricultural production in 1978 and 1979. One of the most important provisions of the "economic policy of the CCP in rural areas," which was set forth in the "Decisions of the CCP Central Committee on Some Problems in the Accelerated Development of Agriculture," drafted in December 1978 and fully approved in October 1979, was the relegation of production assignments to groups supervised by a single production brigade. The basic purpose of this measure is to supplement the "commune--large brigade--brigade" triple level of organization with something like a fourth level, corresponding to the low level of development of rural productive forces and the peasant consciousness. In accordance with the method of "group labor assignments," the resources of production brigades--their land, implements, livestock and manpower--are divided up and assigned to contracting production groups consisting of several farmsteads; output norms and labor units are then set for the groups. In the system of "individual norm calculation" and "individual responsibility in farming," small plots of land, implements and production quotas are assigned to one able-bodied peasant.

These primitive small-scale forms of organization are dictated by all the archaic features of Chinese agriculture, where labor productivity, according to the Chinese press, is the same as it was at the time of the Han dynasty, 2,000 years ago.⁹ In view of the fact that, as Beijing sees it, "agricultural production is now based on manual labor and the use of draught livestock in most parts of the country and the level of mechanization is low, the majority of field operations can best be conducted individually under the supervision of a single production brigade." The numerous reports on the introduction of this system make references to virtually all of China's main farming provinces, particularly the densely populated and traditionally agrarian regions in the center, south and east.

These aspects of the "economic policy of the CCP in rural areas," which are expected to develop the initiative and material incentive of the peasants, could evoke the proper response in an insignificant quantity of average-sized prosperous farmsteads with many able-bodied members and all of the necessary implements. The itemized calculation of time-consuming manual operations in small groups will stimulate their labor activity to a higher degree than in the brigades. In essence, the principles of labor norm-setting, the payment of wages according to the "work more and get more" method, and the eradication of absolute equality are aimed at these small groups. Beijing's hopes for some kind of stability in agricultural production are also largely connected with this small peasant substratum. There is abundant evidence that most of the peasants who have benefited from the introduction of this system and whose share of the year-end distribution of products and funds is much higher than the average are the members of the strong able-bodied families that were once called farmsteads with unpaid labor units. In the past, a large part of the income of these families was redistributed to support the poor. For example, one of the main conclusions that can be drawn from a detailed report in ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO on the "growing income" of

peasants in 1978 and 1979 is that there has only been an increase in the income of a handful of prosperous peasants, representing a negligible percentage of the rural population. In 1978 and 1979 the prosperous families that were once repressed as "rich peasants" and "wealthy homesteaders," regained their "good name," the rigid ceilings on the growth of their income were canceled, and their confiscated implements, money and products were returned to them. The central Chinese press has praised them as "diligent people who perform their work well."

The necessary lowering of the level of management in Chinese rural areas and the encouragement of brigade and group initiative gave rise to more pronounced centrifugal tendencies in the weak collective sector. It was acknowledged that the "emphasis on the independence of production brigades" has "given rise, in some places, to a reluctance to be guided by the state plan." Under the official cover of "group production assignments," the "latent disintegration" of the collective sector took on broader scales, and the groups became full-fledged economically accountable units in many locations, taking the place of production brigades with their "single supervisory entity."

It is indicative that these production groups are now called "mutual assistance groups" in many places. This was the name given to the groups which began the cooperative process in the 1950's. Behind the screen of these groups, traditional neighborhood and clan forms of production are being revived: "Father and son groups," groups consisting of the members of a single family, and groups of strong able-bodied workers who unite to increase their own income. The creation of small autonomous groups "is giving rise to new problems and new conflicts": the disintegration of brigades, the fragmentation of farming work, frequent refusals to use even existing machines, the appearance of "modified individual labor," "disagreement between commune members," rivalry between groups over existing production resources, and the danger of a "new disruption of agricultural production."¹⁰ The present "economic policy of the CCP in rural areas," which emphasizes the need for traditional small-groups and even individual forms of farming, is already causing the obvious exacerbation of social conflicts in the peasant cooperative sector of the PRC, which is still immature and has not taken final shape as a new social community.

The system of norm-setting in small groups benefits the prosperous peasants, who use it to usurp more of the prerogatives of collectives, and is of little advantage to poor peasants. Conditions in most parts of underdeveloped rural China give the numerous poor and poverty-stricken peasants only two choices: either sweatshop labor within the framework of the "system of responsibility" and "punishments and rewards," or the sabotage of this system, in which case weak farmsteads with only a few workers can hope for nothing more than their daily food ration. The poorest peasants, who never acquired, or lost, the talent for active labor under the conditions of the unrelieved work, with no prospects for anything better, and the beggarly rations in communes, have responded with open hostility or indifference to all the attempts to institute production group norms in rural areas, envisaging the payment of wages according to the fulfillment of field work norms, and not simply according to monthly and annual output norms. Chaos continued to reign in many brigades, and in spite of all demands from above, "per capita distribution" was still practiced. "Disorderly labor," "slipshod labor" and "either no work or unsatisfactory work" are still characteristic of rural areas.¹¹ The introduction

of the system of group and individual responsibility, which was objectively intended to heighten the initiative of prosperous farmsteads consisting of able-bodied individuals with excellent production skills, encountered serious obstacles in the form of the "ultra-leftist current" and the egalitarian outlook that is firmly entrenched in the minds of local authorities.

The strategic purpose of Beijing's present organizational measures and propaganda in rural areas is to guard the center of China, with its limited resources that are primarily earmarked for militarization, against the long-term and difficult problems of most of rural China, which is extremely underdeveloped, and to force rural China to find its own way out of these difficulties. In Beijing's opinion, as set forth in the June 1979 issue of HONGQI, in the majority of rural regions, with their low level of mechanization, the development of agricultural production, the elevation of the standard of living of peasants and the augmentation of collective accumulations must be accomplished by means of "the self-reliance of peasant masses," by means of the "cumulative labor" of peasants and their "persistent struggle"--the intensive use of live labor and draft cattle, the painstaking manual cultivation of fields to augment the yield per unit of farming area, the development of small enterprises and ancillary trades, capital construction in the fields, the construction of local roads and the planting of forests.

From Beijing's vantage point, the special importance of this line is that it directs the majority of rural inhabitants to make an independent and agonizing search for acceptable ways of guaranteeing expanded reproduction, and to fight an independent battle against the routine of semimedieval economic life. The Chinese leadership has had to acknowledge the huge proportion accounted for by underdeveloped rural regions which will be unaffected by centralized measures to modernize agriculture in a negligible number of "key agricultural bases." The majority of underdeveloped regions will have to continue, "for some time," engaging in agricultural production based on "semimechanization," the use of draft cattle and reliance on manual labor. As the June 1979 issue of HONGQI acknowledged, the mechanization and modernization of agriculture in an average Chinese district with a population of 500,000-600,000 would require 400 million yuan in capital investments. For the sake of comparison, let us consider the fact that the annual income of commune and brigade enterprises--this is supposed to be the main source of funds and accumulations for rural modernization at the present time--in an average Chinese district totals, according to nationwide statistics, just over 3 million yuan.¹²

The introduction of sweatshop "systems of responsibility" and rigid output norms per unit of farmland in a country where agrarian zones are overpopulated and plowland is limited should, according to the Beijing leaders, create a labor "surplus" which could be transferred to various ancillary branches and cottage industry for the purpose of making them self-sufficient. In connection with this, the central press has begun to actively propagandize the use of various branches of rural industry, operating on the basis of this labor surplus.

The pragmatic advances in the center's approach to problems in the modernization of agriculture are taking place under the conditions of the degradation of agricultural production and the failure of attempts to mobilize rural workers for a new "great leap." Whereas in 1976 and 1977 the Chinese leaders still hoped that intensive mechanization could be accomplished within a short period of time by

local forces on a "low level," in 1978 and 1979 these plans were gradually abandoned. Since the beginning of 1979 the plans for agricultural mechanization have assigned priority to the isolated objective of establishing and reinforcing mechanized districts and state farms, "modern bases" and "support points" in a small number of regions.

Instructing the majority of rural regions to "pool their labor" in local industrial-agricultural systems, Beijing has announced that "the center of gravity on the national scale must be transferred to the suburbs of large centers, large state farms and trade bases for grain, cotton, vegetable oil and sugarcane." "To enhance the economic impact of agricultural mechanization," HONGQI magazine stated, "forces must be concentrated for a decisive struggle...to use our limited capital, equipment and raw materials in the most important and profitable spheres. State capital investments in agriculture must be concentrated in a group of modern agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry, ancillary trade and fishing bases."¹³ This has been dictated by the main purpose of these plans--to lay a solid foundation for the constant provision of the main military-industrial centers with food and raw materials. The decision of the CCP Central Committee "On Some Problems in the Accelerated Development of Agriculture" frankly states that the modernization of agriculture and the augmentation of peasant income must be stimulated primarily in rural regions inhabited by only 5 percent of the national population, or, in other words, in existing major bases of commercial agriculture, taking in a negligible share of the plowland and rural population of China.

It is indicative that even when the main bases of commercial farming were established, particularly in the densely populated farming regions of the Yangzi and Huanghe river basins, no radical socioeconomic advances were made in the nature of peasant labor. The mechanization of a number of key spheres, which makes some manpower available, is utilized for the intensification of manual field work in other spheres. This kind of mechanization is closely associated with a "higher level of painstaking cultivation" by hand in small contracted groups.

The system for the production, delivery and repair of agricultural equipment is extremely costly and unreliable. The rise in labor productivity is far from consistent with the augmentation of the vehicle inventory. The number of draft cattle on mechanized plots is not decreasing. All of the expenses involved in the purchase of frequently worthless or substandard equipment, which is not equipped with spare parts, fuel or the possibility of repairs, plus the constant cost of maintaining working livestock must be borne by the peasants, and this reduces the income of farms and peasants.

The establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and the extensive use of extra-economic coercive methods by this regime resulted in the existence and development of a comparatively sizable social substratum of cadre--"ganbu"--consisting of party and administrative leaders, army officers, the heads of various public organizations and so forth. They control socioeconomic and political processes in the society. Although as a whole they represent the existing regime's basis of social support, the "ganbu" are deeply involved in the factional struggle and, consequently, the power struggle; various segments of this category, along with representatives of the intelligentsia, have always been the target of serious political campaigns, purges and programs of re-education by means of physical labor, which have turned them into a potential source of social upheavals in the nation.

The main reserve of personnel for party, government and administrative bodies is the PLA [People's Liberation Army], to which the Beijing leadership has assigned a special role in national sociopolitical life. In an attempt to adapt the army to the needs of their adventuristic policy and to turn it into a weapon of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, the Maoists have deliberately narrowed the social base of the PLA by drafting primarily members of the poorest peasant strata.

At present, the majority of cadres do not have a higher education. According to data for 1965, only 52 percent of the 145 "ganbu" surveyed in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, had a higher education.¹⁴ The situation is still the same today. According to the data of a study conducted in Gansu Province, "many komsomol workers of the provincial Communist Youth League committee have a low general educational level, many who are studying economics have no knowledge of mathematics, those who are studying politics cannot conduct a survey or write an article, and some do not even know the rules of punctuation."¹⁵

The "ganbu" are accountable only to their superiors, and not to the working masses. This has given rise to a variety of negative phenomena that are widespread within the "ganbu" substratum--corruption, graft, embezzlement and the harsh treatment of subordinates. Special investigations of abuses of power by the "ganbu" were conducted in 1978 in Xunyi District in Shaanxi Province and in the Hekou People's Commune in the Dau District of Hubei Province, and cases of embezzlement by cadres were investigated in the Zhumadian District of Henan Province and the city of Luda in Liaoning Province.

To put an end to these scandalous cases of lawlessness and to reinforce party discipline, a special disciplinary commission of the CCP Central Committee was created at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. However, judging by a flood of letters that the central newspapers have been unable to conceal, the campaign to stop abuses of power is not being conducted in many districts and regions. Domination by the "ganbu" is promoting the further bureaucratization of Chinese society and the creation of a social substratum which supports the present military-bureaucratic regime in the PRC. This substratum promotes the policy of the Chinese leadership. The "ganbu" social substratum's control over the main means of production, which are either state-owned or collective property, is now much stronger due to the absence of a democratic system of elections, the periodic transfer of cadres and the low educational level of the population. As a result of all this, many cadres stop performing their duties, cannot make the proper decisions at the proper time, and are only concerned with keeping their present position or gaining a higher position for themselves and their friends and relatives in defiance of existing laws.

The position of the intelligentsia is still shaky and difficult. The slight improvement in the working and living conditions of the intelligentsia was a temporary measure instituted by the Beijing leaders in connection with the program of "Four Modernizations." Since the time of the "Cultural Revolution," the Chinese leaders have never concerned themselves with preparing an intelligentsia through the higher educational system and the nation is now suffering from a shortage of personnel with a higher or secondary specialized education. In his speech at the First Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Guofeng frankly admitted that "the previously reduced gap between our country and the most advanced level of world science and technology has started to grow again in recent years. The

quality of teaching in academic institutions has deteriorated dramatically. The shortage of young personnel with special skills is being felt in all areas of work."¹⁶

The present Chinese leadership has begun to pay more attention to the training of an intelligentsia because it recognizes the great importance of science and technology in the augmentation of China's military potential. The role of higher education in the creation of an intelligentsia was somewhat augmented by the institution of new VUZ admission rules, worked out by the PRC Ministry of Education, and higher requirements for applicants. But VUZ admission figures are still low. As a spokesman for the PRC Ministry of Education informed a NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY correspondent, "higher academic institutions cannot accept all applicants as yet; it does not matter whether you go to rural or alpine regions or continue to work in your previous job--all of this is good because all of this serves the cause of the 'Four Modernizations.'"¹⁷ At a conference on higher education in Beijing in October 1978, it was noted that "it would not be wise to increase the number of students. Many difficulties exist, and they are particularly pronounced this year, with regard to dormitories, teaching materials, instructors and academic equipment, and they have not been overcome yet."¹⁸ Nonetheless, all Chinese VUZ's were advised to follow Tianjin's example in experimenting with additional student enrollment. This experiment is essentially one in which the students provide themselves with money and housing and attend classes only in branches of institutes and universities. If this experiment is conducted on a nationwide scale, it will diminish the quality of the training of specialists with a higher education even more because the students will not have the proper conditions for academic studies.

At the same time, China has many scientific, engineering and technical personnel who are not working in their specialty. According to data cited in the Chinese press, in some provinces the number of these personnel is equal to the number of VUZ graduates in these provinces over the last 3 years; in some provinces and districts the number even exceeds the number of persons working in their special field. Many members of the intelligentsia are dismissed from their jobs because of their age, even though they are still capable of working. In particular, according to the statistics division of the railroad administration of a large city, 31 engineering and technical workers were dismissed in recent years although a third of them could have continued to work.¹⁹ It appears that many members of the intelligentsia now simply have no chance of working in their specialty.

On the other hand, the members of the scientific, technical and artistic intelligentsia who are working in their specialty are still likely to be taken away from their jobs and sent elsewhere to perform physical labor. Although the Chinese leaders have announced that scientific, engineering and technical personnel must spend five-sixths of their time in their main job, it has been officially acknowledged that this rule is not being observed at many enterprises and in many mines, and many cadres believe that this provision does not apply to this category of workers. As we can see, the Chinese intelligentsia is still not being given an opportunity to perform mental labor. In addition to the use of higher education as a form of training for the intelligentsia, the present Chinese leadership has proposed the retention of the forms of training that were used during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" and later to make up for the shortage of specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education.

In this way, two intelligentsias are being created in China. The first group is being trained in the system of higher education, its members are hand-picked and are then sent to enterprises of central jurisdiction and to scientific research institutes which serve the goal of national militarization. The second group receives its professional training through other types of education. The level of this training is generally low due to the low theoretical level of teaching and the brevity of the training course. The specialists of this group are mainly employed by enterprises which satisfy the material demands of the public.

This policy of the Beijing leaders will divide the Chinese intelligentsia into two different social groups, completely distinct from one another in the system of social production.

One of the peculiarities of the social class structure of the PRC is the artificial preservation of the national bourgeoisie. It has lost the basis for its existence as a class, but the measures taken by the Beijing leaders have allowed it to retain some of the characteristics which categorize it as a separate social stratum. By a decision of the CCP Central Committee (January 1979), the bank accounts and other property confiscated from the national bourgeoisie during the "Cultural Revolution" have been returned, the previous higher wages of members of the national bourgeoisie who have remained in administrative positions have been restored, and they have been repaid the withheld portion of their salary.

In a speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, Ye Jianying said that "the former capitalists--the overwhelming majority of those who are able to work--have been reeducated and have become workers who support themselves by means of their own labor."²⁰ A campaign is now being conducted in the Chinese press to demand the removal of the "label" from the bourgeoisie and to deny that the bank accounts returned to them and their higher wages are "income from exploitation." What is more, references are being made, on the one hand, to the relatively low number of living representatives of the national bourgeoisie--500,000--and to their relatively low income level,²¹ and on the other hand, to the fact that these measures will encourage capitalist huaqiao abroad, especially in Hong Kong and Macao, to invest in the Chinese economy for the completion of the program of "Four Modernizations."

The possibility of the revival of capitalist tendencies in the economy has become a reality in connection with the policy of the Beijing leaders, who have begun to cooperate with capitalist monopolies and have flung the doors of the national economy wide open to foreign capital. The establishment of a significant number of enterprises jointly with foreign capital signaled the birth of unique types of state-capitalist enterprises in the socioeconomic structure of the PRC.²²

Special privileges have been offered to foreign monopolies for the purpose of attracting them on a broad scale. A law passed by the Third Session of the NPC stipulates that enterprises jointly owned by Chinese and foreign capital will be taxed at a rate 20 percent below the rate in developed countries and slightly lower than the rate in developing countries. To dispel the worries of Western investors, by a decision of the Beijing leaders the Chinese People's Insurance Company is offering new types of insurance and, in particular, "political risk insurance." The Chinese side has promised to cover all losses incurred by foreign

businessmen "in the event of strikes, riots and the requisition, confiscation or seizure of insured property by government agencies."

All of this testifies that unique types of state-capital enterprises have made their appearance in the socioeconomic structure of the PRC. The Maoists' favorable treatment of the national bourgeoisie is motivated by a desire to use it as a middleman in closer contacts with the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie to gain access to its economic potential, exceeding 15 billion dollars, as well as the financial, economic, scientific, technical and other potential of the countries where the overseas bourgeoisie lives and to use all of this potential for the accelerated military-industrial development of the PRC.

Therefore, new tendencies, attesting to China's further departure from the positions of scientific socialism, have become apparent in the socioeconomic policy of the Chinese leadership. The socialist foundations of the economic basis laid in the first years of the PRC's existence are being deformed even more. Despite the fact the new economic measures taken in the last two or three years by the Beijing leadership to neutralize the most odious features of its policy, the socioeconomic structure of China is still strongly influenced by the Maoist policy line. As a result, during the course of the prolonged deformation of the superstructure, which has changed the nature of national government radically, serious negative changes have taken place in the socioeconomic structure of society: The leading role of the working class in Chinese society is being undermined, and the ties binding the working class to the peasantry have been severed. This could lead to the gradual disappearance of socialist elements from the socioeconomic structure of Chinese society and, ultimately, to grave consequences affecting the fate of the entire Chinese population.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 10 September 1979.
2. GONGREN RIBAO, 20 August 1980.
3. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 28 August 1979; RENMIN RIBAO, 28 June 1979.
4. RENMIN RIBAO, 4 August 1979.
5. Ibid., 15 April 1979.
6. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 3 February 1979.
7. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 February 1978.
8. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 11 January 1979.
9. GUANGMING RIBAO, 19 January 1979.
10. HONGQI, 1979, No 5; RENMIN RIBAO, 23 February 1979, 15 March 1979, 19 April 1979, 21 May 1979, 24 May 1979, etc.

11. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 September 1978, 9 May 1979; GUANGMING RIBAO, 14 October 1978.
12. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 December 1978, 6 February 1979; HONGQI, 1979, No 6.
13. HONGQI, 1979, No 3, p 57; 1979, No 6, p 8.
14. Ying-mao, Kau, "The Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: A Case Study of Wuhan, 1949-1965--Chinese Communist Politics in Action," Seattle-London, 1969, p 227.
15. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 27 March 1979.
16. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.
17. Ibid., 22 October 1977.
18. Ibid., 11 November 1978.
19. Ibid., 24 November 1978.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 September 1979.
21. According to the statistics for the four largest cities in the PRC (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou), just before the Cultural Revolution 79.3 percent of all capitalists had a monthly salary of less than 100 yuan, 20 percent earned from 100 to 300 yuan, and 0.7 percent earned more than 300 yuan (ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO, 8 September 1979).
22. In 1979 there were more than 200 joint enterprises in just the coastal regions of Guangdong Province.

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CSO: 1805

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORICAL STUDIES OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN 1928-1937

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 117-129

[Article by M. V. Koval', candidate of economic sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

THE FAILURE OF MAOISM IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 130-142

[Article by R. M. Aslanov, candidate of historical sciences, and B. A. Bolotin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The present line of the Chinese leadership is a fairly strange, unscrupulous and unnatural combination of revolutionary, Marxist terminology with a deviationist policy that is a betrayal of the revolution and Marxism-Leninism. The possibility of this kind of situation was once pointed out by V. I. Lenin. "Opportunism," he wrote, "can be expressed in the terms of any doctrine whatsoever, including Marxism."¹ Explaining the nature of such phenomena, V. I. Lenin noted that "the theoretical victory of Marxism has made its enemies put on a Marxist disguise."²

The Maoists have pretended, and are still pretending, to be Marxist-Leninists. They once made active use of revolutionary terminology to gain the trust of the communist movement in an attempt to head the world revolutionary process and to ensure China a leading position in the world through the agency of revolutionary forces. Beijing is now striving, just as it has in the past, to embellish its overtly pro-imperialist policy within China and in the international arena with pseudo-Marxist phrases and arguments.

According to the plans of Mao Zedong and his supporters, the attainment of Chinese hegemony in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, was to be an important stage on the way to world supremacy. "We," Mao declared, "must take Southeast Asia.... Regions like Southeast Asia are extremely rich and have many minerals.... In the future, this region will be extremely useful in the development of Chinese industry.... After we take Southeast Asia...the east wind will prevail over the west wind."³ Mao Zedong and his associates believed that favorable conditions for the spread of Maoism's ideological and political influence in the Southeast Asian countries were created by the geographic proximity of these countries to China, the presence in these countries of a large Chinese population and other ethnic groups also living in China, the historical features common to these countries and China, the traditional ties between them, the similarity of the class composition of participants in the revolutionary movement, and the appeal of the example set by the Chinese revolution.

At first, the execution of great-Han plans centered around the most radical measures, around the accomplishment of an immediate revolution in these countries. The Chinese leaders appear to be struck by what V. I. Lenin called "the revolutionary

itch." "The revolutionary itch usually afflicts revolutionary parties when these parties make a direct or indirect attempt to combine, connect and unite proletarian and petty bourgeois elements," V. I. Lenin wrote, "and when the course of revolutionary events is distinguished by massive and quick reversals. The revolutionary itch is a condition in which revolutionary slogans are repeated without any regard for objective conditions, after any reversal, and in any set of circumstances. The slogans are superb, appealing and intoxicating, but they are completely groundless, and this is the essence of the revolutionary itch.... There is not one grain of real revolutionary spirit here; there is only an obsession with revolutionary phrases."⁴

These empty revolutionary phrases, which are an inherent part of the petty bourgeois aspects of Maoism and which are used with a view to the objective shortage of theoretical maturity and experience in purely proletarian revolutionary struggle in China's neighboring Asian countries, have been employed by the Beijing leadership as an important means of obtaining great-power goals.

Displaying a consumer approach to Marxism-Leninism, the Maoists are trying to use only those of its elements that can be adapted to the interests of their hegemonic policy. In the Maoist interpretation, Marxist-Leninist tenets lose their real meaning, their actual purpose and their class content.

"Using Marxist terminology, Beijing is spreading views that have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. Maoism was born in a backward country, which had been suffering from colonial oppression for a long time, as a unique peasant version of petty bourgeois revolutionism. This is an ideology which reflects the desire of the petty bourgeois to improve his status immediately, by means of universal egalitarianism, and if not, then let all mankind perish."⁵

The Maoists' parasitical usage of Marxist-Leninist doctrine explains to some degree the relative stability and temporary appeal of Maoism to the backward and politically inexperienced working masses.

The Maoists' nationalistic speculation on individual tenets of revolutionary doctrine was not as obvious during the Chinese people's armed struggle against the sociopolitical forces that were openly displaying contempt for China's national interests. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, however, it became increasingly apparent.

Soon after the PRC was founded, the "Thought of Mao Zedong," supposedly a result of the "combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution," began to be referred to persistently and methodically in statements by Chinese leaders. Even then, the Maoists were already planning to distort the facts so as to pass Mao Zedong off as one of the founders of revolutionary theory, and then to impose the "Thought of Mao Zedong" on the Asian and world liberation movement. For this purpose, official Chinese propaganda began to distort the history of the Chinese revolution, depicting Mao Zedong as the person who was supposedly able to apply revolutionary theory, worked out by the founders of Marxism with a view to the experience and conditions of the developed capitalist countries, to the conditions of a semifeudal, semicolonial country.

In the Maoist interpretation, the Chinese revolutionary experience appeared to be an endless chain of victories, exclusively due to the theoretical generalizations and political leadership of Mao Zedong. The history of the Chinese revolution, as fabricated by the Maoists, completely denied the significance of the objective international conditions and the subjective factors that contributed directly and decisively to the victory of the Chinese people.

However, "the Chinese people's victory in 1949 was, in the broadest sense, a great victory for Marxism-Leninism, which had correctly defined the relationship between general and specific factors in the development of the revolutionary process in semifeudal, semicolonial China."⁶ By excluding the most important elements from the causes and conditions of the Chinese revolutionary victory--the changes brought about in the world correlation of class forces by the victories of real socialism, the general successes in the development of the world revolutionary process and the international assistance of world socialism, the workers and communist movements and all progressive forces in the world--the Maoists were attempting to do more than just extol China, the Chinese revolution and the "Thought of Mao Zedong." When Beijing refuted the significance of decisive changes in the world situation and denied the outstanding role of the international support given to the Chinese revolution, it was primarily striving to depict Maoism as a separate and unique revolutionary theory for the underdeveloped countries of Asia and to ensure China's ideological hegemony in these countries.

The exclusivity and superiority of everything Chinese, particularly the Chinese revolution, which had supposedly triumphed by means of "self-reliance," the unique revolutionary potential of the peasantry and special methods of armed struggle, began to be openly propagandized in the Chinese press. After inheriting the reactionary idea of world supremacy for China, Beijing began to claim a leading role in the socialist community and the world revolutionary, liberation and communist movement.

In this connection, it was extremely important for the Maoist leaders of the PRC to encourage other communist parties to accept the falsified experience of the Chinese revolution, as stated in the "Thought of Mao Zedong," including the following three basic components: 1) armed struggle as the basic form of revolutionary struggle, regardless of objective and subjective conditions in the country; 2) "revolutionary support bases" in remote rural areas; 3) rural encirclement of the cities.

It was this tactical scheme of revolution that the Maoists forced on the communist parties of the Southeast Asian countries after the end of World War II. Viewing Southeast Asia as a "natural" sphere of its influence, the Chinese leadership was already trying to gain control over the communist parties of this region in the 1940's. Ignoring the specific historical conditions and the new alignment of class and political forces after the war, the Maoists urged the communist parties to start "people's wars" modeled on the Chinese example, despite the absence of any objective need for this, and compelled them to oppose the political groups of the national bourgeois and revolutionary democratic currents that were supported by much of the population.

Chinese intervention put the Communist Party of Indonesia in a difficult spot. Deliberately inciting the communist party to adventuristic actions, Beijing placed it under severe attack by reactionary forces at the precise time when these forces were able to mobilize all of their strength and establish their power. The consequences of the events of 30 September 1965 in Indonesia were tragic. Hundreds of thousands of communist party members were suppressed, imprisoned and executed. In those difficult days for the Communist Party of Indonesia, Beijing did not even think of coming to its defense and did not raise its voice to protest the persecution of the Indonesian communists. What is more, Beijing refused to learn any lessons from the failure of its faulty policy line and continued to impose on the Indonesian communist movement even after the 1965 events. Pro-Maoist elements in this party, blindly repeating Mao Zedong's statements about the creation of "revolutionary support bases" and imitating CCP tactics of the 1930's, founded something like a "liberated region" in 1967, near Blitar in East Java. Chinese propaganda, proclaiming to the entire world that there was a "sea of people's war on East Java," repeatedly mentioned the specific locations of partisan detachments, and RENMIN RIBAO even printed a map which pinpointed the locations of Indonesian partisan forces. This publication appeared to have been timed to coincide with the Indonesian Army's commencement of operations in July 1968 against partisan forces, which were soon defeated. One of the main reasons for this defeat was Beijing's outright treachery.

The adventurism of the Maoists gave reactionary militarists an excuse to discredit the Indonesian Communist Party in the eyes of the Indonesian people and for a new wave of repressive actions against Indonesian communists. In this situation, the only correct course of action was the immediate restoration of the Indonesian Communist Party on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles. This objective was outlined in "The Present Objectives of the Communist Movement in Indonesia," a document drawn up by Indonesian Marxist-Leninists in 1969.

"Indonesian communists," a representative of the Indonesian Communist Party announced at the festivities commemorating the 50th anniversary of the USSR, "are now continuing their struggle under difficult conditions underground. We have learned more than we wanted to know about the misery and losses Maoism brings. The rebirth of the Indonesian Communist Party on a Marxist-Leninist basis can only be accomplished on the condition of resolute separation from Maoism and an irreconcilable struggle against any rightist and 'leftist'-opportunist tendencies. We have resisted all attempts by Maoist elements to isolate the Indonesian Communist Party from the international communist movement and to turn our party into a weapon of struggle against the fraternal parties."

Despite the severe trials suffered by the Indonesian communists (for which the Maoist leaders of China are also responsible), this communist party has now been revived and its central leadership is taking action. As the leaders of the party have stressed, it is once again guided by Marxist-Leninist doctrine in all of its activity. It has informed communists that their principal duty is to continue the struggle against reaction and imperialism and for an Indonesian revolution, which will contribute to the establishment of a socialist Indonesia in the future. This work is now being conducted under the difficult conditions of the underground. Revolutionary forces have been greatly weakened and disorganized by anticomunist terrorism, and they are still suffering the consequences of reactionary attacks. The Indonesian Communist Party is particularly concerned with strengthening its ranks and cooperating with other patriotic forces.⁸

The use of Beijing recipes considerably weakened the Philippine Communist Party. Armed struggle in the absence of a revolutionary situation, and isolation from the main forces of the international communist movement had a negative effect on the status of this party. At the end of the 1960's, the CCP leadership tried to force the Philippine Communist Party to accept the "Thought of Mao Zedong" unconditionally. After this attempt failed, the Chinese leaders urged pro-Maoist elements to seize leading positions in the party. When this plan also failed, Beijing sanctioned and financed the creation of the so-called "Philippine Communist Party of the Thought of Mao Zedong" by schismatics expelled from the Philippine Communist Party for factional activity.

The Philippine Maoists, who chose as their emblem a machine-gun with a hammer and sickle in the background, embarked on the course of prolonged "people's war," taking the form of a policy of terror and isolated acts of violence. As Philippine CP documents noted, the leader of the Philippine Maoists, J. Sison (also known as A. Guerrero), "made a fetish of the rifle and reduced Marxism-Leninism to the status of a cowboy ideology." Subversive pro-Beijing activity brought J. Sison and his associates to the prisoner's dock, and they were tried as common, and not political, prisoners. But this did not put an end to the gangster tactics of the Maoists. Detachments of the Maoist group which calls itself the "New People's Army," which thrive on banditry, are still receiving weapons, means of communication and propaganda literature from China, and their command personnel are being trained in China.

According to reports in the press, immediately prior to the arrival of Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua in the Philippines in March 1980, members of the pro-Beijing extremist group and Moro separatists organized several disturbances, during the course of which more than 150 people were killed and wounded. It has long been known that the Maoist revolutionary fighters in the Philippines are supported by the CIA as well as Beijing.

Philippine communists are fighting an irreconcilable struggle against Maoism, which has not received any serious support from the masses. Resolutely rejecting the authoritarian instructions of the Chinese leaders and creatively seeking their own methods of struggle, they are aware of the negative aspects of the separatism and sectarianism cultivated by Beijing and they have expressed a desire to unite with world revolutionary and progressive forces.

In the Philippines, a representative of this country's communist party said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "leftist" adventurists support reaction in its struggle against the implementation of a national democratic program of profound structural reforms, which would put the country on the path of non-capitalist development and would eventually lead it to socialism. "The Philippine Communist Party," he said, "has to fight on two fronts: On one side, against ultra-reactionary forces, which are striving to preserve the status quo at any cost, and on the other, against ultra-leftist forces, which are denying the importance of current changes and are conspiring with the right wing."⁹

The Philippine CP has resolutely dissociated itself from Beijing's hegemonic policy and has condemned the flagrant intervention in the affairs of Afghanistan and the subversive activity against the April revolution. In a statement published in January 1980, Philippine communists expressed their "profound worries about the unprecedented campaign launched by the United States, England, China and some of

their allies in connection with the events in Afghanistan." The document concludes with the statement that "the Philippine Communist Party unconditionally supports the Afghan people and their revolutionary conquests, and supports all acts of fraternal solidarity that will help to protect and preserve these conquests and will safeguard the sovereignty of Afghanistan."

Beijing's intervention in the affairs of the Communist Party of Burma had negative consequences. Not all of the CP leaders agreed with the tactic of "people's war" forced on them by the Chinese leaders. The fact that this tactic was used against the Revolutionary Council, which took power in 1962 and began to institute progressive socioeconomic reforms in the country, made it all the more inappropriate and unwarranted.

The revision of the ultra-leftist, antinational line imposed from outside in the mid-1960's was advocated by a group of senior party members, including Deputy Chairman Goshal (Thakin Ba Tin) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma and Kuo Thei. The veterans won the support of several local party organizations. Events built up to a split in the party, but it did not take place because in 1967 and 1968 the pro-Beijing leadership executed many prominent party members who had taken a patriotic and internationalist stand. The Chinese-style "cultural revolution" conducted within the Communist Party of Burma inflicted losses on the party that were unparalleled even in the days of the colonial domination and foreign occupation of Burma.

After getting rid of their opponents, the Maoist leaders of the Communist Party of Burma ordered the commencement of actions against government troops in the first half of 1968. All of this was done without any support from the popular masses. The adventuristic actions of Mao's Burmese followers led the party to serious defeats.

Soon after Hua Guofeng became chairman of the CCP Central Committee, he met with Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma,¹⁰ who had been residing continuously in Beijing since 1950 and represented the "doyen" of Southeast Asian Maoists in the Chinese capital. Hua announced that no changes would be made in the line, inherited from Mao Zedong, of supporting Beijing's minions outside China and wished his "comrades-in-arms" success in the struggle to overthrow the "reactionary Ne Win regime."

The armed struggle in Burma, inspired by Beijing, is still going on, although its unpopularity among the working masses has now become particularly evident. Its new features are, firstly, the alliance of Maoist rebels with rightist separatists from the Kachin, Shan, Palaung, Pao, Mon and Karen nationalities and other ethnic groups that were just recently branded "reactionaries" "nationalists" and "racists" by the Maoists and, secondly, the coordination of the actions of the PRC authorities and U.S. special services in support of "leftist" and rightist antigovernment forces.

It is true that Beijing has reined externally correct relations with the Burmese Government. This attests to the dual--or, more precisely two-faced--policy that is now being conducted by China in relations with other Southeast Asian countries as well. On the one hand, the PRC leaders are striving to win the ruling circles

in these countries over to their side in the hope of gaining their support for Beijing's hegemonic plans, which are directed primarily against Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and on the other, they are using the actions of rebel forces, controlled by China, to exert pressure on these governments.

Inciting the governments of Thailand and other ASEAN countries to confrontations with Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina, Beijing has indicated that it is willing to disregard the interests of the disoriented local communists it has deceived for the sake of its own hegemonic plans in this region.

According to a FRENCH PRESS AGENCY report of 19 February 1979, in 1978 when then Thai Prime Minister K. Chamanan asked if Beijing were willing to refuse to assist the communist movement in Southeast Asia, Deng Xiaoping replied that China supposedly had to provide this kind of assistance because it would otherwise be offered by "others." "However," Deng went on, "if your government should take repressive actions against this movement, our ambassadors will not object." Deng Xiaoping also allegedly told the members of one Thai delegation that they would "not have to worry about the Thai Communist Party any more."¹¹

In 1979 Thailand was visited by Chinese governmental and military delegations, as well as a delegation from the PRC's Minister of Public Security, at which time the assistance of Pol Pot's gangs, fleeing to Thailand from Kampuchea, was discussed. In exchange for the services of the Thai Government, Beijing agreed to redirect the armed detachments of its followers in Thailand to commit provocative acts against the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The Thai authorities followed Beijing's lead and supported the remnants of Pol Pot's gangs, helping them to invade Kampuchea. According to the news agency of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, some border regions of Kampuchea were attacked by missiles and artillery from Thai territory and several border incidents took place. Some units of the republic's People's Revolutionary Army resolutely repulsed the provocateurs.

"The forces behind the escalation of tension on Kampuchea's western borders and the attempts to revitalize the political corpses swept out of the Kampuchean land by a now free people, are the same forces that put the clique of pro-imperialist generals in power in Phnom Penh in 1970, and Maoist agents in 1975--Washington and Beijing. Within the general channel of their military and political alliance, both the United States and the PRC are interfering with the normalization of conditions in Indochina."¹²

In 1974 A. Razak, then the prime minister of Malaysia, was received by the Chinese leaders. Commenting on the results of Razak's talks with Mao, officials in Kuala Lumpur announced that these talks had left Malaysian communists "without a leg to stand on."

As soon as the prime minister returned to Malaysia from the Chinese capital, a propaganda campaign was launched, during the course of which local authorities attempted to stress the fact that Beijing was no longer on the side of the partisans. In corroboration of this, leaflets with photographs of Mao Zedong and A. Razak shaking hands were dropped from airplanes and helicopters in partisan regions.

It is no secret that it was after Razak's visit to Beijing that the Malaysian Government changed its tactics in dealing with partisan groups and detachments. Whereas the government had previously hoped that the rebels would agree to surrender to the authorities on the condition that their freedom would be guaranteed, it now resolved to destroy the rebels by all of the means at its disposal. The suspected locations of partisan bases were subjected to intensive bombing and missile fire. Beijing, which had urged people who trusted it to take risks and unwarranted actions, not only made no effort to come to their rescue, but even openly encouraged their political opponents.

In 1975 the Chinese press printed more articles advising the Malaysian communists to continue their armed struggle,¹³ and "The Voice of the Malaysian Revolution," a radio broadcast from China, announced that the ruling "cliques" in Malaysia had to be overthrown. Recent events indicate that a lack of principles and narrow pragmatism are still characteristic features of the policy of the Chinese leaders.

When PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua toured the Southeast Asian countries in spring 1980, he invariably refused to answer any questions about Beijing's support of antigovernmental underground groups in the region. At a meeting with news correspondents in Singapore, he said that this matter was "too delicate to discuss with representatives of the press."

The Chinese leadership's foreign policy zigzags are confusing all those who were once carried away by Maoist slogans. Confusion and chaos reign in the pro-Beijing parties of Southeast Asia. The Malaysian Communist Party has split into three parts: In addition to the Communist Party of Malaysia, there are the "CPM (Marxist-Leninist)" and "CPM (Revolutionary)," which interpret the "Thought of Mao" in different ways and are fiercely fighting one another. There is no unity in the communist parties of Burma and Thailand. Some of the members of these parties are "sobering up," are experiencing a desire to reassess the experience of the recent past and are beginning to criticize Maoist tenets, now that they are certain that there is no mass support for these tenets.

The possible consequences of follow! Beijing's instructions are graphically illustrated by the sad example of Kampuchea. Between April 1975 and January 1979, this country was ruled by a clique of Chinese proteges who obediently followed the orders of their masters. With the aid of this clique, Beijing tried to transplant the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" in Kampuchean soil and to establish a Maoist-style political and social order in Kampuchea. This monstrous experiment envisaged the mass eviction of people from the cities, hard labor for everyone without exception, the liquidation of academic institutions and cultural establishments, the confiscation of personal property, the denial of the right to communicate with friends and relatives and the cancellation of travel and correspondence rights.

"You have won a remarkable victory! Mao Zedong said to Pol Pot's troops. "One blow—and there are no more classes."¹⁴ Pol Pot frankly associated all that he and his comrades did with the name of Mao Zedong and with his "Thought." When he was in Beijing, he said: "Chairman Mao and the Chinese people have supplied us with the most valuable aid for the accomplishment of revolution in Kampuchea, namely the ideology of Mao Zedong."¹⁵

Following the orders of the Beijing hegemonists, the puppet regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary committed genocide of unprecedented scales against their own people. Mass executions were held on the slightest pretext. Fanatical methods were employed to take revenge on undesirables. Within 3 years and 8 months, around 3 million people died as a result of executions, torture, starvation and disease. In Pol Pot's words, if just a million natives were left in Kampuchea, this would be enough. The planned and deliberate annihilation of the Khmer nationality was being carried out so that Kampuchea could be settled by Chinese. "Now we can clearly see," wrote one Kampuchean leader, Roch Samai, "that the purpose of establishing the first Maoist-style political order outside of China, in Kampuchea, under the cover of which our people were mercilessly tortured, was, in the final analysis, the preparation of new 'living area' by Beijing for settlement by its huaqiao, and the transformation of Kampuchea into a support base of militant expansionism in Southeast Asia."¹⁶

Beijing recommended that the Kampuchean experiment be taken as a model by Maoists in other countries. It organized pilgrimages for Australian, American, Japanese and other Maoists to Pol Pot's Kampuchea. The CCP leadership set up a coordinating bureau in Phnom Penh for the direct supervision of pro-Beijing groups in Southeast Asia.

Through the efforts of Beijing and its obedient servants, Kampuchea became a source of tension in Southeast Asia and a bridgehead for aggressive, expansionist, provocative actions against neighboring countries. The realization of the dangerous plans of the Chinese rulers and their puppets was impeded by the Kampuchean people, who rebelled against the alien regime they hated. With no support among the masses, the pro-Beijing regime collapsed, like a house of cards. The victory of the anti-Maoist revolution, achieved under the guidance of a united front for the national salvation of Kampuchea, afforded the Kampuchean people favorable prospects for free and independent development and dealt a perceptible blow to Beijing's crazy plans to gain control over the Indochinese countries and the rest of the Southeast Asian states.

Reluctant to accept their defeat in Kampuchea, the Chinese leaders are still supporting the last remnants of Pol Pot's gangs. In March 1980 they received Khieu Samphan, who succeeded Pol Pot as "premier" of a non-existent regime, in Beijing. Incidentally, it was this same Khieu Samphan who felt no need to conceal the fact that Washington, as well as Beijing, was involved in the attempts to strengthen Pol Pot's followers, when he was interviewed by Western journalists, with whom he supposedly met "somewhere in the jungle." According to the American press, he candidly declared: "We are deeply grateful to the United States.... If the United States continues to give us military or economic assistance, we would certainly be very, very grateful."¹⁷

Beijing has also become a refuge for other political corpses--Sisanan, who fled from Laos, and Hoang Van Hoan, who betrayed the Vietnamese people. Beijing has used this renegade rabble to form the "pocket parties" it hopes to set up in opposition to the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos and the Communist Party of Vietnam.

In their subversive activity against Laos, the Chinese rulers have even enlisted the services of such inveterate counterrevolutionaries and cutthroats as General Wang Pao, who serves the CIA and whose gangs operate near the Sino-Lao border.

All kinds of "fronts" are being put together in the PRC to represent the minorities living in the northern regions of Laos and Vietnam, and armed detachments of people of these nationalities are being formed for diversionary actions against the LPDR and SRV. Current plans call for the creation of the puppet "Meo state" in the north of Laos and Vietnam.

Beijing's intervention in Vietnamese affairs has a long history. For a long time, the Chinese leaders tried to interfere with the creation of the united Vietnamese State. "In 1954," Soviet researcher Ye. V. Kobelev wrote, "the head of the Chinese delegation at a Geneva conference, Zhou Enlai, mortally wounded Ho Chi Minh when he entered into direct negotiations with the French delegation, without the consent of the DRV Government, and proposed that the Vietnamese question be settled by the division of Vietnam into two parts. Ho Chi Minh, for whom the fight for a free and united Vietnam was the sole purpose of life, had to live with this wound in all the years to come, with all of his thoughts dominated by the passionate desire to liberate the usurped south of the nation and unite his native land on a socialist foundation."¹⁸ Beijing, on the other hand, had an interest in perpetuating the division of Vietnam because this, according to its calculations, would simplify the conduct of hegemonic policy on the Indochinese peninsula.

The CCP leaders made several attempts to brainwash the Vietnamese communists in the Maoist spirit. As reported in "The Truth About Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in the Last 30 Years," a document published in October 1979 by the SRV Minister of Foreign Affairs, when the Beijing leaders negotiated with the Vietnamese side in 1963, they were already trying to convince the Vietnamese comrades to renounce the unity of the socialist camp, promote a split in the communist movement and help to "pave the way" for Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. The Beijing leaders even resorted to direct bribes. In the mid-1960's, Deng Xiaoping promised Vietnam 1 billion yuan if it should break off relations with the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese side resolutely denied China's request.

During the period of American imperialist aggression against Vietnam, Beijing categorically refused to act jointly with the communist parties and socialist countries in support of the Vietnamese people. The Beijing leaders demanded over and over that Vietnam "break off relations with the Soviet Union," threatening that the failure to do this could sever relations between the two parties.¹⁹

The PRC rulers actually encouraged U.S. aggression in Vietnam and other Indochinese countries, in the hope of seeing these countries weakened, ruined and alienated from one another, which would simplify their subsequent subjugation by China. This is why the Vietnamese people's liberation of the southern half of their native land in 1975 and the declaration of a united Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976 signified a serious defeat for the Chinese hegemonists as well as the American imperialists. From that time, Beijing has been openly hostile to Vietnam, even resorting to armed attacks that have been resolutely repulsed by the Vietnamese people.

In connection with China's treacherous aggression against Vietnam in February-March 1979, Comrade I. I. Brezhnev said: "With this unprecedented arrogant, piratical attack on a small neighboring country--socialist Vietnam--the present Beijing rulers have clearly shown the entire world the insidious, aggressive nature of their great-power, hegemonic policy. Now everyone can see that it is this policy that now represents the most serious threat to peace throughout the world."²⁰

The Vietnamese communists are profoundly aware of the danger emanating from Maoist China. "The Chinese reactionaries," Secretary General Le Duan of the VCP Central Committee remarked, "have become overt enemies of the Vietnamese people and are seriously undermining the revolutionary cause of the people of the world. The fight against imperialism, the chief enemy of the revolution, is inseparable from the fight against China's great-Han expansionism and great-power hegemonism. The struggle to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism will require the resolute exposure of all of the reactionary doctrines of Beijing ruling circles."²¹

Beijing's hegemonic ambitions are being condemned irately in the Mongolian People's Republic, the territory of which was openly claimed by Mao Zedong. The present Chinese leaders have also laid claim to Mongolian territory. In recent years, hundreds of provocations have been started by armed Chinese personnel near the Chinese-Mongolian border. Sizable detachments of the Chinese Army are concentrated here. Military exercises are frequently held here to intimidate people's Mongolia.

At the November Plenum of the MPRV [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee in 1979, First Secretary of the MPRV Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural Yu. Tsedenbal stressed: "We must frankly said that the threat posed to the independence and sovereignty of the MPR by the Beijing authorities does exist. Naturally, until this threat has been eliminated, we will need the effective assistance of the Soviet Union to defend the independence and security of our socialist homeland."²²

China's territorial claims also extend to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. During the "Cultural Revolution," Mao Zedong's group tried to exert strong pressure on the DPRK, even going so far as economic sanctions and the provocation of border conflicts. Later Beijing began to resort to double-dealing policy toward the DPRK. It makes statements in support of Korea, but its actions assist Korea's enemies.

Numerous facts indicate that the Chinese leaders fully approve of the presence of American troops with nuclear weapons and missiles on the Asian continent.²³ An article in the WASHINGTON POST on the situation on the Korean peninsula stated that China "secretly hopes that the American troops will stay in South Korea." In private talks with high-level American officials, the Chinese, according to this newspaper, have insisted on the preservation of American military potential in South Korea. When the inconsistency of their position on the Korean question is pointed out to them, "their replies are often vague and irresponsible."²⁴

The armed demonstration by South Korean workers in May 1980 was reported with extreme restraint in Beijing, and absolutely nothing was said about the participation of the so-called united command of the American and South Korean armed forces in the repression of the South Korean population.

The Chinese leaders have appealed for the creation of an American-Chinese-Japanese alliance in the Far East, and this will certainly involve South Korea, which is connected by a thousand bonds, including military, to the United States and Japan. The danger of a new Washington-Beijing-Tokyo-Seoul axis is being discussed with increasing frequency in the Japanese communist and democratic press.

American-Japanese military cooperation on the basis of the "Security Treaty" is looked upon favorably in China today, and the revival of Japanese militarism is being welcomed. Establishing broader and more thorough contacts with Japanese reaction and the military establishment, Beijing ruling circles are displaying utterly unconcealed hostility toward the Japan Communist Party.

Mao Zedong condemned the JCP as early as 1966, after its representatives spoke with the CCP leadership and refused to accept the line of "exclusively violent revolution" in Japan and rejected the idea of an international "anti-American, Anti-Soviet united front."²⁵ The Japanese communists did not feel that the "Thought of Mao" was applicable to Japan. They not only had no intention of entering into a fight against the Soviet Union, which could not in any sense be ranked with the United States, but also supported united action by the USSR and PRC in the struggle against the U.S. aggression in Vietnam.

The JCP's "disobedience" led to attacks by the Chinese leadership, which later grew into political struggle and subversive activity against the JCP. Maoist propaganda called the JCP one of the "enemies of the Japanese and Chinese people, the people of Asia and the entire world." Beijing radio broadcasted appeals to Japanese voters, asking them not to vote for communists. Representatives of the JCP in Beijing were persecuted and insulted by Red Guards, as a result of which they were recalled to Japan in summer 1967. Since that time, members of the JCP have not been allowed to enter the PRC.

Beijing tried to put together various types of anti-party groups in Japan, which were used as an instrument of struggle against the JCP and subversive activity in mass organizations. The JCP had to mobilize its strength to resist Maoist intervention in the affairs of the Japanese communist and democratic movement. "The party," states "Fifty Years of the Japan Communist Party," a work published in Tokyo in 1972, "pointedly criticized the pretensions of the Mao Zedong-Zhou Enlai group to some kind of 'social-colonialism,' and the establishment of control over other parties and people, which lie at the basis of their intervention. It demonstrated that a firm position must be taken, excluding the possibility of great-power intervention, so that the Japanese people can independently lay their own course for the future."²⁶

The exposure of Beijing's pro-imperialist policy was given considerable attention at the 15th JCP Congress. The congress resolution stated that the "second half of the 1970's was marked by China's continuous intervention and subversive actions against other communist parties. Viewing the USSR as their chief enemy, the Beijing leaders have gone so far as to openly support aggressive military alliances, the leading force of which is American imperialism, and launched an aggressive war against a neighboring socialist country. Openly conducting a policy of 'social-imperialism,' they are trying to reverse the course of history and assist imperialism."²⁷

The communist parties of the Asian countries, including those once influenced by Beijing, are becoming increasingly aware of the ruinous effect of Maoist policy. They are resolutely opposing the intrigues of the Chinese rulers, aimed at splitting and undermining the international revolutionary movement and at creating a threat to world peace.

The events of recent years have conclusively proved that Maoism has not only been unable to take root anywhere outside of China, but is also losing more and more of its illusory appeal. It is revealing its groundlessness and appears unacceptable to the Asian people and the people of other continents, who have learned through experience that adherence to Maoism today is tantamount to serving the Beijing hegemonists, striking an alliance with imperialism and reaction, and advocating war.

"Under the conditions of more pronounced conflicts between the socialist and capitalist world systems, China's significance as a negative factor in international politics is increasing. The imperialist countries, especially the United States, are gambling more and more on the 'China card.' Beijing's partnership with the United States on a basis hostile to the USSR and other socialist countries, and their joint actions are seriously complicating the political situation in Asia and the rest of the world."²⁸

Outside China, the Maoists have only won the affection of pseudo-, and essentially, counterrevolutionary elements, imperialist circles and inveterate reactionaries, who find Beijing's anti-Sovietism appealing and are interested in the possibility of using the ruling Maoist group as a Trojan horse in the world revolutionary-liberation movement.

The international communist movement's predictions of the early 1960's regarding the possibility of the great-power, militaristic Chinese leadership's alliance with the most militant circles of imperialism is now becoming an established fact. The CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum assessed the current state of international affairs and made special mention of the Chinese leadership's alliance with aggressive Western circles. The plenum decree stresses: "Imperialism's partnership with Beijing hegemonism represents a new and dangerous phenomenon in world politics, dangerous to all mankind, including the American and Chinese people."²⁹

"Beijing is not only approving and supporting the intrigues of imperialist circles (primarily in the United States) to counteract the influence of the socialist states in various parts of the world and serving as the promoter and instigator of NATO's aggressive ambitions, but has also embarked on the path of aggression itself by starting a shameful war against the Vietnamese people. The Chinese expansionists are organizing provocative actions against Laos and Kampuchea, are conducting subversive activity against Afghanistan and constantly try to intervene in the affairs of other countries."³⁰

World events are constantly confirming the scientific depth and political wisdom of a statement made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 25th CPSU Congress: "It is no longer enough to merely say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They are overtly hostile to it."³¹

Launching a campaign against world socialism and the communist movement from an ultra-leftist position, allegedly in defense of "real Marxism-Leninism," the Maoist have become zealous preachers of anticommunism and the direct accomplices of imperialism and reaction. They once disgraced themselves with their pseudo-revolutionary slogans. Their rightist nationalist, pro-imperialist policy will also fail.

FOOTNOTES

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4. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 35, pp 343, 348.
5. B. M. Leybzon, "Melkoburzhuaznyy revolyutsionarizm" [Petty Bourgeois Revolutionism], Moscow, 1967, p 30.
6. "Ideyno-politicheskaya sushchnost' maoizma" [The Ideological and Political Essence of Maoism], Moscow, 1977, p 345.
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31. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskimi kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following the Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], vol 5, p 459.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA 1: Russian No 4, 1980 pp 143-154
(Article 1, K. V. Shevelev, candidate of historical sciences)

(Not translated by JPRS)

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COMMEMORATING THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF CAO GANG'S DEATH

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 155-163

(Article by A. S. Titov)

(Not translated by JPRS)

CSD: 1805

KURAHARA KORENITO--EXPERT ON RUSSIAN LITERATURE (A CHAPTER IN JAPANESE PUSHKIN STUDIES)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 164-171
[Article by A. I. Mamonov, candidate of philological sciences]

(Not translated by JPRS)

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EDGAR SNOW AND THE 'CHINA CARD'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 172-178

[Article by Ye. G. Pashchenko, candidate of historical sciences]

(Not translated by JPRS)

CSD: 1805

CONVERSATIONS ABOUT LU XING (FROM NOTES TAKEN IN THE 1930'S)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 179-187

(Article by V. N. Rogov)

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSD: 1805

BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF THE LEADER OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980, pp 188-190

(Review by Yu. N. Gavrilov of the book "Sukarno. Politicheskaya biografiya" (Sukarno. A Political Biography) by N. S. Kapites and N. P. Maletin, Moscow, Mysl', 1980, 332 pages, illustrated)

[Text] There are people in the history of each nation who seem to personify a whole era. They include outstanding ideologists and leaders of the Indonesian people's anticolonial liberation struggle, Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, whose political biography by N. S. Kapites and N. P. Maletin is the subject of this review. Representing an objective stage in the sociopolitical maturation of his country's population and the development of the Indonesian people's anti-imperialist struggle, Sukarno is also a typical political leader of the final stage in the anti-colonial struggle and the first decades of the independent political existence of the former colonial and dependent countries of Asia and Africa.

He is a typical leader primarily by virtue of the fact that he realized, after Sun Yat-sen and Gandhi and at the same time as Nehru, that colonialism could not be overthrown through individual efforts, even by the most outstanding individuals, and that foreign oppression could only be ended as a result of purposeful and organized struggle by the masses.

Sukarno came from the traditional political elite, but he took his place in the arena of political struggle when there was no longer any room for offspring of "noble families" in the traditional social structure that had been destroyed by the colonizers, and before there was any room for him in the new social relations of the colonial-capitalist type. Despite his social origins, Sukarno entered the ranks of the non-aristocratic intelligentsia. His biographers have performed a great service by describing the specific conditions of the formation of Sukarno's personality and by reconstructing the atmosphere in which he became a political activist. The authors are completely correct in noting the significance of the years Sukarno spent in the home of Chokroaminoto, the recognized leader of the anticolonial struggle of that time, who, as the authors write, "became an ideal for the young Sukarno, and his house became a kind of political university." In this house, Sukarno was able to meet outstanding Indonesian political leaders who were fighting for the political sovereignty of the country.

The process by which Sukarno's ideological views and political program took shape is described in detail in the book. The authors demonstrate that one of the decisive moments in the formation of Sukarno's ideological and political platform was the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which brought about a situation in which, as a result of the activities of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Internationale and of the first successes of socialist construction in the USSR, "the echo of the Internationale," as Sukarno put it, "reached Asia from Europe."

The authors describe the influence of the socialist revolution in Russia and the Leninist teachings that inspired this revolution on Sukarno, who later repeatedly remarked that "the anticolonial nature of the Soviet State's Leninist policy and the principle of national self-determination had a tremendous effect on the oppressed peoples." Sukarno wrote: "After the victory of the October Revolution in Russia, the struggle of the Asian people for national independence and against oppression by invaders flared up with new strength. This struggle became more organized, and its goal became clear and unequivocal--namely, independence, and soon."

The authors prove that Sukarno entered the history of the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle forever as the first activist in the Indonesian national liberation movement to realize that the cause of national unity would necessitate cooperation with the communists. Sukarno opposed "communisophobia" for all or almost all his life. In 1926 he drafted a statement that became the focal point of all his subsequent political activity. "We must proceed from the belief," he wrote in his article "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism," "that only unity will lead us to our goal, our dream--an independent Indonesia."

Sukarno was the first activist in the anticolonial struggle--and this is revealed in detail in the book--to realize the importance of Marxist-Leninist ideals to the liberation struggle of people oppressed by imperialism, the importance of real socialism as a factor changing the balance of power in the international arena in favor of democracy and national liberation. He decided that anti-imperialist nationalism could not triumph without some kind of alliance with triumphant socialism, without reliance on certain tenets of Marxism-Leninism and without the adoption of certain organizational elements. Sukarno's historic role was also determined by his declaration, after he became the nation's leader, of the principle of NASACOM as a major point of government ideology--the principle of cooperation by the three main currents in the struggle to win and consolidate state sovereignty: nationalism, forces fighting under the religious banner, and the communist movement.

Sukarno played an important part in the establishment and the anti-imperialist consolidation of the movement for non-alignment, which has become one of the influential forces of the present day.

In their discussion of the positive aspects of Sukarno's activity, his biographers have been able to avoid a onesided interpretation, and this gives their work great value. They justifiably point out the inconsistency and petty bourgeois illusions in Sukarno's views. Although Sukarno was one of the few activists in the anti-colonial struggle who realized that independence was not a goal in itself, that it was only a means of eliminating economic, cultural and technological underdevelopment and a condition for its elimination, he was unable to propose a realistic program of economic development and the improvement of the life of his people.

Sukarno's historical limitations are quite cogently demonstrated by M. S. Kapitsa and N. P. Maletin in their discussion of Sukarno's ideological and political failure to accomplish a qualitative transition from his position as leader of the anticolonial opposition to the position of the head of his country and state. After "acquiring the habit" of setting forth slogans and programs aimed at the destruction of the colonial system in the 1920's and 1930's, Sukarno continued to set forth slogans and programs aimed at destruction, and not at construction, after he became president. It is indicative that the words "down with" and "destroy" continue to dominate his political vocabulary, without giving way to appeals or, more importantly, realistic and sound programs for the development of individual branches and the national economy as a whole.

The balance of social and political forces in Indonesia and within its leadership is described well in the book. Progressive patriotic forces generally had enough strength to pass progressive laws and directives, but they encountered so much resistance each time that the laws were either never enforced or their enactment was postponed for many years. Sukarno was completely incapable of opposing the wave of corruption that swept through the nation and flooded the upper echelons of government. Under these conditions, the future of the country was particularly injured by the restriction of the democratic rights and freedoms of workers and the activities of the parties and organizations expressing their interests within the framework of the so-called "guided democracy." Taking advantage of the total dependence of political parties on the president's attitude toward them, the higher echelon of the Indonesian bureaucracy turned their positions in government into a source of personal wealth. Sukarno's "guided democracy" removed the bureaucracy from the control of democratic institutions and organizations and thereby gave birth to the forces that destroyed this system and deprived Sukarno of his status as political leader.

Kapitsa and Maletin conclusively prove that the so-called forces of the "new order," which began to rule the country after 1965, were actually a product of what they call the "old order," and that it was their fault that the nation's economy was in a state of stagnation under Sukarno.

Another great and important service performed by this new book is its contribution to the ideological and political struggle over Sukarno's legacy. First of all, it proves that Sukarno's role in Indonesian history and his ideological and political views has been interpreted incorrectly by bourgeois authors of various currents, and discusses their reasons for deliberately distorting his views on several issues. It is just as significant that M. S. Kapitsa and N. P. Maletin shed light on the actual role played by China's Maoist leaders in the tragedy the Indonesian people had to suffer in 1965-1967, the consequences of which are still present. The authors point out the fact that when Sukarno restricted the democratic rights and freedoms of his people, he was inspired by the example of China, where, as he said when he returned from Beijing in 1956, the people work like ants and do not demand anything for their labor. In subsequent years, China's Maoist leaders took every opportunity to play up to the first Indonesian president's ambition, making completely unfounded references to his alleged role as sole leader of the movement for non-alignment, and convincing Sukarno that his actions could change the world situation radically. During this process, while they were striving for their own hegemonic goals through the agency of Sukarno's

efforts, authority and prestige, they did everything within their power to start fights between Indonesia and its real friends.

Summarizing the events of this period of Sukarno's life, M. S. Kapitsa and N. P. Maletin correctly state: "The refusal to institute socioeconomic reforms and to purge the corrupt government bureaucracy logically led to the degeneration of Indonesian petty bourgeois democracy. The ruling elite, headed by Sukarno, became a restricted political group of individuals bound by personal ties, objectively impeded the development of the country and doomed it to stagnation" (p 241).

At the same time, the book relates how, after Sukarno's death, when his negative actions receded into the past, he regained his status as a figure of nationwide significance; what is more, each of the opposing sides in the Indonesian political arena has tried to turn his legacy to its own advantage. Sukarno's popularity, the authors state, is due to the fact that, from the beginning of his political activity to the end of the 1950's, he went further than any of the other first-generation leaders of the anticolonial liberation struggle in expressing the fundamental interests of the budding Indonesian nation, including its working strata and its emerging proletariat, and that he remained a symbol of state unity until the end of his life and did much to turn the members of the more than 100 ethnic groups inhabiting Indonesia into a single Indonesian community. Sukarno also entered the history of the Indonesian revolution because, as early as the mid-1920's, he already realized, more than any of his colleagues, the role and significance of the working class in political struggle and worked out a program which definitely considered the interests of the workers.

This is an original book in many respects. Although the authors based their research on the works of predecessors who elucidated various aspects of Indonesian ideology and politics, they present considerable new material that has never been analyzed by Soviet Orientologists.

The structure of the book is also masterful, depicting enough of the general political background, Indonesian and international, of Sukarno's development as a political fighter and his activities as president of the Republic of Indonesia.

Naturally, not all of the 40 years during which Sukarno was in the center of the political struggle in his country has been given equal coverage in the new book. For example, the pages describing Sukarno's activity during the years of Japanese occupation are not very convincing. The authors were also unable to thoroughly explain Sukarno's role in the "events of 30 September." However, the weak points of the book are few in number and are partially due to the fact that these periods in the history of the anticolonial liberation struggle in general, and in the history of Indonesia in particular, have not been analyzed sufficiently as yet.

On the whole, however, this new book will deservedly take its place among the political biographies and portraits of leaders of the anticolonial liberation struggle. It will make a valuable contribution to our knowledge of past and present political life in Indonesia and all of the former colonial and dependent countries.

**HONOGRAPH ON AN IMPORTANT IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CURRENT IN CHINA AT THE END OF
THE 19TH CENTURY**

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 190-193

[Review by Professor A. V. Meliksetov of the book "Dvizheniye za reformy v Kitaye
v kontse XIX veka" (The Movement for Reform in China at the End of the 19th Century)
by S. L. Tikhvinetskiy, 2d edition, supplemented, Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 360 pages]

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IMPERIALISM'S PLANS FOR SOUTH KOREA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 194-196

[Review by V. I. Andrianov of the book "Yuzhnaya Koreya--baza imperializma na Dal'nem Vostoke" (South Korea--Imperialism's Base in the Far East) by V. A. Marinov and A. V. Torkunov, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1979, 131 pages]

[Text] The Soviet Army's liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial oppression in August 1945 put the Korean people on the path to freedom and independence. In accordance with ally agreements, the territory of Korea was temporarily divided along the 38th parallel into two occupation zones--with the Soviet Army in the North and the American Army in the South--to receive the surrender of Japanese troops and aid in democratic reforms. The Soviet-American joint commission on Korea, made up of representatives of the allied command, was supposed to assist in the establishment of a unified Korean provisional democratic government. The United States disrupted the work of this commission, however, and promoted the creation of a separate state in the South. In May 1948, separate "elections" to the National Assembly were held in an atmosphere of terror in South Korea, and on 15 August 1948 the creation of the so-called Republic of Korea was announced in Seoul. This marked the beginning of Korea's split and of imperialist domination of the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

South Korea has been governed by puppet dictatorial regimes for more than three decades now--first by the police state of Syngman Rhee, and then, after 1961, by the military-bureaucratic regime of Pak Chung-hui. The assassination of Dictator Pak Chung-hui by his own men in October 1979 did not change, and could not have changed, conditions within the country or Korean foreign policy. The presidential office was occupied by Pak Chung-hui's closest assistant, former Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah. Foreign political correspondents agree that the decision to hange puppets was made in Washington because, as the NEW YORK TIMES reported, "his hard line in domestic policy, which was criticized more and more by Washington, began to create unrest and put two large centers of organized authority in the nation in a difficult position--the armed forces and the intelligence agency."¹

Imperialism's preoccupation with South Korea has been due to many factors: primarily, Korea's important strategic location, which has made the constant maintenance of a seat of cold war in the region possible, and its favorable conditions for economic expansion. In recent years it has become even more important to imperialist forces in connection with the "normalization" of U.S.-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese relations and the far from futile U.S. attempts to attach Beijing to the

Washington-Seoul-Tokyo military axis that was created long ago, although Beijing's hegemonistic ambitions are hostile to the interests of the Korean people. The subject of this review is an enquiry into these matters.

The strategic goal of U.S. policy in Asia, which consists in the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance here, is directly related to the U.S. efforts to strengthen the Seoul regime. Whereas during the period of the "policy of containment" South Korea was regarded as a U.S. bridgehead for "throwing back communism," since the beginning of the 1970's Seoul has been viewed primarily as a buffer zone and connecting link with the Japanese "defensive border" on the continent. This is the reason for the special system of Washington-Seoul-Tokyo interrelations and for the increasing American and Japanese assistance South Korea has received in the attainment of "military independence"--that is, in the further militarization of the country.

The military cooperation of the three sides takes the form of shipments of weapons and ammunition to Seoul for the "modernization" of its army and of coordinated interaction by their armed forces. For example, Korean-Japanese naval exercises were conducted in 1977, and massive American-Korean maneuvers were held in summer 1978 under the code name "Team Spirit." At the beginning of this year, the Seoul government offered its territory for maneuvers by subunits of the interventionist "rapid deployment force." Around 4,000 Marines, who, according to a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown, are to constitute the backbone of the "force," were transferred from Okinawa to South Korea.

As we know, during the campaign, U.S. President J. Carter promised to withdraw all American troops from South Korea within 5 years. A projected plan for the withdrawal of ground troops was even published. In 1979, however, Carter broke his campaign promise, and this indicated to some people even then that the Washington Administration was secretly preparing to redirect its foreign policy line toward the curtailment of detente. It is believed that the U.S. President's change in plans was also due to Beijing's negative stand on the reduction of the American military presence in this part of the world.²

The Beijing leadership's worries about the possible withdrawal of American ground troops from South Korea stemmed directly from the intensely anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese ruling clique and its decision to ally itself with imperialism for a struggle against world socialism. Although Beijing's true interests are no secret, China has not made its stand public because this would contradict its statements in "support" of the unification of Korea, which is now being impeded primarily by the American military presence in the South. According to Professor D. Zagoria, U.S. State Department adviser, in its attitude toward the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, "Beijing has displayed two approaches--public and private. The latter, which it cannot state openly, consists in supporting the presence of these troops in South Korea."³ This is also the view of another American expert--H. Hinton, who remarked that "Beijing is taking a cautious approach by not admitting openly that its interests in Korea coincide with the interests of the United States."⁴

The world public was presented with more evidence of the Beijing leaders' double-dealing when it learned about the results of U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown's visit to the PRC at the beginning of this year, during the course of which the

situation on the Korean peninsula was discussed. It became known that the U.S. line of more active military presence in this part of the world and of the perpetuation of the division of Korea won the full approval of the present Chinese leadership.⁵

In essence, the Chinese position, the authors conclude, "consists in the belief that the reduction of American presence in continental Asia will diminish Beijing's chances to provoke a conflict here between the USSR and the United States. In view of its provocation of the escalation of international tension in general, Beijing has no interest in detente on the Korean peninsula, which would be objectively promoted by the withdrawal of foreign troops from the region" (p 30).

Imperialism's plans for South Korea are aimed at economic goals as well as political objectives. The vast amounts of U.S. economic "aid" to the Seoul regime, which totaled around 2.3 billion dollars just between 1953 and 1961 (p 43), have established the necessary internal conditions for extensive penetration by monopolistic capital and for the involvement of this country in international capitalist division of labor on the basis of the so-called export strategy of development.

According to this strategy, accumulations from foreign trade, resulting from the priority development of export branches, should serve as a material basis for the establishment of a national economic complex. The technological revolution has forced monopolies to specialize production, and they have done this by separating production units in such a way that the labor-intensive but technologically simple types of work are organized where labor is cheap--that is, in the dependent countries. These monopolies not only guarantee themselves superprofits, but also have an opportunity to keep the export-oriented economy of the dependent countries within the sphere of their influence.

The Seoul regime provided foreign monopolies, especially American and Japanese firms, with the most favorable conditions by creating a suitable investment climate and passing draconian labor laws. Since 1971 the workers have not had the right to resort to any kind of collective action--from the negotiation of labor contracts to strikes, participation in which is punishable by 7 years in prison. The government has the right to dissolve any trade union that "poses a threat to security." The wages of the South Korean workers are among the lowest in the world, and only 13 percent of the workers earn more than the minimum subsistence figure established by the government, while 54 percent of the workers earn only half this amount. Women in South Korea are paid only 44 percent of a man's salary. The work week is at least 60 hours everywhere (pp 71, 72).

As for the privileges of foreign monopolies, they are allowed to import duty-free equipment and raw materials and are free to send all of their revenues out of the country. Enterprises built with the funds of foreign investors are completely exempt from taxes for the first 5 years, and from half of their taxes for the next 3 years.

The distribution of direct capital investments provides some idea of foreign capitalist expansion in the South Korean economy. In terms of total investments, the first place is held by the textile industry--the main export branch in the nation (36 percent of all exports in 1976), the electronics industry is in second place, and the tourist industry is in third place. They are followed by

metallurgy, chemicals and petrochemicals, automotive and transport equipment engineering and the machine tool industry. Therefore, foreign capital has taken over the "most promising export branches in South Korea" (p 67).

The exclusive development of export branches of industry has had, as should have been anticipated, the opposite results, however. Export revenues cannot be used for accumulation because they are almost totally spent. Expenditures on imports increase from year to year, and the import growth rate has stayed ahead of export growth. Whereas the deficit in the balance of trade amounted to 890 million dollars in 1972, it had already risen to 2.2 billion dollars by 1978. According to the authors' calculations, more than half of South Korea's imports since 1973 have been used to satisfy the needs of the export sector of the economy (p 63). Besides this, the stagnation in the branches producing substitutes for import goods, resulting from the priority development of export branches, has led to a situation in which growing demand in the domestic market has had to be satisfied with imports.

Currency also flows out of the country to pay the rising interest rates on foreign loans and credit. In 1974 these interest payments were equivalent to 500 million dollars, and in 1977 the figure was 1.4 billion. Increasing exports of revenues by foreign firms also contribute to the outflow of capital. Between 1967 and 1977, when direct capital investments in the South Korean economy totaled 712 million dollars, the profits taken out of the country totaled 173 million. South Korea is becoming more dependent on foreign capital. Whereas foreign capital entering South Korea totaled 6.3 billion dollars during the third five-year plan for economic development (1972-1976), ' will take at least 10 billion dollars to cover the expense of the current, fourth five-year plan (1977-1981).⁶

In the concluding sections of the book, the authors analyze the foreign policy activity of the Seoul authorities and the interrelations between the DPRK and South Korea. The authors stress that "rabid anticommunism and its consequences, aggression and adventurism, in foreign policy have always been characteristic of the regime.... Only the tactics have changed..." (p 111), and they list the four major fields of South Korean activity in the international arena. The first of these is the all-round reinforcement of relations with the United States on the basis of the military alliance stipulated in the 1953 treaty; what is more, the retention of American bases is regarded as the foundation of this alliance. The second is the development of relations with Japan in the economic sphere and in military and political matters. The third is the search for allies and partners on the basis of anticommunism, as well as the consolidation of ties with all reactionary regimes. The fourth is active opposition of the DPRK in the international arena, and a line of "encirclement and isolation" of the DPRK. These areas of Seoul's foreign policy activity stem from its fundamental line of perpetuating the division of Korea.

The DPRK's consistent efforts to relax tension on the Korean peninsula and achieve the peaceful democratic unification of the country without foreign intervention have been ignored by Seoul. This line, as set forth in specific proposals addressed to the South Korean authorities, consists in evicting American troops from South Korea, as they constitute the main source of tension and the chief obstacle to unification, and then reducing the number of northern and southern armed forces to 100,000 men; ceasing the augmentation of armed forces and stopping the arms race; curtailing imports of weapons and military equipment from abroad; declaring the American-South Korean treaty on mutual security invalid, as well as South Korea's

other agreements which are contrary to the interests of the Korean people; concluding a peace agreement between the North and South to replace the unreliable armistice.

In the beginning of 1980 the Korean Workers' Party and the DPRK Government issued another appeal for "the resumption of the interrupted dialog between the North and South. This appeal was set forth in letters sent to representatives of the South Korean government, political parties and public and religious organizations." These documents note that, despite the differences in the southern and northern social structures, the peaceful dialog begun in 1972 must be continued, to pave the way for the peaceful unification of the country by the Koreans themselves.

The South Korean authorities and their imperialist patrons, however, have consigned the joint North-South declaration, signed in 1972, to oblivion and have continued to intensify military preparations. In the beginning of January 1980, maneuvers by American troops, "Mad-Jacks-80," were commenced in South Korea near the military demarcation line with the DPRK. These maneuvers were justifiably described by RODONG SHINMUN as "an unacceptable aggressive act, posing a threat to peace in Korea, in Asia and throughout the world."⁸

The Korean people's struggle for peaceful democratic unification without any kind of outside intervention is also a struggle to free South Korea from its imperialist chains. It will help to eliminate an extremely dangerous military threat and will serve to safeguard the security of all Asian countries. And this struggle will end in victory.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 4 November 1979.
2. Ibid., 8 January 1979, 21 January 1979.
3. KOREA NEWSREVIEW, 5 August 1978, p 8.
4. "The Major Powers and Peace in Korea," Seoul, 1979, p 110.
5. PRAVDA, 10 January 1980.
6. ASIAN SURVEY, 1978, No 1, p 55; No 4, p 372.
7. RODONG SHINMUN, 13-15 January 1980.
8. Ibid., 8 January 1980.

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JAPANESE SOCIALISTS WRITE ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 197-198

[Review by G. D. Spektorov of the book "Sobieto-no tito jiti" (Local Administrative Bodies in the USSR), edited by Masahiro Sakanashi, Tokyo, Ariesu Shobo, 1979, 169 pages]

(Not translated by JPRS)

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BEIJING'S EXPANSIONISM ON MARITIME BORDERS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 199-200

[Review by G. A. Alekseyev of the book "Ekspansionizm Kitaya na more" (China's Expansionism on the Seas) by Ye. D. Stepanov, Moscow, 1980, 157 pages]

[Text] For more than 20 years the world public has been watching the nationalist leaders of China conduct an increasingly active great-power policy under the cover of slogans about struggle against the hegemonism of the "superpowers."

On the regional scale, Beijing's hegemonism began to take the form of the provocation of border conflicts as early as the second half of the 1950's. China's rapprochement with the United States and Japan in the 1970's has been used by Beijing for the considerable expansion of its sphere of hegemonic ambitions: Expansionism is now being manifested distinctly on maritime borders as well as boundaries on dry land. In this new book, Ye. D. Stepanov analyzes the forms and methods of China's great-power policy on sea borders.

The following four sections constitute the core of the work. Here the author thoroughly exposes the great-power and expansionist practices of China in the last 25 years. The author demonstrates that the nationalist wing of the PRC leadership never really abandoned the traditional hegemonic policy of Imperial China, although it naturally had to conceal its aims for some time. In the first years after the people's revolution of 1949, some statements by representatives of this wing, which were consistent with the general views of the new government, laid, so to speak, the first stones in the foundation of future claims to the territory of neighbors on land and sea. As an example of this kind of remark, the author correctly cites a statement made in August 1951 by PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai about the U.S.-British draft peace treaty with Japan and the conference in San Francisco. He said that islands in the South China Sea--the Xisha, Nansha, Zhongsha and Dongsha archipelagos--"have always been Chinese territory" (p 28). Later, as the author points out, the Chinese referred to this statement as universally accepted proof that these islands had "always" belonged to China. Zhou Enlai's statement contained no arguments to corroborate his claim. The absolutely peremptory nature of such opinions, affecting the interests of many countries, is a sign of great-power ambitions in itself and, coming from the Chinese nationalists, this is also a sign of possible overt expansionism. The author cites many examples to substantiate this interconnection between hegemonism and expansionism.

As we know, the nationalist wing in the CCP leadership was able to impose an adventurous domestic policy and a provocative foreign policy on the party and state at

the end of the 1950's. This was also the time when Beijing began to conduct a more active great-power, expansionist policy on land and sea borders. For example, in spring 1959, the Chinese side exacerbated the situation in the region of the Paracel Islands to the extreme. These islands had previously, according to the author's apt description, been "silently divided up" between the South Vietnamese administration and China (p 31). Fifteen years later, Beijing made use of its rapprochement with the United States to provoke an armed conflict on these islands in January 1974, and the entire island group was put under the control of the Chinese Army (p 38).

The author presents abundant factual material to prove that China's position on the ownership of the islands in the South China Sea did not change after Mao Zedong's death (p 48). This is attested to not only by the statements of representatives of the present Chinese leadership, but also by the claims "to the last bit of dry land in the South China Sea that has never been entered on any previous lists of territorial claims"--Scarborough Reef, or South Rock, which was claimed, "unofficially, for the time being," at the end of 1977 (p 50).

The author recognizes all of the complexity of the maritime borders in the South China Sea, which is a sphere of economic activity for many countries in this basin. He correctly notes, however, that any complexities can and should be overcome by the parties involved by peaceful means, during the course of businesslike and constructive negotiations. This is being impeded by the Chinese nationalists' attempts to assume the rights of sovereigns of the entire region and their unfounded claims to all of the islands in this sea (p 54).

The reader of this book will find information about the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, located in the East China Sea (pp 54-75). He will find new evidence of Beijing's great-power practices, which are no longer confined to relations with small and medium-sized countries. Now Beijing is using these tactics in dealing with Japan, one of the strongest powers of the capitalist world. There is one significant difference, however: China now believes that it is quite sufficient to clearly and, naturally, unequivocally define the problem and then postpone its resolution until a more favorable time.

"China's claims to the islands in the seas around it," the author accurately measures the scope of Beijing's expansionist plans, "are only the tip, the visible part, of the iceberg representing all of its claims on maritime borders" (p 76). After 1949, "sea boundaries" were delineated in an extremely peculiar way in China: They included all of the water between the continent and the outer edges of islands claimed, but not owned, by China. Carefully analyzing all of the terminological tricks and "subtleties" of the Chinese hegemonists, the author concludes: "It can therefore be said that the traditional depiction of China's sea boundaries in Chinese maps after 1949 does not meet the requirements of the international law of the sea and is nothing other than an act of 'cartographic aggression,' the object of which is not only, and perhaps not so much, the islands of the South China Sea as the open seas themselves" (p 81). As China builds up its strength, it will take advantage of the conflicts it provokes on the regional or global scale to carry out this part of its expansionist program as well.

The author's conclusion also deserves careful consideration because China intends to use any convenient excuse to encroach upon the rights of all countries using the

seas around China for shipping and all types of economic activity. This is attested to by a number of Beijing's actions in the past. In particular, the author cites the statement by the head of the Chinese delegation at a session of the UN Economic and Social Council in May 1976, who protested the work of an international hydrographic commission in the South China Sea. The author reveals the Chinese claims to the entire South China Sea that lie behind the verbal subtleties in the speech by the Chinese representative (pp 84-85). The author later cites facts which indicate that this also applies to the East China Sea (p 86).

Furthermore, as the author of this work demonstrates, Beijing's claims to sovereignty over the open seas were not the last word in the Chinese nationalists' expansionist intrigues on maritime borders. The latest word, the author believes, is China's present equally peremptory claim to exclusive rights to the entire continental shelf of the seas surrounding China. The author shows how these claims have gone beyond words. They are already taking the form of Chinese efforts to keep the countries in the basin of the Yellow, East China and South China seas from appropriating the resources of the continental shelf, at least without the knowledge and consent of China.

The author logically demonstrates that the Chinese leadership's position obviously contradicts the provisions of the 1958 Geneva convention on the continental shelf. "Beijing's line," the author writes, "is aimed at acquiring jurisdiction over zones to which China has no right, and it is therefore overtly expansionist" (p 107).

It is a well-known fact that Beijing likes to pass itself off as the defender of the rights and interests of the developing countries. But, in fact, many events in the last 20 years-plus have exposed the speculative nature of China's position on matters pertaining to the status of previously backward countries in today's world. What is more, since the beginning of the 1970's Beijing has been taking an increasingly distinct pro-imperialist approach and opposing the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Citing the proceedings of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea as an example, the author cogently exposes the greed of the Chinese side and its desire to support any "maximalist" proposals that meet the aims of its great-power policy on maritime borders (pp 120-140).

In conclusion, the author says that in its expansionist plans, "Beijing is looking first to Southeast Asia and is striving to seize convenient bridgeheads from which it can control the course of events throughout the region and threaten the countries located here" (p 151). The Beijing leadership's great-power expansionist policy is a source of serious conflicts, threatening the cause of peace and stability in Asia.

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FROM THE HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE CCP LEADERSHIP

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 200-202

[Review by V. V. Arunov and Professor M. P. Yur'yev of the book "Iz istorii bor'by i raskola v rukovodstve KPK, 1935-1936 gg." (From the History of the Struggle and Schism Within the CCP Leadership, 1935-1936) by A. S. Titov, Moscow, 1979, 152 pages]

[Text] Serious difficulties must be overcome before the true history of the revolutionary and, in particular, the communist movement in China can be reconstructed. This is largely due to the fact that the history of the CCP in Chinese publications is thoroughly distorted in favor of the cult of personality of Mao Zedong. Many issues and events are either described in an extremely tendentious manner or are simply ignored. Beginning with Mao Zedong's talks with American journalist E. Snow and the "Decisions on Some Aspects of the History of Our Party" (1945), the history of the Chinese Communist Party has been arbitrarily updated several times, and the description of various periods, problems and historical figures has changed in accordance with the current state of affairs. Now even some Chinese authors are admitting that the falsification of history is widespread, although they associate this phenomenon with the activities of Lin Biao and the "gang of four."

In the last 10-15 years, Soviet Sinologists have made a great effort to show how the revolutionary process actually developed in China. A prominent place among publications on this subject matter is occupied by A. S. Titov's articles about the exposure, within the historical context, of the nationalistic character of Mao Zedong's policy, important events in CCP history (for example, the conferences in Ningdu and Zunyi), the struggle to create and preserve the united front, and the lives and activities of prominent Chinese communists. Many of these articles have been published in our journal. One of the characteristic features of the majority of A. S. Titov's scientific works is the new and important historical information he presents, which sometimes gives the author an opportunity to interpret in a new way events that have already been analyzed.

These positive features are fully apparent in A. S. Titov's new book about the intraparty struggle within the CCP in the mid-1930's. The work centers around the complex events taking place in the CCP at the time of the Chinese Red Army's retreat from the Soviet regions in the Yangzi Valley, known as the Long March in the PRC. The author is primarily concerned with the fierce struggle that broke out between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao for power in the party and the army—a struggle which severely injured the cause of the Chinese revolution. But the contents of the book

cover a much longer period of time and a broader range of subject matter. They include a description of the events taking place in the operational region of the troops of the Chinese Red Army's fourth front, led by Zhang Guotao, before the retreat and their association with the troops of the first front, headed by Mao Zedong, and the history of the CCP troops' retreat under the pressure of the Kuomintang Army. The author paints a vivid picture of the general historical background of Mao Zedong's struggle for power in the army and the party, conveys the general atmosphere of those years and describes the interrelations between various CCP leaders.

One of the indisputable merits of the book is the author's use of a broad variety of reference sources and literary texts. In addition to the in-depth analysis of collections of documents and materials that are well known to specialists ("The Soviets in China" and "The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in National-Colonial Revolution; As Exemplified by the Chinese Experience"), there is a discussion of little-known sources (for example, "The Discussion of Li Linan's Line in the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee"). The author makes extensive use of the memoirs and other works of Wang Ming, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Guotao and Comintern workers Otto Braun and S. A. Dalin. The achievements of Soviet historians and works by bourgeois authors are taken into account. The author carefully analyzes information taken from various sources and subjects it to critical examination. As a result, Soviet Sinology has been enriched by a work that elucidates one of the "blank spaces" in CCP history.

The author's comparison of the views, roles and influence of Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong in the CCP up to the mid-1930's, when the struggle analyzed in the book began, is an unqualified success. He makes it clear that although one of them (Mao Zedong) committed rightist opportunist errors and the other (Zhang Guotao) committed errors of a leftist nature before the Communist Party defeat of 1927, they had much in common. Above all, this applies to their desire to "combine" Marxism-Leninism with nationalism and to use the communist movement for nationalistic purposes. "Therefore," A. S. Titov writes, "both Mao and Zhang were motivated by nationalistic considerations when they joined the budding communist movement in China and, as later events showed, essentially remained nationalists and were unable to take a real Marxist-Leninist stand" (p 7). After 1927, as the author points out, "Zhang Guotao and Mao Zedong exchanged roles: Zhang Guotao made a sharp turn to the right, and Mao Zedong turned to the left" (p 10). But they still had in common a contempt for theory, a misunderstanding of the essence of scientific socialism, the role of various classes in a revolution and the Leninist principles of party construction and methods of intraparty struggle, a lust for power and a reliance on cliques. This is clearly attested to by the practical activities of both men. Mao Zedong and his followers organized the torture of dissident party and military cadres in southwest Jiangxi (the Putian events at the end of 1930 and subsequent mass repression) and west Fujian (the struggle against "social democrats" and the "anti-Bolshevik alliance" in 1931). Zhang Guotao took similar actions in his struggle against so-called counterrevolutionaries in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet region in 1931. The two men took a virtually identical stand on the question of power. "Power is where the army is," said Mao. "The armed forces constitute 90 percent of the essence of power," declared Zhang Guotao (p 15).

The author presents interesting data on the soviet movement and the selfless struggle of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army against Kuomintang troops.

The abundant factual material about the state of affairs in the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Region is interesting. This is particularly important because historical literature, especially works of a general nature, concentrates on the central Soviet regions.

One of the great merits of this book is the author's discerning analysis of one of his main sources--the memoirs of Zhang Guotao. On the basis of concrete factual material, A. S. Titov proves that many of the statements and opinions in these memoirs have been deliberately distorted and are obviously far from the truth. This was no accident, as Zhang Guotao was carrying out the social orders of his new masters. As A. S. Titov correctly points out, the main purpose of Zhang Guotao's memoirs, which were written long after the author had withdrawn from the communist movement, was "to please certain circles in the West whose interests are served by the anticomunist, anti-Comintern and anti-Soviet tone of his memoirs" (p 144).

The conclusions the author draws as a result of his study are quite unequivocal. "The facts show," he writes, "that Mao Zedong won the unprincipled factional fight for power in the Chinese Red Army and the party not because he defended 'the more correct line,' as Maoist historians would have us believe. There were no fundamental differences between Mao Zedong and Zhang Guotao. Both of them followed the same line, committed similar errors and had the same lust for power in the CCP" (p 144). The struggle between Mao Zedong's and Zhang Guotao's groups, which split the CCP leadership in the mid-1930's and severely injured the revolutionary movement in China, was a reflection of certain weaknesses in the Chinese Communist Party of that time. They included the presence of subjectivist tendencies in the leadership and the excessive importance attached to military-administrative methods, which made it easier for "strong personalities" to advance and to fight for hegemony. The objective reasons for these weaknesses, as A. S. Titov correctly points out, "were the small size and insufficient maturity of the Chinese proletariat, the extremely strong influence of petty bourgeois elements in the CCP and insufficient contact with the international workers movement" (p 144).

Titov's book, which elucidates one of the least-studied periods in modern Chinese history, is contributing to the exposure of Maoist historical science and the speculative theories of bourgeois pro-Maoist authors. It will help in the further dissemination of the ideas of Soviet historians and in the more thorough study of CCP history by Marxist Sinologists.

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**SCIENCE SYMPOSIUM FOR THE CRITICISM AND EXPOSURE OF THE BEIJING LEADERSHIP'S
GREAT-POWER CHAUVINIST POLICY TOWARD THE MPR**

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1980 pp 203-204

[Article by R. M. Neronov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] A science symposium organized by the History Institute and Oriental Studies Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences for discussion of the "Criticism and Exposure of the Chinese Leaders' Great-Power Policy Toward the MPR" was held in Ulaanbaatar on 24 and 25 June 1980. It was attended by prominent Mongolian Sinologists, economists, historians, archaeologists, ethnographers, geographers, philosophers, jurists and philologists. The symposium was also attended by Soviet scholars.

The symposium opened with an introductory speech by President B. Shirendeb of the MPR Academy of Sciences, and the meetings were conducted by Vice President S. Bira. Sound reports were presented by Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Iejamts, deputy director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences, on the subject of the "Policy of the Beijing Leadership Toward the MPR as Part of Its Policy Toward World Socialism" and by Academician S. H. Natsagdorj, director of the History Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences on "The True Purpose of the Maoist Falsification of Mongolian History." Twelve other speeches and scientific reports were presented at the symposium. They conclusively proved that Chinese ruling circles are still conducting a great-power policy toward the MPR and toward the non-Han people inhabiting Inner Mongolia and other national regions in China.

A broad variety of problems in the history of Mongolian-Chinese relations were discussed at the symposium, the socioeconomic, political and ideological aspects of the present state of affairs in the MPR and PRC were analyzed, and the present policy of the Chinese leadership and its developmental tendencies were assessed scientifically from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint.

Speakers pointed out the abundance of works on Mongolian history now being published in China, including works about the Hsiunnu, Hsianbi, Turkic, Uighur and Kidani peoples. Just recently, the "Secret Tale of the Mongols," an outstanding old Mongolian literary text, was published in the PRC. The Chinese press regularly prints long articles about famous historical figures, particularly Genghis Khan. The Chinese have long been conducting archaeological studies along their border with the MPR. These works and articles have been published as "scientific" proof that the Mongols have always inhabited China's territory, that a

"single Chinese family of peoples" has existed since ancient times, that the Mongolian conquest of China was an "internal affair," that the non-Han people did not have their own culture and approached civilization only through the agency of Chinese culture, and so forth. Speakers at the symposium conclusively proved that these pseudo-scientific stories are contrary to historical fact.

Mongolian and Soviet historians have done much to expose Maoist falsifications. A joint Mongolian-Soviet historical and cultural expedition contributed to the study of the ancient Mongolian culture, and its findings helped to expose the unscientific theories of Maoist historians. Jointly published works--the third edition of "The History of the MPR," "The Civilization of the Nomads of Central Asia," "The History of Mongolian-Soviet Relations, 1917-1977" and others--contain abundant factual data that expose Maoist falsifications.

Speakers at the symposium also discussed modern history and international relations and their connection with the present day. It was noted, for example, that Mao Zedong and other nationalist leaders of the CCP had taken a negative stand on the question of Mongolian independence. As early as 1949-1960, under the conditions of constantly developing intergovernmental relations between the two countries, the Mao Zedong group in the CCP leadership repeatedly considered the annexation of the MPR behind the back of the Mongolian population and its government.

In the 1960's and 1970's, the Chinese leaders did not fulfill their obligations stemming from intergovernmental agreements and they still have not turned the treaty on the Mongolian-Chinese border over to the United Nations for its formal registration (the MPR Government had the treaty recorded unilaterally). At present, Beijing is intensifying its propaganda and political and scientific work directed against the MPR, and its anti-Sovietism and intrigues against the socialist countries are increasing.

Speeches and reports by Doctor of Economic Sciences K. H. Dasdonjob, director of the Economics Institute of the MPR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Ser-Odjawa, academic secretary of the History Institute, Candidate of Historical Sciences C. H. Dalai, academic secretary of the Oriental Studies Institute, Research Associates D. Sangidansan and T. S. Handsuren from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, Research Associate A. Damdinsuren from the Oriental Studies Institute and others contain in-depth analysis of Beijing's present economic, social and national policy and the latest information on archaeological digs. Soviet scholars, Doctor of Historical Sciences S. D. Dylykov and Candidate of Historical Sciences R. M. Neronov, presented reports on Sino-Mongolian border relations and on the modification of Beijing domestic policy within the national regions of the PRC.

Some of the interesting scientific reports were the speech by Corresponding Member of the MPR Academy of Sciences B. Gungadas on "The Cartographic Aggression of the Beijing Leadership Against the MPR" and the report by Corresponding Member of the MPR Academy of Sciences C. H. Zugder and Candidate of Philosophical Sciences T. Sodnomdargia on "The Maoists' Hostile Intrigues in the Buddhist Peace Movement." Speeches by philologists aroused interest: Corresponding Member of the MPR Academy of Sciences A. Lubaandendeb, director of the Institute of Language and Literature, reported on "The Oral Folk Epic 'Flame of Rage,'" Corresponding Member P. Harloo and Research Associate M. Zenee from the Oriental

Studies Institute reported on "The Depiction of the Mongolian People's Struggle Against the Manchurian Chinese Yoke in Oral Folk Tradition," and K. H. Sampildendeh, sector head from the Institute of Language and Literature, reported on "Criticism of the Chinese Great-Power, Chauvinist and Expansionist Policy in Contemporary Mongolian Literature."

When President B. Shirendeb of the MPR Academy of Sciences addressed the gathering, he stressed that Beijing is still trying to belittle the international prestige of the MPR and discredit, in the eyes of the developing countries, the Mongolian People's historic experience in making the transition to socialism without passing through the stage of capitalism. Mongolian history is being falsified flagrantly in China. This work is now being conducted in accordance with a detailed plan by several hundred scientific workers engaged in Mongolian and Chinese area studies. Beijing is claiming a leading role in centers of the world study of Mongolia and the Central Asian civilizations.

The president of the MPR Academy of Sciences called upon Mongolian scholars to work with Sinologists and experts on Mongolian affairs in the socialist countries and to investigate contemporary problems in history, economics, culture and other fields of science in depth for the refutation of Maoist falsifications and the exposure of Beijing's great-Han chauvinistic policy toward the MPR.

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IN MEMORY OF GERONTIY VALENTINOVICH YEFIMOV (1906-1980)

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